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Trust among individuals is essential for transactions.  A human or software agent 
in need of resources may reduce transaction risk by modeling the trustworthiness of 
potential partners.  Experience- and reputation-based trust models have unique 
advantages and disadvantages depending on environment factors, including availability 
of experience opportunities, trustee trustworthiness dynamics, reputation accuracy, and 
reputation cost.  This research identifies how trusters may utilize both experience- and 
reputation-based trust modeling to achieve more accurate decision-making tools than 
using either modeling technique alone.  The research produces: 1) the Adaptive Trust 
Modeling technique for combining experience- vs. reputation-based models to produce 
the most accurate aggregated model possible, 2) a quantitative analysis of the tradeoffs 
between experience- and reputation-based models to determine conditions under which 
each type of model is favorable, and 3) an Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm for 
assessing the value of trust information given acquisition costs.  Experiments show that 
Adaptive Trust Modeling yields an aggregate trust model more accurate than either 
experience- or reputation-based modeling alone, and Adaptive Cost Selection acquires 
the optimal combination of trust information, maximizing a truster’s transaction payoff 
while minimizing trust information costs.  These tools enable humans and software 
agents to make effective trust-based decisions given dynamic system conditions. 
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Trust among individuals is essential for transactions.  Often an individual does not 
have the resources—such as tangible goods, information, or services—to accomplish its 
goals alone.  In these cases, the individual may obtain needed resources through 
transactions with others.  In a transaction, two individuals make an (implicit or explicit) 
exchange agreement; however, the individuals are exposed to risk, since one or both of 
the transaction partners may fail to execute the transaction according to the exchange 
agreement [Fullam, et al., 2005a].  A partner’s failure to fulfill a transaction may be 
unintentional, for example, if the partner miscalculates its ability to meet the terms of the 
exchange agreement.  Alternatively, a partner may intentionally sabotage the transaction, 
perhaps for a monetary benefit or to harm a partner who is also a competitor. 
An individual in need of resources can reduce its risk by assessing the 
trustworthiness of potential transaction partners, conducting transactions with those 
partners most likely to fulfill agreements.  To select the most trustworthy partners, an 
individual must be able to both 1) model the trustworthiness of potential transaction 
partners, and 2) make trust-based decisions based on those models [Fullam, et al., 2005a].  
Trust models assist an individual in predicting the outcome of transactions, while trust-
based decision-making enables an individual to select the best transaction partners and 
avoid risky transactions. 
This research examines trust within the context of software agents.  Agents are 
proactive, autonomous pieces of software that sense, act, and interact (with humans or 
other agents) [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995].  Trust assessment in multi-agent systems 
is essential for agents operating on behalf of humans in numerous domains.  In e-
commerce environments, such as eBay [eBay, 2007] or Amazon Marketplace [Amazon, 
2007], agents acting on behalf of buyers must assess the trustworthiness of potential 
sellers to deliver purchased goods.  Agents seeking recommendations via online referral 
networks like Epinions [Epinions, 2007] or Bizrate [Bizrate, 2007] must verify the 
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accuracy of received referrals.  For agents operating in online social networks, such as 
MySpace [MySpace, 2007], Friendster [Friendster, 2007], or LinkedIn [LinkedIn, 2007], 
trust assessment is necessary for identifying fake profiles, isolating online predators, and 
verifying the accuracy of information exchanged among “friends.”  Further, the multi-
agent system paradigm provides a unique opportunity to simulate human interactions, 
providing direction for human decision-making in uncertain environments among 
potentially untrustworthy individuals. 
Agents may use several techniques for building models of the trustworthiness of 
other agents, including social, “soft security” techniques (such as experiences and 
reputations) and more traditional, “hard security” mechanisms (such as credentials and 
passwords) [Barber, et al., 2003]. Soft security techniques are derived from human 
methods for assessing trustworthiness of other humans.  In particular, this research 
addresses the relationship between two forms of social trust modeling: experience- and 
reputation-based trust modeling.  A brief overview of both modeling types is given here.  
Experience-based trust modeling [Barber and Kim, 2002; Jonker and Treur, 1999; 
Schillo, et al., 2000] occurs when an agent uses the outcomes of its previous interactions 
with a partner to estimate that partner’s future trustworthiness.  Experience-based trust 
modeling is advantageous when agents have opportunities for numerous, repeated 
interactions.  When the outcome of interactions are observable, transaction experiences 
provide an agent with trustworthiness feedback that is certain.  Unfortunately, conducting 
the initial transactions used to build an experience-based trust models exposes a truster to 
risk if the truster has no other trust information available before conducting the 
transactions [Barber, et al., 2003]. 
In reputation-based trust modeling [Shi, et al., 2005; Teacy, et al., 2005; Yu and 
Singh, 2002], an agent builds its trust model of a potential transaction partner by 
requesting trust information, or reputations, from third-party agents.  Adapted from the 
definition by Barber and Fullam, a reputation is a (not necessarily truthful) 
communication from one agent to another about the sender’s trust in a third subject-agent 
[Barber and Fullam, 2003].  Reputation exchange is useful for quickly identifying 
trustworthiness characteristics of other agents [Mui, et al., 2002].  In systems with few 
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opportunities for repeated transactions, rendering experience-based trust modeling 
infeasible, reputation exchange is an advantageous alternative.   
Further, reputation exchange limits the risk exposure problem by providing an 
agent with trust information before conducting a first transaction.  Agents entering a 
multi-agent system can quickly build trust models by requesting reputations from more 
knowledgeable agents.  However, reputation-based trust modeling requires that at least 
some agents in the system have conducted—and observed the outcomes of—transactions 
with the agent whose trustworthiness is being modeled.  Though an agent may assume its 
observations of transaction outcomes (the information used to build experience-based 
trust models) are certain, reputations (the information used to build reputation-based trust 
models) received from other agents introduce uncertainty, since reputation providers may 
be inaccurate or lying.  Therefore, an agent has the additional task of assessing the 
accuracy of reputations it receives and the trustworthiness of the agents providing them.   
Differences between experience- and reputation-based models mean each type of 
model conveys unique advantages and disadvantages.  This research introduces Adaptive 
Trust Modeling, a technique enabling trusting agents to dynamically combine both 
experience- and reputation-based models to make accurate trust-related decisions under 
varied system conditions.  Using Adaptive Trust Modeling, this research performs a 
quantitative analysis of the tradeoffs between experience- and reputation-based trust 
models, determining how environment factors (such as availability of experience 
opportunities, trustee trustworthiness dynamics, reputation accuracy, and reputation cost) 
influence which type of trust modeling is most useful.  Further, this research devotes 
significant effort to assessing the cost-benefit tradeoff of reputation-based trust modeling 
when reputation acquisition incurs a cost; Adaptive Cost Selection is introduced, by 
which a trusting agent selects reputations to purchase based on analysis of individual 
reputation utility. 
1.1  Problem 
Clues about how to combine experience- and reputation-based trust modeling 
techniques are derived by examining how humans form and use trust models.  Humans 
frequently, if informally, utilize trust information for decision-making.  Humans may 
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quickly identify the best type of trust modeling (experience-based vs reputation-based) 
for a situation, possibly combining both types.  Consider the examples in Table 1-1 
involving experience- and/or reputation-based trust modeling.  These examples identify 
the types of factors influencing whether experience- vs. reputation-based modeling is 
appropriate for a given scenario.   
 




A traveler who has never been to New York seeks out 
several hotel recommendations before booking a Manhattan 
room online. 
2 
An elderly woman continues to schedule medical 
appointments with her doctor of thirty, trouble-free years, 
despite hearing negative referrals about the doctor from her 
neighbors. 
3 
Upon being asked to attend a critical, one-on-one meeting 
with the company’s CEO, an employee queries coworkers 
for gossip about the CEO’s mood and pet peeves. 
4 
A couple celebrating their 25th wedding anniversary wants 
to revisit their honeymoon hotel in Paris; they research 
numerous travel reviews before booking, since they suspect 
the hotel’s quality may have changed since they visited last. 
5 
A young married couple decides not to seek the advice of a 
fee-only financial planner once they realize the planner’s 
hourly charges are large compared to the value of the 
couple’s financial portfolio. 
6 
A student, frustrated by the inaccuracy of daily weather 
forecasts on the morning news, stops watching the weather 
report, opting instead to base her outfit choices on how the 
weather appears from her window. 
7 
An investor’s garrulous brother-in-law repeatedly gives the 
wrong advice about which stocks to purchase; the investor 




From Table 1-1, several qualitative, intuitive guidelines for using experience- vs. 
reputation-based modeling emerge.  These guidelines are described in Table 1-2 by four 
environment factors that influence the choice of model type (experience- vs. reputation-
based): 1) availability of experience opportunities, 2) trustee trustworthiness dynamics, 3) 
reputation accuracy, and 4) reputation cost.  A truster should base trust decisions on 
experience-based models only when the truster has sufficient experience opportunities 
with the potential trustee.  Similarly, the truster cannot rely on experience-based models 
if the potential trustee’s behavior is too untrustworthy or dynamic for the truster to model 
using experiences.  On the other hand, the truster can rely on reputation-based models if 
the provided reputations are accurate and inexpensive.  Table 1-3 identifies the 
environment factor influencing the choice of model type for each of the examples 
introduced in Table 1-1. 
 
Table 1-2. Environment factors influencing choice of trust modeling type (experience- vs. reputation-
based), with conditions under which each type of modeling is favored. 
Environment Factor 
Influencing Choice of 
Model Type 
Use Experience-Based   
Trust Modeling 





Sufficient experience with 
potential trustee 




Trustee trustworthiness pattern 
changes infrequently 
Trustee trustworthiness pattern 
changes frequently 
Reputation Accuracy Reputations are        inaccurate 
Reputations are           
accurate 
Reputation Cost Reputations are          expensive 







Table 1-3. Examples in which humans make decisions regarding experience- vs. reputation-based 
trust modeling.  Each example is labeled with the environment factor influencing the human’s choice 




of Model Type 
1 
A traveler who has never been to New York seeks out 






An elderly woman continues to schedule medical 
appointments with her doctor of thirty, trouble-free years, 






Upon being asked to attend a critical, one-on-one meeting 
with the company’s CEO, an employee queries coworkers 





A couple celebrating their 25th wedding anniversary wants 
to revisit their honeymoon hotel in Paris; they research 
numerous travel reviews before booking, since they suspect 





A young married couple decides not to seek the advice of a 
fee-only financial planner once they realize the planner’s 
hourly charges are large compared to the value of the 
couple’s financial portfolio. 
Reputation Cost 
6 
A student, frustrated by the inaccuracy of daily weather 
forecasts on the morning news, stops watching the weather 
report, opting instead to base her outfit choices on how the 
weather appears from her window. 
Reputation         
Accuracy 
7 
An investor’s garrulous brother-in-law repeatedly gives the 
wrong advice about which stocks to purchase; the investor 
begins purchasing stocks according to the opposite of his 
brother-in-law’s advice. 




Despite the clues human behaviors give for determining when to use experience- 
vs. reputation-based modeling, humans often make mistakes when assessing 
trustworthiness.  Trust assessment mistakes may be caused by irrationality; for example, 
a customer may continue to trust a service-provider—long after recommendations have 
shown the service-provider to be a crook—because the customer refuses to acknowledge 
his previous poor decisions to trust the service-provider.  In addition, trust assessment 
mistakes may be related to human emotion, as is the case when an infatuated individual is 
taken advantage of by a lover who happens to be a con artist.  Trust assessment mistakes 
 7
may be due to poor association between current observations and previous experiences.  
For example, a wary store owner might deny service to a poorly-dressed customer 
because the owner expects the customer will shoplift (the store owner associates poor 
dressing habits with shoplifters).  Similarly, an unsuspecting homeowner may answer the 
door when an intruder knocks if the intruder dresses convincingly as a delivery person 
(the homeowner associates delivery uniforms with trustworthy individuals).  For humans, 
trust assessment is further complicated by social constraints; laws prevent individuals 
from discriminating based on race or ethnicity, and, in some circles, it is socially or 
ethically unacceptable to gain reputation information through gossip.  Human trusters 
benefit significantly from the Adaptive Trust Modeling technique presented in the 
research, an objective trust evaluation technique which weighs the utility of both 
experience- and reputation-based models to produce the most accurate trust assessment 
possible. 
Humans often also have difficulty gauging the value of trust information, 
investing too much or too little to build a trust model relative the magnitude of the 
decision at stake.  For example, a prospective vacationer may spend numerous hours 
scouring tourism review websites to determine the best hotel to patronize, though the 
value of the hours spent researching significantly outweighs the cost of the hotel room.  
Conversely, a consumer looking to purchase an automobile may purchase an attractive 
red convertible in a spur-of-the-moment decision before acquiring significant data about 
the vehicle’s reliability.  Adaptive Cost Selection enables trusters to objectively assess 
the value of trust information to determine how much trust information to acquire based 
on the magnitude of the transaction decision in question and the information’s expected 
benefit. 
Lastly, because the guidelines in Table 1-2 are vague (specific words causing 
ambiguity are italicized in Table 1-2), a truster has difficulty answering questions such 
as:  
• When is the availability of experience opportunities sufficient enough to rely on 
an experience-based model? 
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• How frequently may a trustee change its behavior pattern yet still be accurately 
modeled by experiences?   
• How accurate must provided reputations be to make reputation-based modeling 
advantageous?   
• At what point do reputations become too expensive to make reputation-based 
modeling feasible? 
The purpose of this research is to quantitatively identify the tradeoffs between 
experience- and reputation-based trust modeling by answering the questions above.  This 
research introduces the Adaptive Trust Modeling technique to identify under which 
circumstances (according to the factors in Table 1-2) experience- vs. reputation-based 
trust modeling is preferable, combining both models for greatest accuracy in trust-based 
decision-making.  In particular, assessing the value of trust information (including 
acceptable expense of reputations) is difficult; the connection must be established 
between the accuracy of one piece of trust information and the payoff from a truster’s 
resulting decision, based on the aggregation of all available trust information.  This 
research presents the Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm, which selects reputations to 
purchase, weighing the cost of each reputation against the resulting decision accuracy 
that reputation produces.   
1.2 Research Questions 
 
This research examines the following hypothesis:  
Experience- and reputation-based trust models can be integrated to yield an 
aggregate trust model more accurate and cost-effective than either single model. 
Experience-based and reputation-based trust modeling are each suited to different trusting 
scenarios, based on environment factors such as the availability of experience 
opportunities, trustee trustworthiness dynamics, accuracy of available reputation 
providers, and cost to acquire reputations.  In some multi-agent systems, a truster benefits 
from using both experience- and reputation-based models in assessing the trustworthiness 
of potential trustees.  Therefore, a truster must determine what type of trust 
information—whether from experiences or reputations—are best suited for given system 
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conditions.  If the truster decides that both types of trust information are useful, the 
truster must have a technique for combining the two trust model types, determining 
whether one model is more valuable than the other.  While other research emphasizes use 
of experience-based modeling only [Jonker and Treur, 1999; Schillo, et al., 2000], 
reputation-based modeling only [Shi, et al., 2005; Yolum and Singh, 2003], or static 
hybrids [Barber and Kim, 2002; Huynh, et al., 2004; Ramchurn, et al., 2004], this 
research introduces Adaptive Trust Modeling, a tool to dynamically determine the best 
combination of experience- and reputation-based trust modeling, identifying the best type 
of trust modeling for given system conditions.  In following with this goal, the research 
will seek to answer the following two research questions: 
RQ 1: How do characteristics of a truster’s environment affect the usefulness of 
the truster’s experience- and reputation-based models? 
RQ 2: How should a truster assess the value of trust information (specifically, 
reputations), in light of the cost of that information, to determine what trust 
information to acquire? 
The following subsections expand upon these research questions. 
1.2.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCING 
EXPERIENCE- AND REPUTATION-BASED MODELS 
Research Question 1 asks: How do characteristics of a truster’s environment 
affect the usefulness of the truster’s experience- and reputation-based models?  A 
truster’s environment can vary, affecting which type of trust model, experience- vs. 
reputation-based, is more advantageous.  A truster must know what combination of trust 
modeling techniques to exploit for given system conditions.  Toward the goal of 
identifying how environment factors influence the usefulness of a truster’s experience 
and reputation-based model, this research question yields two sub-questions: 
RQ 1.1: How do characteristics of a truster’s environment affect the usefulness of the 
truster’s experience-based models?   
Experience-based models have unique qualities that differentiate them from 
reputation-based models: experience-based models are built up over numerous 
interactions, and the data points (outcomes of those interactions) are usually observed by 
the truster with certainty.  Further, experience-based models require frequent additional 
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interactions experiences over time to identify changes in a trustee’s trustworthiness 
behavior.  Therefore, this research examines how the following environment factors 
impact the usefulness of a truster’s experience-based models: 
1) Availability of experience opportunities and 
2) Trustee trustworthiness dynamics. 
The availability of experience opportunities influences the accuracy and certainty 
of the truster’s experience-based model.  As a truster accumulates more experiences with 
a trustee, the truster develops a more accurate experience-based model of the trustee’s 
trustworthiness.  As a result, the truster’s reputation-based model may be favored early 
on, when the truster has observed no or few experiences.  However, as more observations 
are accumulated, the truster should increase its reliance on its experience-based model. 
The trustworthiness of a potential trustee influences a truster’s ability to build an 
experience-based trust model about that trustee.  First, if a trustee tends to be 
untrustworthy, the truster will be less likely to conduct transactions with the trustee.  
Therefore, the truster will take longer to accumulate transaction observations upon which 
to build its experience-based model.  As a result, the truster should utilize a reputation- 
over experience-based model.  Additionally, the truster may need to implement some 
form of “exploration,” occasionally risking an untrustworthy transaction to observe 
additional transactions, especially if the trustee may have changed its behavior to become 
more trustworthy.  On the contrary, when a trustee tends to be trustworthy, the truster 
should quickly accumulate transaction observations upon which to build an experience-
based model.  In this case, the experience-based model should more quickly overtake a 
reputation-based model in terms of accuracy. 
The frequency with which a trustee changes its level of trustworthiness, or 
behavior pattern, also influences the truster’s ability to build an experience-based trust 
model.  If the trustee changes its behavior pattern frequently and continuously, the truster 
will not accumulate enough transaction observations to build an experience-based model 
with accuracy.  In this case, the truster is more likely to rely on a reputation-based trust 
model.  However, if the trustee maintains a consistent behavior pattern, the truster will 
build an experience-based model with increasing certainty as additional transaction 
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observations are accumulated, thereby decreasing its reliance on reputation-based trust 
modeling. 
The purpose of this research question is to quantitatively assess the effects of 
environment factors (availability of experience opportunities and trustee trustworthiness 
dynamics) on the usefulness of a truster’s experience-based trust model.  This research 
question is addressed in Section 3.2. 
RQ 1.2: How do characteristics of a truster’s environment affect the usefulness of the 
truster’s reputation-based models?   
Reputation-based models have unique characteristics because reputations are 
communicated from third-party reputation providers.  The truster lacks certainty as to the 
accuracy of the reputations, since providers may be incompetent or may choose to lie.  
Further, the truster may have access to several potential reputation providers; the truster 
must choose how many reputations to acquire, which providers to utilize, and how to 
combine the acquired reputations to achieve the most accurate aggregation possible.  
Finally, acquisition of reputations may cost a truster in terms of purchase prices, time, 
and communication costs.  Therefore, this research examines how the following 
environment factors impact the usefulness of a truster’s reputation-based models: 
1) Reputation accuracy and 
2) Reputation cost. 
When reputations are accurate, they provide valuable predictions of transaction 
outcomes, and a truster will rely on its reputation-based model over its experience-based 
model.  More specifically, when reputations are more accurate, the truster must 
accumulate more transaction observations (build a more accurate experience-based 
model) before it will stop favoring its reputation-based model.  On the contrary, when 
reputations are inaccurate, only a few transaction observations are needed to build an 
experience-based model with accuracy exceeding that of the reputation-based model. 
The error consistency of reputations, in addition to accuracy, plays an important 
role in determining a truster’s reliance on its reputation-based model.  Reputations with 
highly-consistent error, though inaccurate, may still provide useful information to the 
truster.  The consistency of the reputation provider’s error gives the information receiver 
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a transformation by which to correct the information’s inaccuracy.  Therefore, inaccurate 
reputations with highly-consistent error may cause a truster to favor its reputation-based 
trust model, even though it has built up an accurate experience-based model. 
The availability of multiple reputations from many providers introduces a 
problem of combining reputations of varying accuracy into an aggregated reputation-
based model.  A truster must determine the number of reputations to consider and how to 
combine those reputations to achieve the most accurate aggregation possible.  Further, 
when the acquisition of each reputation incurs a cost, the truster must evaluate the 
tradeoff between that cost and the benefit of increased accuracy the reputation provides to 
the truster’s reputation-based model.  Since this cost-benefit evaluation of reputations is a 
difficult problem, it is addressed separately in Research Question 2. 
The purpose of this research question is to quantitatively assess the effects of 
environment factors (number and accuracy of available reputation providers, and cost to 
purchase reputations) on the usefulness of a truster’s reputation-based trust model.  This 
research question is addressed in Section 3.3. 
1.2.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: ASSESSING TRUST INFORMATION VALUE 
Research Question 2 asks: How should a truster assess the value of trust 
information (specifically, reputations), in light of the cost of that information, to 
determine what trust information to acquire?  It cannot always be assumed that trust 
information is free.  Instead, trust information, especially reputations, often incurs costs 
related to acquisition time and communication or fees charged by providers for 
specialized information.  For example, employment recruiters charge companies for 
providing qualified candidates.  Travel guidebooks, which discuss the reputations of 
tourism-related businesses such as hotels and restaurants, are sold for a price.  Even 
access to internet-based consumer product rating magazines requires a paid subscription, 
in many cases. 
The cost of acquiring reputations from providers influences the accuracy of a 
truster’s reputation-based model, and, therefore, the truster’s tendency to favor its 
reputation- over experience-based model.  When reputation costs are high, the truster is 
more likely to restrict the number of reputations it acquires.  As a result, the accuracy of 
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its reputation-based model may be low, and the truster may be more inclined to rely on its 
experience-based model.  On the contrary, when reputation costs are low, the truster is 
less likely to be restricted by reputation costs; the truster’s ability to acquire more 
reputations means the truster can achieve a reputation-based model of higher accuracy.  
Therefore, if the truster builds a highly-accurate reputation-based model because 
reputation costs are low, the truster may be more inclined to rely on its reputation- over 
experience-based model.  Further, if a truster knows the value of a reputation, the truster 
can determine the price it is willing to pay for that reputation (or which reputations it 
should purchase given a fixed reputation cost). 
Assessing the value of (or, the cost a truster should be willing to pay for) 
reputations is a difficult problem.  The truster must evaluate the contribution—in 
monetary terms—of reputations toward the truster’s payoff from a given transaction.  In 
addition, the value of a single reputation must be isolated from that of other reputations 
contributing to the truster’s decision.  Assessing reputation value is further complicated 
by the fact that specific transaction payoffs are dependent on trustee decisions, which the 
truster cannot control.  A reputation may correctly indicate the truster should trust 
(resulting in a positive payoff) in one case, or correctly indicate the truster should not 
trust (resulting in zero payoff) in another; though the reputation gives a correct 
assessment in both cases, the truster’s payoff in the two cases is very different. 
Though this research question focuses on valuating reputations in light of 
reputation cost, it should be noted that experience-based trust information has value, also.  
Though time to conduct the transaction and possible losses incurred while experiencing 
the transaction are considered part of a transaction’s cost, they can also be considered an 
investment in building up an experience-based model that remains useful beyond the 
single transaction.  Therefore, if the value of experience-based trust information can be 
assessed (in the same way the value of reputation-based trust information is assessed), the 
truster can determine the utility of intentionally investing time and risk to build an 
experience-based model. 
The purpose of this research question is to address the cost-benefit tradeoff of 
purchasing trust information—in particular, reputations—enabling a truster to select the 
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appropriate combination of reputations to purchase as a function of number of reputation 
providers, estimated accuracy of reputations, and estimated reward from acquiring them.  
This research question is addressed in Chapter 4. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The encapsulating purpose of the research is to identify how trusters may utilize 
both experience- and reputation-based trust modeling to achieve more accurate decision-
making tools than using either modeling technique alone.  Toward this goal, the research 
aims to achieve three concrete objectives:  
1) An Adaptive Trust Modeling technique for weighting experience- vs. reputation-
based models to produce the most accurate and cost-effective aggregated model 
possible, 
2) A quantitative analysis of the tradeoffs between experience- and reputation-based 
models to determine the conditions under which each type of model is favorable, 
and 
3) An Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm for assessing the value of trust information, 
enabling a truster to determine what information to acquire when cost is a factor. 
First the research provides a weighting technique called Adaptive Trust Modeling, 
based on error estimates of both experience- and reputation-based models, to integrate 
suggestions from each model about whether to trust.  Adaptive Trust Modeling also 
predicts the error (certainty) of the aggregate model.  Further, an extension of Adaptive 
Trust Modeling permits the aggregation of trust information from more than two sources, 
as in scenarios in which reputations from numerous reputation providers must be 
combined.  Weighting is dynamic, taking into consideration changing factors influencing 
the accuracy of each type of trust model, including 1) availability of experiences, 2) 
trustee trustworthiness dynamics, 3) number and accuracy of available reputation 
providers, and 4) cost to acquire reputations.   
Second, the research performs a quantitative investigation to identify how each of 
these four factors influences a truster’s tendency to rely on experience- vs. reputation-
based trust models.  The research identifies a theoretical relationship between the number 
of transactions a truster observes and the resulting accuracy of its experience-based trust 
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model.  Next, the research identifies how a potential trustee’s trustworthiness 
(trustworthy vs. untrustworthy) and dynamics in the trustee’s behavior affect the truster’s 
experience-based model (by influencing the availability of interactions the truster 
observes).  The research identifies a relationship between the accuracy of a reputation-
based model and its weighting, as compared to an experience-based model, as the 
experience-based model is built over time.  This research introduces a technique called 
Error-Sensitive Translation, which makes use of inaccurate reputations from providers 
with consistent error.   
Finally, the research introduces the Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm for 
valuating trust information.  When there is a cost to purchase reputations, the research 
theoretically assesses the tradeoff between the amount paid for reputations and resulting 
increase in profit resulting from better accuracy in trust-based decisions.  The research 
enables trusters to computationally maximize decision-making accuracy by utilizing both 
experiences and reputations. 
1.4 Contribution  
This research delivers 1) the Adaptive Trust Modeling tool for producing accurate 
aggregated trust models by weighting experiences and reputations, 2) a quantitative 
assessment of the conditions under which each type of model is favorable, and 3) the 
Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm for valuating trust information.  The implications of 
these research products are wide-reaching, both for agent and human trusters.   
Existing agent trust research limits an agent to experience-only [Jonker and Treur, 
1999; Schillo, et al., 2000], reputation-only [Huynh, et al., 2005; Yolum and Singh, 
2003], or static hybrid trust models (excluding “hard security” mechanisms, such as 
credentials, passwords, and encryption).  Few examples of static hybrids exist; work by 
Barber and Kim simply averages the results of both models, regardless of system 
variables [Barber and Kim, 2003], while work by Patel, et al., utilizes reputations only if 
no experience-based model exists [Patel, et al., 2005].  In each limiting case, a human 
designer must estimate the best type of trust modeling for the given multi-agent system, 
equipping agent trusters with the trust modeling capabilities the designer deems most 
suitable.  In some situations, the single best type of trust modeling may be unclear.  In 
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others, inflexible agent trusters are ill-equipped to model trust appropriately in the midst 
of changing system conditions based on availability of experience opportunities, trustee 
trustworthiness dynamics, reputation availability and accuracy, and reputation cost. 
In contrast, Adaptive Trust Modeling enables an agent truster to dynamically and 
automatically adapt its reliance on experience- or reputation-based trust as system 
conditions vary.  For example, agent trusters may initially rely on reputations in a large 
multi-agent system with few experience opportunities; however, as sub-communities 
form, in which more repeated experience opportunities are available, trusters may 
increase their dependence on experience-based trust modeling.  Similarly, an agent truster 
who relies on inexpensive reputations may instead place more weight on a tentative 
experience-based model if the cost of purchasing reputations increases dramatically.  
Adaptive Trust Modeling enables agent trusters to transition smoothly along the spectrum 
of experience- and reputation-based trust model usage by translating these system 
conditions into influencers of trust model accuracy. 
In many domains, humans perform their own trust-based decision-making, which 
is susceptible to irrationality and incorrect judgments about the correct combination of 
trust modeling techniques to use.  For example, a home improvement “do-it-yourselfer” 
may misjudge the level of project difficulty he can handle without guidance, often 
overestimating his level of experience while discounting the expertise of professionals.  
In online social networks such as MySpace and Friendster, teenagers may make unwise 
trusting decisions, risking personal safety to achieve popularity and large circles of 
“friends.”  Similarly, business professionals using networking sites like LinkedIn, in job 
search desperation, may be scammed by false job leads or, in a quest for reciprocal 
recommendations, risk promoting untrustworthy acquaintances.  In the Freecycle email 
group system [Freecycle, 2007], by which local members exchange free items, offerors 
may be frustrated by requesters who fail to pick up items as promised, and eventually 
develop smaller trusted subgroups with whom they exchange.  In each example, system 
conditions—such as availability of experience opportunities, trustee trustworthiness 
dynamics, and accuracy and cost of reputations—may change.  The social networks 
described here are best maneuvered using both reputation-based modeling (for 
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identifying strangers within the larger system of participants) and experience-based 
modeling (for maintaining personal contacts in sub-communities).  Adaptive Trust 
Modeling quantitatively computes the tradeoffs between experience- and reputation-
based modeling, automating trust assessment to take advantage of both modeling types 
for the human user or software agent. 
By quantitatively analyzing the system conditions under which experience- vs. 
reputation-based models are advantageous, this research provides human trusters with 
intuitive explanations for when each type of trust modeling, experience- and reputation-
based, is most appropriate.  The theory and experimental results clarify some common 
misconceptions, including: 
Misconception 1: Large systems (with many trusters/trustees) always make 
experience-based modeling ineffective.  In truth, experience-based modeling is 
effective as long as a truster has numerous, repeated opportunities to interact with 
each trustee it considers.  Experience-based modeling in large systems is 
perceived to be ineffective because trusters do not always conduct the large 
volume of interactions necessary to make experience-based modeling of each 
potential trustee effective in such scenarios.  However, trusters who conduct large 
numbers of transactions in large systems may find experience-based modeling 
useful; conversely, trusters who very rarely conduct any transactions, even in 
small systems, may have inaccurate experience-based models (see Section 3.2.1 
Availability of Transaction Observation Opportunities). 
Misconception 2: Infrequent transactions always make experience-based 
modeling ineffective.  In truth, experience-based modeling is effective as long as 
the frequency with which experience observations are accumulated sufficiently 
exceeds the frequency with which a trustee changes its trustworthiness behavior 
pattern.  Infrequent interactions still build an effective experience-based model 
when trustee behavior patterns change rarely or never.  Conversely, experience-
based trust modeling may be ineffective if a trustee changes its trustworthiness 
behavior pattern very frequently, even if the truster conducts frequent (yet not 
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sufficiently frequent) interactions with the trustee (see Section 3.2.3 Dynamic 
Trustee Trustworthiness). 
Misconception 3: Inaccurate reputation providers are never useful.  In truth, if a 
reputation provider produces reputations that, though inaccurate, have consistent 
error, the truster can perform transformations (determined by error magnitude) on 
those reputations to achieve useful information about a trustee (see Section 3.3.1.2 
Performing Error-Sensitive Translation: Overcoming Mean Errors).   
Misconception 4: A truster can rely on experience-based modeling for low-value 
transactions, but should always acquire reputations when considering high-value 
transactions.  This misconception arises from the idea that reputations are a more 
accurate supplement to a truster’s existing experience-based model, which is not 
always true.  In truth, though a truster’s experience-based model may be 
considered “free” and reputations may incur a cost, a truster’s decision to utilize 
experience vs. reputations must be based on the relative accuracy of both models, 
as well as the cost of reputations relative to the benefit of interacting with the 
trustee.  If the truster’s experience-based model is more accurate than the 
reputations it has access to, the truster should rely more on experience than on 
reputations.  If the benefit of the potential interaction is low relative to reputation 
cost, the truster may choose to rely on experience, or, if no experience-based 
model exists, on no model at all  (see Section 3.3.1 Reputation-Based Model 
Accuracy and Section 3.3.2 Reputation Cost).  
Misconception 5: A truster should always acquire only the single or few “best” 
reputations.  In truth, when reputations are free to acquire, a truster achieves the 
lowest predicted error by aggregating as many reputations as possible, weighting 
each according to estimated error (see Section 3.3.2 Reputation Cost).  
Misconception 6: A truster should always rely on reputation-based modeling 
when it has no experience with a trustee.  In truth, if reputations incur a 
prohibitive cost, a truster may be better off relying on no trust model at all.  If no 
trust information is available, the truster must decide whether the risk posed by 
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the transaction’s magnitude is worthwhile (see Section 4.1.5 Assessing Risk via 
AverageReward Functions). 
Analysis of experience- and reputation-encouraging system conditions improves 
strategic trust-related decision-making.  If a truster has control over building its 
experience- and reputation-based models, knowing the system conditions conducive to 
each type of model instructs the truster about which type of model to invest in building.  
For example, if a truster knows reputations are expensive or inaccurate, it might seek out 
more opportunities for experiences, knowing that each experience is an investment that 
provides useful trust information for future trust decisions.  Or, if that truster realizes 
experience opportunities are rare, it may put extra effort into seeking out additional 
reputations that are cheaper or more accurate.  Further, an individual who benefits from a 
specific type of trust modeling may seek out (or even influence) specific system 
conditions to encourage its preferred trust modeling technique.  For example, reputation 
brokers might search for niche markets for reputations by looking for systems in which 
numerous, repeated transactions are rare.  Those same brokers might reduce reputation 
costs or increase reputation accuracy, with the goal of increasing system-wide reputation-
based modeling.  Finally, if a truster requires a certain level of accuracy in its trust 
assessments, Adaptive Trust Modeling informs the truster of the quantity and cost of trust 
information required, motivating the truster to obtain the needed trust information. 
Finally, Adaptive Cost Selection enables a truster to assess the value of trust 
information.  By knowing the worth of a given piece of trust information, a truster can 
decide how much time, effort, and money it is willing to invest to acquire that 
information.  Further, Adaptive Cost Selection assists both reputation providers in setting 
reputation costs and trusters in negotiating reputation costs (when those costs are 
flexible). 
This research produces tools to aid both human and agent decision-makers in 
determining when to trust.  Adaptive Trust Modeling enables trusters to weight 
experience- and reputation-based models, yielding accurate and cost-effective aggregated 
models.  A quantitative analysis of the tradeoffs between experience- and reputation-
based models eliminates misconceptions about both model types and empowers agents to 
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make trust-related decisions to acquire the types of trust information they can utilize best.  
Adaptive Cost Selection assesses the value of trust information, enabling a truster to 
analyze the cost vs. benefit of acquiring trust information. 
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Chapter 2   
BACKGROUND 
 
Trust assessment has numerous applications to real-world domains, including 
business transactions [Yamagishi and Matsuda, 2003], e-commerce [eBay, 2007; 
Amazon, 2007], referral networks [Epinions, 2007; Bizrate, 2007], and online social 
networks [MySpace, 2007; Friendster, 2007; LinkedIn, 2007].  The large range of these 
potential applications justifies the value of trust models based on both experience and 
reputations.  The related work discussed in this chapter first presents common definitions 
of trust and representations for trust models (Section 2.1).  Second, the bases of human 
trusting are described as a foundation for agent-based trust technologies designed to both 
assist humans and operate alone in multi-agent systems (Section 2.2).  Next, recent 
research progress related to experience-and reputation-based trust modeling is outlined 
(Section 2.3).  Finally, the contributions of this research to the state of the art are 
delineated (Section 2.4).  
2.1 Defining Trust 
Definitions of the terms “trust” and “reputation” vary widely.  Jurca and Faltings 
describe reputation in general terms as “information about [an agent’s] past behavior” 
[Jurca and Faltings, 2002].  Barber and Kim, describing trust in information domains, 
closely link trust in an information provider (“confidence in the ability and intention of an 
information source to deliver correct information”) to the information provider’s 
reputation (“the amount of trust an information source has created for itself through 
interactions with other agents”) [Barber and Kim, 2003].  Others, such as Yu and Singh, 
identify trust with the perspective of a single agent, while reputation is considered a 
group opinion [Yu and Singh, 2002].  As defined by Sztompka, “trust is a bet on the 
future contingent actions of others” [Sztompka, 1999].  Further, from the definition given 
by Barber and Fullam, reputation is considered to be a truster agent’s subjective estimate 
of the trust a set of agents has in a trustee, denoted by ,
G
s ar , where s is the subject-agent 
(trustee) whose trust is being modeled, G is the set of agents whose trust in s is being 
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modeled, and a is the agent who is modeling the trust of G in s [Barber and Fullam, 
2003]. 
Trust may be considered to have numerous facets.  Falcone, et al., have proposed 
a method for evaluating trust from beliefs about several factors [Falcone, et al., 2002].  
Causal factors of trust in an agent may include the agent’s intent, or tendency toward 
honest behavior (in the negative sense, an agent’s tendency toward malice).  Examples of 
honest behavior include an agent providing information it believes to be truthful, or an 
agent attempting to follow through with an action it has agreed to perform.  An agent’s 
competence, or raw ability to accomplish a task, such as providing accurate information 
or performing a desired action, is another important factor.  According to Falcone, et al., 
trust can also be based on availability (an agent’s freedom from commitments which limit 
its ability to accomplish a task for a potential cooperative partner), promptness (the speed 
at which an agent responds to task requests by accomplishing the agreed upon task), or 
external factors (an agent’s susceptibility to uncontrollable factors affecting the agent’s 
ability to accomplish an agreed upon task).  Exposure to external factors may vary from 
agent to agent depending on the agent’s methods for completing the desired task, and so, 
in some cases, may be related to the agent’s competence [Falcone, et al., 2002].  Gefen 
emphasizes a distilled list of fewer trust facets, including competence, benevolence, and 
integrity [Gefen, 2002].  Barber et al. examine two facets: intent (honest vs. malicious) 
and competence (high vs. low).  They argue that, in many cases, knowing the reason for 
trustworthiness failure (malicious intent or incompetence) is immaterial to the truster, 
who may suffer the same consequence regardless of cause [Barber, et al., 2003]; Fullam 
and Barber use the term “reliability” to encapsulate both intent and competence aspects 
of trust [Fullam and Barber, 2004]. 
Trust may be transitive; in other words, if agent A trusts agent B, and agent B 
trusts agent C, then agent A will most likely trust C.  However, work by Gray, et al., 
Guha and Kumar, and Jøsang, et al., examining the propagation of trust in networks, has 
shown that trust is not completely transitive.  Rather, trust degrades as chains of inter-
agent relationships lengthen [Gray, et al., 2003; Guha and Kumar, 2004; Jøsang, et al., 
2003].  In addition, trust may be asymmetric; one agent’s trust in a second agent does not 
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ensure the second agent’s trust in the first agent [Hardin, 2002].  Further, trust may be 
multidimensional.  Gujral, et al., describe multi-dimensional trust, in which agents exhibit 
different levels of trustworthiness according to different metrics (quality of product 
delivered or timeliness of delivery, for example) [Gujral, et al., 2006].  Work by Griffiths 
includes the additional dimensions of success (likelihood of successful execution) and 
cost [Griffiths, 2005].  
This research relies on the definition of trust provided by Sztompka (“trust is a bet 
on the future contingent actions of others” [Sztompka, 1999]).  Further, this research 
adopts a definition of reputation adapted from Barber and Fullam: a reputation is a (not 
necessarily truthful) communication from one agent to another about the sender’s trust in 
a third subject-agent [Barber and Fullam, 2003].   
2.2 Trust in Human Societies 
It is valuable to begin a study of trust by examining trust among humans.  
Humans utilize trust often, if informally.  Therefore, observing successful trust in human 
social contexts provides indicators of suitable agent-based trust strategies.  Scrutinizing 
human error in trusting is equally as valuable, providing insight for agent-based tools 
robust to those human mistakes.  As a result this research yields both 1) tools for assisting 
human trusters and 2) successful navigation of trusting scenarios by software agents in 
multi-agent systems. 
Human exposure to trusting dynamics begins in infancy, when babies learn to rely 
on parents for basic needs [Weigert, 1962].  Experiments by Ainsworth demonstrate that 
a child’s tendency to trust is directly correlated to the sensitivity of his caregiver toward 
accommodating those needs [Ainsworth, 1979].  A child raised in a nurturing, even 
sheltered environment may later approach new situations with naïve super-trusting, while 
a child whose upbringing is plagued by abuse may develop habits of extreme distrust 
[Worchel and Austin, 1986], even to the point of abnormalities such as Reactive 
Attachment Disorder [Hanson and Spratt, 2000].  Research has even detected a biological 
link between hormone levels and an individual’s inclination to trust [Kirsch, et al., 2005]. 
According to Wrightsman’s Philosophies of Human Nature Scale, humans base 
decisions to trust on assumptions about others in relation to several factors, including 
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altruism, trustworthiness, and rationality [Wrightsman, 1974], perhaps related to a greater 
instilled worldview.  Work by Rotter demonstrates that humans develop expectations, 
based on interactions in numerous relationships, which provide the basis for inferences 
about future interactions with unknown individuals [Rotter, 1954].  From this 
perspective, trust may be said to be association-based.  Trivers shows how reciprocal 
altruism develops among humans—and animals—as a means of self-preservation; by two 
individuals relying on each other, the chances of survival for each increases [Trivers, 
1971].  Further, Bennis argues that two individuals will tentatively expose themselves to 
small amounts of risk; if an exposure is met by the other’s acceptance, exchange 
continues and trust is built up over time [Bennis, et al., 1964].  This type of mutual 
exchange trust-building is a form of experience-based trust modeling (discussed in 
Section 2.3.1), in which a truster builds its estimate of a trustee’s trustworthiness 
characteristics based on numerous, repeated interactions. 
 In one-on-one relationships, humans often have “signs” which provide clues 
about the trustworthiness of a potential trustee.  Bacharach and Gambetta name these 
observable properties manifesta, indications of unobservable trustworthiness properties 
called krypta [Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001].  According to their work, untrustworthy 
individuals mislead trusters by imitating the manifesta of a truly trustworthy individual.  
Using the example of taxi drivers, who make numerous trust decisions every day 
regarding strangers, Gambetta and Hamill explain that drivers look for reliable signs that 
are difficult for criminals to fake (related to appearance, location, etc.) when selecting cab 
hailers [Gambetta and Hamill, 2005].   
 Humans also use reputation information from third parties when making trust 
decisions, communicating reputations either one-to-one or by broadcast.  According to 
Nicholson, humans use gossip (a form of one-to-one reputation exchange) for 
networking, influence, and social alliances [Nicholson, 2001].  One-to-one reputation 
exchange permits reputation providers to communicate different reputations to different 
reputation receivers, creating unique opportunities for deception.  Humans utilize 
broadcast reputations in online applications, such as eBay, Amazon, and Epinions, where 
reputation information is posted publicly for all users.  Applications such as Yahoo 
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Groups [Yahoo, 2007] employ both types of reputation acquisition; reputation providers 
may respond to reputation requests either publicly to the entire group or privately to the 
requester. 
 The downside of human trust-based decision-making is human tendencies toward 
making mistakes in trustworthiness assessment.  Humans may be inclined to continue 
trusting an untrustworthy individual for several reasons.  Weber and Carter describe the 
pressure to trust based on “social structure” [Weber and Carter, 2003]; for example, a 
mother will continue to lend money to her irresponsible adult son “because he’s family.”  
Similarly, an infatuated teenager will remain faithful to a cheating lover, simply because 
of emotional attachment.  Upon receiving new evidence about a trustee’s cheating 
tendencies (perhaps through recommendations from friends), a truster may respond with 
denial.  Gardenfors addresses the need for individuals to revise beliefs since “people 
accept as certain things that really aren’t because of prejudice, faulty inferences, or 
trusting too many authorities” [Gardenfors, 1988].  Further, trusters are susceptible to 
miscorrelating observations (manifesta) and resulting inferences about trustworthiness 
characteristics (krypta) [Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001], as when a taxi driver refuses an 
innocent hailer because of the hailer’s questionable appearance.  Individuals in online 
social networks such as MySpace may disregard commonsense precautions in a quest for 
increased popularity, exposing themselves to criminals [Apuzzo, 2006].  The Adaptive 
Trust Modeling and Adaptive Cost Selection techniques proposed by this research aid 
both human and software agent trusters in avoiding these trust-based decision-making 
errors. 
2.3 Modeling Trustworthiness 
Agents—whether human or software—must model both the worth and risk of 
interacting with other agents in order to evaluate whether to cooperate and ultimately to 
provide a decision basis for whom to trust [Marsh, 1992].  Trust models serve as decision 
criteria for whether to cooperate with the agent whose trust is being modeled.  As 
summarized from Fullam et al., a truster’s models of trustee trustworthiness should have 
several characteristics [Fullam, et al., 2005a].  First, trust models must be accurate 
predictors of the trustee’s future behavior [Fullam, 2003; Klos and LaPoutre, 2004; 
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Whitby, et al., 2004].  Second, trust models must be adaptive, changing to accommodate 
dynamic trustworthiness characteristics of trustees who might suddenly lose competence 
or maliciously employ strategies to vary trustworthiness [Fullam and Barber, 2005].  In 
addition, trust modeling algorithms must quickly create usable new models when 
unknown agents enter the system. Quick trust model bootstrapping is necessary to thwart 
trustees attempting to change identities by repeatedly entering and leaving a system, and 
can be assessed by the time to converge to sufficiently accurate models [Ding, et al., 
2004].  
A truster must effectively translate its trust models to make decisions and take 
actions.  Given a potential transaction (with implicit or explicit agreement or terms), a 
truster must correctly decide whether to participate in the agreement, predicting whether 
the agreement will be fulfilled by the trustee [Falcone, et al., 2004; Schillo, et al., 2000].  
Further, a truster must estimate the utility of an interaction, or degree to which the 
agreement will be fulfilled, to better negotiate terms of the agreement, such as 
appropriate payment [Neville and Pitt, 2004].  Finally, trusters must identify—and 
collectively isolate—untrustworthy trustees by refusing to interact with them [Barber and 
Kim, 2002; Biswas, et al., 1999]. 
Agents can perform trust assessment via traditional security techniques (such as 
credentials or passwords) or “soft security” methods (social trust modeling techniques 
based on past experiences or reputations provided by other agents) [Artz and Gil, 2007].  
Section 2.3.1 discusses the advantages of soft security techniques over traditional security 
techniques, while Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3 explain experience-based trust 
modeling and reputation-based trust modeling, respectively.  This section demonstrates 
that both experience- and reputation-based modeling techniques have strengths and 
weaknesses, motivating this research to deliver techniques for combining both modeling 
types to yield robust, aggregate trust models. 
2.3.1 TRADITIONAL SECURITY TECHNIQUES VS. “SOFT SECURITY” 
Traditional security methods (dubbed “hard security” by Rasmusson and Jansson 
[Rasmusson and Jansson, 1996]) include techniques such as credentials, passwords, 
firewalls, and encryption.  Bacharach and Gambetta, discussing trust based on 
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appearances, present the weaknesses of human use of informal credentials in social 
interaction [Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001].  Often humans trust based on the 
appearance of a potential trustee (“The man looks like a policeman, so he must be a 
policeman”).  However, appearance-based trust is often unreliable, since appearances 
may be falsified, and may be hard to obtain if visual contact cannot be established.   
Hard security techniques in software applications are designed to serve as 
barriers, preventing untrustworthy entities from entering systems or accessing 
information.  Hard security mechanisms are relatively easy to establish: commercial 
software and hardware are readily available for building firewall and password-protected 
fences around sensitive information and networks.  However, while hard security 
techniques are widely used, and successful in many cases, for applications such as 
personal computer protection and e-mail access restriction, they provide an “all-or-
nothing” approach.  Hard security techniques are unable to protect against untrusted 
entities that break through the hard security mechanism, for example, by producing a 
false credential, circumventing a password, bypassing a firewall, or breaking encryption 
[Barber and Kim, 2003].   
Wong and Sycara utilize credentials in the Retsina model, enabling agents to 
prove their identities by ensuring agents are uniquely identifiable and bound to a human 
with a public key certificate [Wong and Sycara, 2000].  Poggi, et al., present certificate-
based permissions protocols for the JADE platform [Poggi, et al., 2003].  Work in 
biometrics has produce technology for hard-to-falsify personal credentials for humans 
[Bechelli, et al., 2002; Wilson, 2002], and “passive trust” credential protocols enable 
quick identity determination at low cost [Ghanea-Hercock, 2004].  However, these 
credential-based trust mechanisms require the presence of a trusted third party to verify 
the authenticity of credentials. Further, credential techniques may insist that agents reveal 
private information to verify identities [Yu and Winslett, 2003].   
In contrast, “soft security” [Rasmusson and Jansson, 1996] implements 
trustworthiness assessment, based on social interactions among entities in a system, via 
behavior modeling of potential trustees.  Soft security trust evaluation is useful either as a 
layer of protection secondary to hard security measures or as a stand-alone technique 
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when hard security measures are not available or are deemed too restrictive.  This 
research relies on two prominent methods for soft security trustworthiness evaluation: 
experience-based trust modeling (Section 2.3.2) and reputation-based trust modeling 
(Section 2.3.3). 
2.3.2 EXPERIENCE-BASED TRUST MODELING 
Experience-based trust modeling occurs when a truster uses the outcomes of its 
previous transactions with a trustee to estimate that trustee’s future trustworthiness.  
Experience-based trust modeling is advantageous when agents have opportunities for 
numerous, repeated interactions.  When the outcome of interactions are observable, 
transaction experiences provide a truster with trustworthiness feedback that is certain.  
Unfortunately, basing trust on transaction experiences means risk exposure is 
unavoidable; transactions based on little trust information must take place to evaluate a 
trustee’s trustworthiness characteristics [Barber, et al., 2003].  Therefore, in systems with 
high likelihoods of trustee cheating, trusters should avoid experiences for initial trust 
model-building. 
Numerous algorithms exist for maintaining trust models based on experiences 
with trustees.  For example, Jonker and Treur propose both qualitative and quantitative 
trust metrics, which credit a trustee when a transaction produces a positive outcome, and 
discredit the trustee when a negative outcome is produced [Jonker and Treur, 1999].  
Barber and Kim build experience-based trust models of information sources by 
computing a “dissimilarity measure” to determine the amount of incorrect information 
from a source [Barber and Kim, 2003].  Schillo, et al. use trust as an estimate of an 
agent’s honesty, which is measured as the ratio of positive interactions to total 
interactions, to measure system performance in terms of isolation of deceptive agents 
[Schillo, et al., 2000] in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game [Axelrod, 1984].  For 
Biswas et al., success is measured by the ability of the system to prevent manipulation of 
probabilistic reciprocity strategy by deceptive agents [Biswas, et al., 1999]. 
When no other trust information is available, experience-based models must 
assume some initial default trust assessment which, when inaccurate, can result in unfair 
losses to the truster (when initial trust assessment is too optimistic) or unfair losses to the 
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trustee (when initial trust assessment is too pessimistic) [Dellarocas, 2000].  The truster 
can minimize risk exposure by conducting low-value transactions until an accurate 
experience-based model has been built.  Risk exposure in information transactions can be 
circumvented by subjecting trustees to a preliminary test period, during which the use of 
knowledge acquired through direct interaction is deferred, until the base reputation is 
stabilized.  However, the truster still loses any payments made to obtain information 
during the test period.  Experience-based trust modeling also requires time and 
computational overhead over numerous, repeated transactions.  This research introduces 
Adaptive Trust Modeling, which dynamically supplements experience-based trust models 
by incorporating reputation-based trust modeling when appropriate. 
2.3.3 REPUTATION-BASED TRUST MODELING 
Resnick observes that “…the assumption that what we know is a direct reflection 
of what we have perceived in the physical world has largely disappeared….People also 
build their knowledge structures on the basis of what they are told by others, orally, in 
writing, in pictures, and in gestures,” [Resnick, 1991].  Not only can an agent obtain 
information by experiences, but, just as humans do, the agent can also utilize the 
experiences of others as a source of trust information.  In reputation-based trust 
modeling, the truster learns trust information about the trustee by asking other agents in 
the system about their interactions with the trustee [Sen and Sajja, 2002; Shi, et al., 
2005].  Reputation exchange is useful for quickly learning trustworthiness characteristics 
of potential trustees [Yu and Singh, 2002].  In systems with large populations and too few 
interaction opportunities, when experience-based trust modeling is infeasible, reputation 
exchange is advantageous.  Reputation-based modeling reduces a truster’s risk exposure; 
a truster risks only the price (if any) of reputations it purchases to build its reputation-
based model, rather than the value of resources exchanged in an interaction to build its 
experience-based model.  Agents entering a multi-agent system quickly can build trust 
models by requesting reputations from more knowledgeable agents.  Reputation-based 
modeling serves as a catalyst in environments in which trusters would otherwise never 
risk transacting, as in online (e.g. eBay) purchases between buyers and sellers who are 
separated by geographic distance [Resnick, et al., 2000]. 
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Reputation-based trust modeling allows the truster to form a trust model of the 
trustee without being exposed to the risk of uninformed experiences.  However, the 
truster is still at risk when it decides to act on or believe the information it receives from 
others.  In addition, the system must contain a base of trusted reputation providers if the 
truster is to form a stable model.  Though a truster may assume its observations of 
transaction outcomes (the information used to build experience-based trust models) are 
certain, reputations (the information used to build reputation-based trust models) received 
from other agents introduce uncertainty, since reputation providers may be inaccurate or 
lying.  Therefore, a truster has the additional task of assessing the accuracy of reputations 
it receives and the trustworthiness of the agents providing them.  Barber and Kim assess 
the trustworthiness of recommenders in the same way that they assess the trustworthiness 
of trustees [Barber and Kim, 2002].  Jurca and Faltings attempt to improve the 
trustworthiness of the recommender base by providing incentives for recommenders to 
tell the truth [Jurca and Faltings, 2002; Jurca and Faltings, 2006], while Fan, et al., 
improve existing online reputation mechanisms by increasing the influence of more 
recent reputations [Fan, et al., 2005].  Reputation-based trust modeling still has difficulty 
in building initial trust models when the truster is new to the system (and therefore does 
not know which reputation providers can be trusted) or when the trustee is new to the 
system (and no reputation providers have formed opinions yet).  In other words, some 
interaction must take place for reputation-based trust models to be built.  Nevertheless, 
this form of agent “gossip” is valuable because it provides a cheap, low-risk form of 
communicating knowledge.   
Several researchers have developed concepts to address the problem of initial 
trust assignments during the period before experiences or reputation information can be 
obtained.  Bacharach explains that a truster can believe characteristics displayed by a 
trustee to the degree that those characteristics are difficult to duplicate by an impostor 
[Bacharach, 2002].  Based on this theory, an agent can trust another if it believes the 
descriptive meta-information the trustee agent displays is authentic.  Determining how 
meta-information is structured and communicated, as well as how an agent models 
difficulty of impersonation, must be addressed.  Halberstadt and Mui suggest 
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classification by group membership and reputation assignment based on associated group 
reputations, but the implications of group prejudice on an individual agent must be 
examined [Halberstadt and Mui, 2001].  Dellarocas argues that a truster’s risk from 
arbitrary assignment is minimized if trustees are motivated by punishment to tell the truth 
[Dellarocas, 2002].  This research addresses the problem of uncertainty in reputation-
based trust models.  While existing research assumes reputation providers are truthful 
[Klos and LaPoutre, 2004; Jurca and Faltings, 2006], this research proposes techniques 
for identifying the best reputation providers, even when provided reputations may be 
inaccurate. 
2.4 Beyond the State of the Art: Adaptive Trust Modeling 
This research presents several advances to the current state of the art.  These 
contributions are outlined according to the research questions presented in Section 1.2. 
2.4.1 RQ 1: ADAPTIVE TRUST MODELING 
Research Question 1 asks: How do characteristics of a truster’s environment 
affect the usefulness of the truster’s experience- and reputation-based models?  The 
contributions of Research Question 1 are 1) an Adaptive Trust Modeling technique for 
weighting experience- vs. reputation-based models to produce the most accurate and cost-
effective aggregated model possible, and 2) a quantitative analysis of the tradeoffs 
between experience- and reputation-based models to determine the conditions under 
which each type of model is favorable. 
Researchers have developed successful algorithms for either experience- [Jonker 
and Treur, 1999; Schillo, et al., 2000] or reputation-based [Shi, et al., 2005; Teacy, et al., 
2005] trust modeling, assuming system conditions are conducive to either only 
experience-based (numerous repeated transactions) or only reputation-based (one-time 
transactions) approaches.  However, each modeling type has strengths and weaknesses.   
Several environments can be considered “hybrids,” in which both experience- and 
reputation-based trust modeling techniques are useful tools depending on changing 
system conditions.  For example, online social networks make use of both experiences 
and reputations when participants seek out new friends via reputations, then decide 
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whether to keep friends based on interactions over time.  Ramchurn, et al., acknowledge 
that a truster’s perspective on a trustee should be based on both reputations and the 
truster’s “confidence” in the trustee (based on past interactions), but methods for 
determining the relative weights of reputation and confidence are not discussed 
[Ramchurn, et al., 2004].  Huynh, et al., combine trust information from four types of 
models (“interaction trust,” “role-based trust,” “witness reputation,” and “certified 
reputation”) but require “end users” to manually set the relative weights of each model 
type according to perceived system conditions [Huynh, et al., 2004]. 
Barber and Kim compare experience- vs. reputation-based trust modeling, 
confirming the intuitive notions that experience is effective over long term interaction 
histories, but reputations give an accurate picture more quickly, assuming reputation 
providers are accurate [Barber and Kim, 2003].  Adaptive Trust Modeling improves upon 
Barber and Kim’s work by considering the accuracy of provided reputations and 
trustworthiness characteristics of trustees, important factors influencing the effectiveness 
of both experience- and reputation-based trust modeling.  Further, Barber and Kim 
produce only a static combination of experience- and reputation-based modeling which 
does not change despite dynamic system conditions.  Adaptive Trust Modeling takes 
advantage of both experience- and reputation-based trust modeling, dynamically 
conforming to a truster’s needs as its system’s conditions vary. 
Several researchers have shown that considering reputations from other agents 
(called reputation providers) improves a truster’s decision-making, but reputations are 
assumed to be known and accurate [Crandall and Goodrich, 2004; Klos and LaPoutre, 
2004].  Similarly, Jurca and Faltings assume a trusted, centralized mechanism, dictating 
protocols for reputation communication, can be established to enforce truthful reputation 
telling [Jurca and Faltings, 2002; Jurca and Faltings, 2006].  Adaptive Trust Modeling 
addresses the real problem of obtaining accurate reputation information when reputation 
providers are inaccurate, either because of incompetence or malicious intent.  By 
performing Error-Based Translation on reputation information, this research 
demonstrates how inaccurate, yet consistent reputations are utilized to increase the 
accuracy of a truster’s reputation-based trust model.   
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Research examining trust over referral networks has made advances toward 
identifying reliable providers of reputation information [Huynh, et al., 2005; Yolum and 
Singh, 2003].  Further, work by Fullam and Barber explores merging several sources of 
information by simple averaging of a best subset of sources [Fullam and Barber, 2007].  
However, Adaptive Trust Modeling is unique in that it not only identifies best reputation 
providers, but combines their reputations using a weighted averaging technique which 
takes into account the relative strengths of each provider.   
2.4.2 RQ 2: ADAPTIVE COST SELECTION 
Research Question 2 asks: How should a truster assess the value of trust 
information (specifically, reputations), in light of the cost of that information, to 
determine what trust information to acquire?  The contribution of Research Question 2 is 
the Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm for assessing the value of trust information, 
enabling a truster to determine what information to acquire when cost is a factor. 
Other research acknowledges the monetary value of trust information.  Avery, et 
al., acknowledge the cost to produce evaluations (reputations), designing a mechanism in 
which side payments encourage buyers to collectively order consumption (experiences) 
to maximize efficient allocation of evaluations among themselves [Avery, et al., 1999].  
Ramchurn, et al., state that when only a low level of trust exists between truster and 
trustee, the truster’s effort to secure “guarantees” of trustworthy behavior is significantly 
increased [Ramchurn, et al., 2004]. Ghanea-Hercock examines the truster’s problem of 
determining how much effort to devote to determining the trustworthiness of a potential 
trustee; while the work attempts to minimize a truster’s effort (“cost”), the “passive trust” 
solution requires trustees to be identified by unchanging ID tags [Ghanea-Hercock, 
2004].  Jurca and Faltings’ incentive compatible reputation mechanism issues side 
payments for truthful reputations, recognizing that trusters value reputation information 
inherently and are willing to pay for it [Jurca and Faltings, 2006].  Huynh, et al., 
introduce “Certified Reputation,” by which trustees actively deliver to trusters certified 
reputations third-party agents have produced (reputation providers have an incentive to 
provide truthful reputations) [Huynh, et al., 2006].  The Certified Reputation scheme, as 
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does Jurca and Faltings’ incentive compatible mechanism for reputation reporting, 
assumes reputation providers know an exact reputation to report and is unable to handle 
reputation provider error.   
The Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm described in this research is unique in that 
it assesses the value of individual pieces of trust information (in particular, reputations), 
with the understanding that trust information may have varying degrees of accuracy.  
Adaptive Cost Selection minimizes the truster’s costs when acquiring trust information 
by determining exactly how much and which trust information to acquire.  Further, the 
algorithm identifies the optimal tradeoff between aggregate trust model accuracy and cost 
of acquired trust information to maximize the truster’s payoff from transactions with 




Chapter 3   
ADAPTIVE TRUST MODELING: MERGING EXPERIENCE- AND 
REPUTATION-BASED TRUST MODELS 
 
This chapter answers Research Question 1: How do characteristics of a truster’s 
environment affect the usefulness of the truster’s experience- and reputation-based 
models?  Two objectives are accomplished: 1) introducing the Adaptive Trust Modeling 
tool for producing accurate aggregated trust models by weighting experiences and 
reputations, and 2) quantitatively analyzing the conditions under which each type of 
model is favorable.  Section 3.1 explains Adaptive Trust Modeling, a tool for combining 
experience- and reputation-based models to produce the most accurate aggregate trust 
model possible.  Adaptive Trust Modeling enables a truster to dynamically and 
automatically adapt its reliance on experience- or reputation-based trust as system 
conditions change.  Section 3.2 examines how characteristics of a truster’s environment 
(including availability of transaction observation opportunities and trustee trustworthiness 
dynamics) affect the usefulness of the truster’s experience-based trust model.  Section 3.3 
examines how characteristics of a truster’s environment (including accuracy and cost of 
available reputations) affect the usefulness of the truster’s reputation-based trust model.  
This analysis of the tradeoffs between experience- and reputation-based models enables 
trusters to acquire the types of trust information they can utilize best.   
3.1 Adaptive Trust Modeling 
This section lays the groundwork for examining the roles experience- vs. 
reputation-based modeling play given a wide range of system conditions, with varying 
availability of transaction opportunities, trustee trustworthiness dynamics, reputation 
accuracy, and reputation cost.  Protocols for transactions (Section 3.1.1) and reputation 
exchange (Section 3.1.2) are outlined, demonstrating the motivation for trust models.  In 
Section 3.1.3, both experience- and reputation-based trust modeling are defined, with 
differences between the two types of models delineated.  Section 3.1.4 presents Adaptive 
Trust Modeling, a technique for comparing experience- and reputation-based trust models 
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by assigning weights based on expected model error.  Adaptive Trust Modeling provides 
the basis for Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, which analyze relative trust model usefulness 
given varying system conditions, influenced by availability of transaction observation 
opportunities, trustee trustworthiness dynamics, reputation accuracy, and reputation cost.  
Adaptive Trust Modeling is important because it identifies the system parameters 
conducive to experience vs. reputation-based modeling, weighing the tradeoffs of each 
model to build a more accurate aggregate model.   
3.1.1 TRANSACTIONS 
This section defines the terminology and notation used in the explanation of 
Adaptive Trust Modeling.  Further, transaction protocol assumptions are outlined.  An 
understanding of transaction details is essential for recognizing the need for trust—and 
Adaptive Trust Modeling—in transactions. 
This research defines a transaction as an (implicit or explicit) agreement between 
two agents to exchange resources, such as goods, services, or information, as shown in 
Figure 3-1.  In this research, a transaction is modeled as a sequential protocol for the 
purpose of separating truster and trustee roles (though in some cases, truster and trustee 
make decisions simultaneously).  In a sequential transaction protocol, the truster first 
makes its decision regarding whether to trust, attempting to predict the trustee’s decision.  
The truster signals its decision to trust by delivering its payment to the trustee in 
expectation of the promised resource.  After the truster has committed to the transaction, 
the trustee then makes its decision (regarding whether to fulfill the agreement).  The 
trustee knows with certainty the outcome of the transaction, based on the extent to which 
it delivers the agreed upon resource.   
The values of promised resources and payments are denoted as Pi,j, where i 
represents the agent delivering the payment (truster) or resource (trustee), and j represents 
the agent valuating the payment or resource.  For the explanation given throughout this 
approach, agents i and j are denoted as either r (the agent acting as truster) or e (the agent 
acting as trustee).  Therefore, Pr,r represents the truster’s valuation of the agreed upon 
price it will pay to purchase a resource in a transaction.  Similarly, Pr,e represents the 
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trustee’s valuation of that same agreed upon price to be paid by the truster to purchase the 
resource in a transaction.  Pe,e denotes the trustee’s valuation of the resource it agrees to 
provide in a transaction, while Pe,r denotes the truster’s valuation of that same resource it 




Note that the trustee and truster private valuations for a given payment or resource 
are different; it is assumed that an agent’s valuation of the payment or resource it agrees 
to receive is greater than the agent’s valuation of the payment or resource it agrees to 
provide (otherwise, the agent would have no incentive to participate in a transaction).  
Therefore: 
Pe,r – Pr,r > 0, and 
Pr,e – Pe,e > 0. 
Note that the values Pe,r, Pr,r, Pr,e, and Pe,e in these equations represent valuations of 
agreed upon payments and resources; however, delivery of payments or resources at the 
represented value is not guaranteed if the trustee chooses not to fulfill its commitment 
and delivers less that the promised resource.  Unless stated otherwise, this research 
Figure 3-1. A sequential transaction between two agents.  The truster first commits to trusting, sending 
payment (valued at Pr,r and Pr,e by truster and trustee, respectively).  Then the trustee decides the extent of 
its own trustworthiness, in terms of the resource to deliver (valued at Pe,r and Pe,e by truster and trustee, 
respectively). 
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assumes agreed upon resources and payments are constant over all transactions among all 
truster-trustee pairs. 
A payoff matrix for a transaction is given in Figure 3-2.  If the truster decides not 
to trust, both the truster and trustee receive a net payoff (denoted as Pr and Pe, 
respectively) of zero, since no transaction takes place.  If the truster chooses to trust, it 
pays Pr,r to the trustee, who perceives the payment’s value as Pr,e.  If the trustee chooses 
to fulfill its promise, it provides a resource it valuates as Pe,e (valuated by the truster as 
Pe,r).  In a binary (cheat vs. not cheat) case, if the trustee chooses to cheat, no resource is 
provided.  When the trustee has multiple options for the value of resource it provides, the 
trustee may fail to fulfill the transaction agreement by providing a resource with an 
intermediate value (valuated by the truster as between zero and Pe,r) that falls short of the 
promised resource value.  In fact, the truster’s valuation of its net payoff (Pr), within the 
continuous range of –Pr,r and Pe,r – Pr,r inclusive, provides the basis for communicated 
reputation values, as discussed later in Section 3.1.2. 
 
 
Figure 3-2. The payoff matrix for a transaction between truster and trustee, assuming a sequential 
protocol, in which the trustee’s decision follows the truster’s observable decision.  In this figure, 
decisions are binary for both truster (trust vs. not trust) and trustee (cheat vs. not cheat), though this 
research permits a trustee to choose any level of trustworthiness such that the truster’s valuation of 
its net payoff, Pact, is between –Pr,r and Pe,r – Pr,r.  
 
If the truster chooses to trust and the trustee chooses to fulfill its promise, then the 
net immediate payoffs to the truster (Pr) and trustee (Pe) are represented as: 
Pr = Pe,r – Pr,r, and 
Pe = Pr,e – Pe,e. 
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If the truster chooses to trust and the trustee chooses to cheat (by delivering no payment), 
then the net immediate payoffs to the truster and trustee are represented as: 
Pr = –Pr,r, and 
Pe = Pr,e. 
The payoff matrix in Figure 3-2 shows that in a one-time transaction, the trustee’s 
decision to cheat yields the highest possible payoff for the trustee.  Therefore, in a one-
time transaction, the truster should always choose not to trust, in order to avoid a loss.  
However, the ability of the truster to model the trustworthiness of the trustee over 
repeated transactions means a trustee must consider not only its immediate payoff.  
Instead, the trustee must also consider the impact of its decision on the future decisions of 
the truster, with the goal of ensuring the truster agrees to trust in future transactions.  
Further, as explained in Section 3.1.2, when trusters may exchange reputations about a 
trustee, a trustee must consider the impact of its transaction decision with one truster on 
future transaction opportunities with other trusters.  
For the purposes of this research, transaction purchase costs (that is, Pr,r), as well 
as truster valuations of promised resources (Pe,r), are assumed to be the same for all 
transactions, constant over all transactions, and known by all agents, whether truster or 
trustee.  Because this research deals with trust models and transaction decisions from the 
truster’s perspective, this research discussion is concerned with transaction terms related 
to the truster’s valuation: 1) its valuation of its own payment to the trustee (Pr,r), 2) its 
valuation of the trustee’s agreed upon resource provision (Pe,r), and 3) its valuation of the 
trustee’s actual resource provided (Pe,r,act).  To simplify, this research will discuss a 
trustee’s level of trustworthiness in terms of the truster’s actual net payoff from a 
transaction, Pact, as compared to the truster’s agreed upon net payoff (Pr) where 
 Pact = Pe,r,act – Pr,r. Eqn 1 
 
Adaptive Trust Modeling maximizes the truster’s net payoff (Pact) by predicting the 
trustee’s actual resource provided (Pe,r,act).  The terminology and transaction protocol 
assumptions outlined in this section provide the basis for the discussion of Adaptive Trust 
Modeling in Section 3.1.4. 
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3.1.2 REPUTATION EXCHANGE 
This section delineates terminology and notation for reputation exchange within 
multi-agent systems.  In many systems, trusters have the opportunity to exchange 
reputations, or information about the trustworthiness of a potential trustee.  In this work, 
reputations about a trustee represent estimates of a truster’s expected net payoff (Pact) 
received from the trustee (as compared to the truster’s agreed upon net payoff Pr).  In 
terms parallel to the discussion of transactions in Section 3.1.1, ,
r
r rP  denotes the agreed 
upon payment (possibly zero) the truster pays to purchase the reputation, while rerP ,  
represents the reputation provider’s valuation of that same agreed upon payment (Figure 
3-3).  reeP ,  represents the reputation provider’s valuation of the resource it loses by 
agreeing to participate in a reputation transaction.  However, since the reputation provider 
is providing an information resource—the reputation—it does not “lose” that resource 
upon successful conduction of the transaction.  Therefore, reeP ,  is assumed to be zero (this 
research does not address any indirect, intangible losses suffered by the reputation 
provider, such as losses due to increased competition from those to whom it provides 
reputations).  rreP ,  represents the truster’s valuation of the reputation it receives.  Because 
the reputation is a form of information, the truster does not receive a tangible payoff from 
receipt of the information, so in immediate terms, rreP ,  is equal to zero.  However, the 
truster may receive a future benefit from the reputation in the form of better trust 
decision-making in transactions, depending on the accuracy of the reputation provided 
(this benefit, termed MarginalReward, is explained in Chapter 4). 
In summary, the net immediate payoffs to the truster and reputation provider, 
respectively, are represented as: 
 rrP = ,
r




erP , . 
Because this research deals with trust models and transaction decisions from the 
truster’s perspective, this research discussion is concerned with transaction terms related 
to the truster’s valuation: 1) reputation cost, the truster’s valuation of its own payment to 
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the reputation provider ( rrrP , ), and 2) the truster’s valuation of the future benefit, in terms 
of better trust decisions, received from the reputation (MarginalReward).  It is possible 
for reputation costs to be zero, a special case.  Throughout the remainder of this research, 




The accuracy of a provided reputation is dependent upon both the quality of the 
reputation provider’s aggregated trust model about the subject-agent (the transaction 
trustee) and the level of truthfulness with which the reputation provider chooses to 
communicate that model (Barber, et al., term these factors “competence” and “intent”, 
respectively [Barber, et al., 2003]).  In other words, a reputation provider with an 
inaccurate aggregated trust model may deliver a truthful, yet still inaccurate, reputation; 
conversely, a reputation provider with an accurate aggregated trust model may choose to 
communicate false, inaccurate reputations.  Note that to build accurate reputation models 
and propagate accurate reputations throughout a multi-agent system, reputation-based 
Figure 3-3. A sequential reputation transaction between a truster and a reputation provider.  The 
truster first commits to purchasing the reputation, sending payment (valued at ,
r
r rP  and ,
r
r eP  by 
truster and reputation provider, respectively).  Then the reputation provider decides the reputation 
to deliver. 
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modeling alone is not sufficient.  At least some agents in the system must first conduct 
transactions (build experience-based models) with the subject-agent (barring the 
availability of other trust-building methods).  
Adaptive Trust Modeling evaluates the accuracy of the reputations a truster 
receives, in comparison with the accuracy of the truster’s experience-based trust model, 
to produce an accurate estimate of the truster’s expected net payoff (Pact).  Further, 
Adaptive Cost Selection (Chapter 4) assesses the tradeoff between reputation accuracy 
and cost, helping a truster purchase reputations to maximize net payoffs from trustees, yet 
minimize total reputation costs. 
3.1.3 TRANSACTION TRUST MODELS 
Transaction trust models assist trusters in predicting the outcome of transactions, 
with the purpose of selecting the most trustworthy trustees with whom to transact.  
Several techniques exist for building trust models based on previous experiences, 
reputations provided by others, group association, or credentials, for example.  This 
research examines trust models based on a combination of two prominent “soft security” 
trust modeling techniques: experience- and reputation-based modeling. 
To aid in making trust-related decisions, a truster has access to one or more trust 
models (based on experience or reputations) which generate suggestions related to future 
transaction opportunities.  This research defines a suggestion, Psug, to be a trust model’s 
prediction about the actual expected net payoff (Pact) from a specified future transaction.  
The representation of suggestions as estimates of Pact is chosen because the Pact estimate 
is the truster’s decision-point for determining whether to trust in a proposed transaction; 
the truster will choose to trust only if it believes Pact will be greater than zero.  In contexts 
other than this research, suggestions may be defined differently.  For example, 
suggestions may measure the trustee’s information error when transactions concern the 
purchase of information [Barber and Fullam, 2003].  Or, suggestions may represent 
Boolean predictions of transaction success (termed “referrals” by Yu and Singh [Yu and 
Singh, 2002]), or graded measures of service quality [Huynh, et al., 2004; Ramchurn, et 
al., 2004] that may be subjective [Vidal, 2003].  Recently, significant research develops 
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reputation ontologies, enabling heterogeneous agents with varied trust models to 
exchange reputation-based suggestions [Casare and Sichman, 2005; Pinyol, et al., 2007; 
Vercouter, et al., 2007]. 
Experience-based trust modeling [Barber and Kim, 2003; Jonker and Treur, 1999] 
occurs when a truster uses the outcomes of its previous transactions with a trustee to 
estimate that trustee’s future trustworthiness.  The observed outcomes of those previous 
transactions are completely certain.  In some cases (as seen in human face-to-face 
transactions involving witnesses), the truster may observe a transaction between a third-
party truster and the trustee; this observation may be included in its experience-based 
trust model if the certainty of the observation can be assured.  Experience-based models 
are limited in accuracy, however, based on the availability of transaction observation 
opportunities regarding the potential trustee in question.  If the number of observations 
making up a truster’s experience-based trust model is few or none, that experience-based 
model will have relatively high error (Section 3.2.3 explains that the error of an 
experience-based model is dependent on the relationship between the number of 
transaction observations and the rate at which the trustee’s behavior pattern changes).  
This research assumes a simple experience-based trust model (similar to that 
employed by [Huynh, et al., 2004]), built by averaging payoffs (Pact) in previous 
observed transactions with the trustee to derive an experience-based model suggestion 
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where previous observations may be weighted with discounting for age, either discretely: 
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. Eqn 3 
The variable t represents the age of the suggestion, in terms of discrete timesteps.  When 
τ = ∞ (discrete discounting case) or α = 0 (continuous discounting case), no discounting 
occurs.  Note that Adaptive Trust Modeling (Section 3.1.4), which combines suggestions 
from experience- and reputation-based trust models based on the accuracy of each model, 
does not specifically require the computation of experience-based suggestions based on 
the experience-averaging calculation above.  
Reputation-based trust modeling [Sen and Sajja, 2002; Shi, et al., 2005] occurs 
when a truster builds its trust model of a potential trustee by requesting reputation 
suggestions, or estimates of Pact, from third-party reputation providers.  Reputation-based 
trust modeling leverages the additional experience of other trusters (for example, a few 
experiences from many different trusters or extensive experience from a few trusters) to 
quickly build a trust model.  However, the truster can not be certain about the accuracy of 
reputations received from reputation providers; providers may choose to lie about the 
trustee, or simply may not have their own accurate model from which to produce 
reputations. 
The accuracy of a truster’s experience- and reputation-based models depends on 
environment factors, including availability of transaction observation opportunities, 
trustee trustworthiness dynamics, and accuracy and cost of available reputations.  When a 
truster has access to both experiences and reputations, the truster is faced with the 
dilemma of determining which type of model, experience- or reputation-based, should 
provide the suggestions the truster follows.  In fact, a combination of suggestions from 
both types of models may yield a more accurate aggregate suggestion than either single 
model.  Adaptive Trust Modeling weighs suggestions from both experience- and 
reputation-based models to produce accurate aggregate suggestions despite changes in 
system conditions. 
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3.1.4 COMPARING TRUST MODELS: ADAPTIVE TRUST MODELING 
This section explains Adaptive Trust Modeling, a technique for maximizing the 
accuracy of a truster’s trust-related decisions by dynamically utilizing suggestions from 
multiple trust models according to the accuracy of each model.  While the weighting 
mechanism behind Adaptive Trust Modeling is quite simple, Adaptive Trust Modeling is 
a powerful tool for fulfilling two objectives of this research:  
1) assessing the effectiveness of both experience- and reputation-based trust 
modeling, in terms of assigned weights, under varying system conditions 
(availability of transaction observation opportunities, trustee trustworthiness 
dynamics, and accuracy and cost of available reputations), and   
2) dynamically combining experience- and reputation-based suggestions, 
depending on changing system conditions, to yield aggregate trust models that 
maintain accuracy by exploiting each model’s strengths. 
The Adaptive Trust Modeling technique assumes the truster must decide how to 
use suggestions from each model without necessarily knowing the content of (the value 
Psug conveyed by) the suggestion.  When this constraint is released, techniques such as 
outlier detection [Fullam and Barber, 2004] can be applied to make best use of 
suggestions once suggestion values are observed.  The Adaptive Trust Modeling 
technique facilitates the discussion in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 of how environment 
factors—including availability of transaction observation opportunities (Section 3.2.1), 
trustee trustworthiness dynamics (Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3), reputation accuracy 
(Section 3.3.1), and reputation cost (Section 3.3.2)—influence preference for experience- 
over reputation-based trust models, or vice versa. 
The Adaptive Trust Modeling mechanism is diagrammed in Figure 3-4.  To 
measure its confidence in a trust model, the truster builds an error probability distribution 
to estimate the accuracy of the model’s suggestions about a future transaction.  This error 
probability distribution is built by aggregating the error of numerous previous 
suggestions, accounting for changes in accuracy over time.  Specifically, a suggestion’s 
error, Perr, is defined as the difference between that suggestion’s predicted truster net 
payoff (called Psug) and the truster’s actual net payoff (Pact):    
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     Perr = Psug – Pact. Eqn 4 
  
 
Figure 3-4. The Adaptive Trust Modeling technique.  The truster decides whether to trust a potential 
trustee by performing a weighted average of suggestions from both experience- and reputation-based 
trust models.  Weights are determined by relative error of each trust model.  The transaction 
outcome is used to update both the truster’s experience-based model (as an additional experience) 
and error estimates for each trust model.  
 
As shown by Equation 4, two factors influence a trust model’s error probability 
distribution: 1) the distribution of the model’s suggestions Psug, and 2) the trustee’s actual 
behavior, as a distribution of the truster’s actual net payoffs Pact.  For ease of calculation 
and to demonstrate the relationships between model error, model suggestions, and trustee 
behavior, trustees are assumed to behave such that trustee behavior (truster net payoff) is 
normally distributed as N(μbeh, σbeh); similarly, trust models are assumed to provide 





























distributions for trustee behavior (N(μbeh, σbeh)), trust model suggestions (N(μsug, σsug)), 
and, therefore, trust model error (N(μerr, σerr)) are reasonable because normal 
distributions appropriately describe many types of real-world behavior.  For example, an 
eBay seller (trustee) may have slight deviations in her valuation accuracy of products she 
sells, or a referral broker (reputation provider) may deliver information with noise.  The 
behavior of trustees who engage in occasional, strategic cheating can be approximated by 
normal distributions with some degree of success.  Further, the normal distribution 
assumption simplifies mathematical derivations for trust model weights and aggregate 
model error, as discussed later in this section.  As an extension to this research, this 
Adaptive Trust Modeling technique could be modified to accommodate patterns not 
easily accommodated by normal distributions (for example, lying reputation providers or 
strategically-cheating trustees whose behaviors follow multi-modal or Bernoulli 
distributions).  These cases require more complicated computation (in some cases, by 
approximation), but the Adaptive Trust Modeling methodology remains unchanged. 
Trust model suggestions (values of Psug) are assumed to be uncorrelated to 
individual instances of trustee behavior (truster net payoffs Pact).  That is, it is assumed 
that a trust model cannot predict individual instances of Pact, but can only estimate the 
general distribution N(μsug, σsug).  When suggestions are uncorrelated to individual trustee 
decisions, in the best case, a model will consistently suggest the mean of the trustee’s 
behavior distribution, resulting in a suggestion distribution of N(μbeh, 0) and error 
distribution of N(0, σbeh).  A model is even more accurate if each suggestion is correlated 
to the trustee’s specific future decision, Pact, such that its suggestion distribution is N(Pact, 
σsug) for each given Pact and for some small or zero σsug, resulting in an error distribution 
of N(0, σsug).  A spectrum of correlation may be implied if a trust model keeps pace with 
a trustee’s changes in behavior distribution, depending on the relationship between the 
variation in the trustee’s behavior (σsug) and the frequency with which the truster changes 
its behavior distribution.  For example, a trustee who maintains a very low σbeh value yet 
changes μsug very frequently may be dually described as following a single behavior 
distribution with constant μsug and high σbeh value.  This research assumes trust model 
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suggestions are not correlated to individual trustee decisions.  Further, the research 
assumes trustees do not change behavior distributions, except in Section 3.3.1.2, where it 
is assumed reputation-based trust models do keep pace with trustee behavior distribution 
changes. 
The research assumes, unless otherwise stated, that μsug = μbeh for all trust models; 
that is, trust models have error only due to distribution standard deviation, not mean.  
Therefore,  
μerr = μsug – μbeh = 0. 
Section 3.2.1 explains why this assumption is valid for experience-based trust models.  
Section 3.3.1.2 includes a discussion of scenarios in which μsug ≠ μbeh for reputation-
based models and provides an accommodation, called Error-Sensitive Translation.  The 
accuracy and usefulness of trust models are measured by their error distributions.  The 
mean (μerr) of a model’s error distribution is an indicator of the accuracy of future 
predictions suggested by the model; distributions with means near zero imply greater 
accuracy that those with means farther from zero (assuming the same standard deviation).  
The standard deviation (σerr) of a model’s error distribution indicates the consistency, or 
usefulness, of future predictions suggested by the model; models with high consistency 
(low standard deviation) are expected to yield predictions of high usefulness.   
Assuming that trust model suggestions (Psug) and trustee behavior (Pact) are 
uncorrelated, derived from independent distributions (N(μsug, σsug) and N(μbeh, σbeh), 
respectively), the following relationship holds: 
 2 2err sug behσ σ σ= + . Eqn 5 
That is, a trust model’s error is the sum of error due to variations in its suggestions and 
error due to variations in the trustee’s behavior.   
Trust model error probability distributions, as built up by observing the results of 
previous transactions, determine how best to combine suggestions from multiple trust 
models to achieve an aggregated suggestion about a future transaction with the lowest 
expected error.  When averaging n suggestions, each taken from normal distributions 
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N(μi,sug, σi,sug), the resulting aggregate suggestion belongs to the distribution (assumed to 
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[Fullam and Barber, 2007]. 












A truster’s goal is to minimize expected error of the aggregated suggestion Pagg,sug 
(and thus, expected error standard deviation σagg,err), as aggregated from experience- and 
reputation-based suggestions (PE,sug and PR,sug).  The value of σagg,err is minimized by 
minimizing σagg,sug, since, as an extension of Equation 5,  
 2 2, ,agg err agg sug behσ σ σ= +  Eqn 7 
 When trust models’ suggestion distributions have non-uniform standard deviation (in 
other words, some trust models are more accurate than others), σagg,sug can be minimized 
by performing weighted linear regression, in which signals (suggestions) from variables 
(trust models) of non-uniform variance are weighted to favor those variables with least 
variance [Mandel, 1964]:   
 ( )2, ,
1
n




= ∑  Eqn 8 
In Equation 8 above, ωi represents the weight given to a specific suggestion Pi,sug when 



















=∑ . Eqn 10 
The objectives of this research include understanding the differences between 
experience- and reputation-based trust modeling types, specifically, identifying the 
conditions under which one or the other is preferred.  Therefore, the discussion in this 
section assumes a truster maintains two trust models: an experience-based trust model 
and a reputation-based model with error probability distributions denoted as N(μE,err, 
σE,err) and N(μR,err, σR,err), respectively.  The suggestions from the truster’s reputation-
based model originate from a single reputation provider or represent aggregations from 
several reputation providers (aggregating suggestions from multiple reputation providers 
is discussed in Section 3.3.2). 
Suggestions from experience- and reputation-based models are represented as 
N(μE,sug, σE,sug) and N(μR,sug, σR,sug) respectively.  Therefore, 
, , ,agg sug E E sug R R sugP P Pω ω= +  and 
 ( ) ( )2 2, , ,agg sug E E sug R R sugσ ω σ ω σ= + , Eqn 11 
where ωE and ωR represent weights for the experience- and reputation-based model 
suggestions, respectively, and 
 1E Rω ω+ = . Eqn 12 
Substituting Equation 12 into Equation 11 (expressing ωE in terms of ωR): 
( )2 2 2 2, , ,1agg sug R E sug R R sugσ ω σ ω σ= − + . 
Simplifying, 
( )2 2 2 2, , ,1 2agg sug R R E sug R R sugσ ω ω σ ω σ= − + +  
2 2 2 2 2 2
, , , , ,2agg sug E sug R E sug R E sug R R sugσ σ ω σ ω σ ω σ= − + +  
( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2, , , , ,2agg sug E sug R sug R E sug R E sugσ σ σ ω σ ω σ= + + − + . 
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To find the optimal weight , agg,err,minR σω for minimizing σagg,sug (and σagg,err), the derivative 
of σagg,sug is set to zero to solve for , agg,err,minR σω . 
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, Eqn 13 


































, Eqn 14 





































. Eqn 15 
Equation 15 is a well-known technique in weighted regression for assigning weights 
based on inverse variance of variables’ signal distributions [Mandel, 1964].  Note that the 
trustee behavior distribution (σbeh) being modeled does not influence weights assigned to 
suggestions from each trust model. 
Substituting equations for , agg,err,minE σω  and , agg,err,minR σω  into Equation 11, σagg,sug,min is 
computed: 
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 Eqn 16 






















. Eqn 18 
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.   Eqn 19 
Figure 3-5 charts aggregate suggestion standard deviation, σagg,sug, for varying 
combinations of ωE and ωR, emphasizing the location of σagg,sug,min. 
 
 
Figure 3-5. Aggregate suggestion standard deviation (σagg,sug) as a function of reputation-based model 
weight (ωR).  The value of σagg,sug is minimized when weights are computed according to Equation 15. 
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According to Equation 5, the reader might note that a trust model’s error is 
minimized when σsug = 0.  It might seem as though a reputation provider, seeking to 
maximize its influence on the truster, could maximize the weight (according to Equation 
13) of the reputation suggestions it provides, minimizing its error simply by making 
consistent suggestions (resulting in σsug = 0).  If the assumption that μsug = μbeh holds 
(under which Equation 13 is derived), and σR,sug does equal zero, then the reputation-
based trust model supplied by the reputation provider does indeed provide the most 
accurate possible suggestions, and ωR should be correspondingly high.  If it is possible 
that μsug ≠ μbeh (in other words, the reputation provider simply picks some default, 
consistent suggestion value), then additional techniques (such as Error-Sensitive 
Translation, as described in Section 3.3.1.2) may be employed to assess the accuracy of 
the reputation provider’s suggestions.  However, techniques such as Error-Sensitive 
Translation require the observation of multiple reputation suggestions before those 
suggestions are put to use.  As a result, the reputation provider’s ability to influence the 
truster’s aggregate suggestion is delayed significantly; hence, the reputation provider 
achieves no real influence gain over the truster by simply reporting an arbitrary, 
consistent suggestion. 
A question arises as to the validity of building estimates of suggestion probability 
distributions (approximating σR,sug) for reputation-based trust models.  Because 
reputation-based models are particularly useful when transaction observation 
opportunities are scarce (and thus, experience-based models are weak), the truster has 
few data points about the trustee in question with which to build estimates of reputation-
based suggestion probability distributions.  However, the truster may base its reputation-
based suggestion probability distribution—at least initially—on the model’s suggestions 
about other trustees, as long as the truster believes the model maintains equivalent 
suggestion accuracy from trustee to trustee.  This “transference of accuracy” assumption 
agrees with the intuitive notion of utilizing a reputation provider for advice about an 
unfamiliar potential trustee if the provider has delivered accurate suggestions about past 
transactions with other trustees. 
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Figure 3-6 compares σagg,err given σE,sug and σR,sug (in this figure, σbeh equals zero) 
for Adaptive Trust Modeling against 1) a “Select One” technique and 2) a “Simple 
Averaging” technique.  Using the Select One technique, the single suggestion anticipated 
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Using the Simple Averaging technique, ωE = ωR = 0.5: 
, , ,0.5 0.5agg sug E sug R sugP P P= +  and 
( ) ( )2 2 2, , ,0.5 0.5agg err E sug R sug behσ σ σ σ= + + . Eqn 20 
 
The Select One technique (Figure 3-6a) achieves a low σagg,err when either σE,sug 
or σR,sug is significantly lower than the other (the occasions when weight combinations of 
zero and one yield lowest σagg,err anyway).  However, when σE,sug and σR,sug are similar in 
value, the Select One technique fails to benefit from the power of averaging, resulting in 
higher σagg,err values than the Adaptive Trust Modeling and Simple Averaging cases.  
Simple Averaging (Figure 3-6b) achieves a low σagg,err when σE,sug and σR,sug are similar 
in value (when 0.5-0.5 weight combinations yield lowest σagg,err anyway).  When σE,sug 
and σR,sug are very different, however, σagg,err values due to the Simple Averaging 
technique are needlessly high because the inaccurate trust model, in addition to the 
accurate trust model, is included in the aggregate suggestion.   
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Figure 3-6. Using (a) the Select One technique, (b) Simple Averaging, and (c) Adaptive Trust 
Modeling to compute aggregate error standard deviation, σagg,err, given experience- and reputation-






































































































Adaptive Trust Modeling (Figure 3-6c) maximizes the benefit of both the Select 
One and Simple Averaging techniques by dynamically identifying the best combination 
of weights for all pairs of σE,sug and σR,sug.  Figure 3-7 shows the optimal ωR (yielding 
lowest σagg,err) for given pairs of σE,sug and σR,sug.  According to Equation 14 and shown 
in Figure 3-7, when σE,sug equals zero, the experience-based model’s suggestion is 
completely favored ( , agg,err,minE σω = 1) and the reputation-based model’s suggestion may be 
discarded ( , agg,err,minR σω = 0).  Similarly, when σR,sug equals zero, the reputation-based 
model’s suggestion is completely favored ( , agg,err,minR σω = 1) and the experience-based 
model’s suggestion may be discarded ( , agg,err,minE σω = 0).  When both σE,sug and σR,sug equal 
zero, any pair of weights may be selected (provided ωE + ωR  = 1), yielding the same 
σagg,err,min.  More generally, when σR,sug is greater than σE,sug, , agg,err,minR σω  is less than 
, agg,err,minE σ
ω , and vice versa.   
 
Figure 3-7. Optimal weights for a truster’s reputation-based model (ωR yielding lowest aggregate 
error standard deviation, σagg,err) given experience- and reputation-based model suggestion standard 
deviations (σE,sug and σR,sug, respectively).  When σE,sug is zero (experience-based model is 
perfectly accurate), ωR is zero (thus ωE is one, and experience-based model is utilized exclusively).  
Conversely, when σR,sug is zero (reputation-based model is perfectly accurate), ωR is one reputation-
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Figure 3-8 and Figure 3-9 show σagg,err for the Select One, Simple Averaging, and 
Adaptive Trust Modeling techniques when σbeh equals 5 and 25, respectively.  These 
figures demonstrate that incremental increases in σE,sug and σR,sug cause lower 
corresponding increases in σagg,err when σbeh is larger.  The error caused by trustee 
behavior variation (σbeh) overshadows the error caused by suggestion variation (σE,sug and 
σR,sug). 
Adaptive Trust Modeling provides a more accurate alternative to Select One and 
Simple Averaging techniques; experience- and reputation-based models are combined 
according to the accuracy of each model (using weights given by Equation 15).  Adaptive 
Trust Modeling improves upon research by Barber and Kim, Huynh, et al., and 
Ramchurn, et al., all of which combine multiple trust models but do not automatically 
relate weights to the relative accuracy of each model [Barber and Kim, 2003; Huynh, et 
al., 2004; Ramchurn, et al., 2004].  Adaptive Trust Modeling dynamically computes 
model weights based on model accuracy, which may vary across changing system 
conditions.  The following sections demonstrate how Adaptive Trust Modeling 
maximizes the accuracy of the truster’s aggregate trust model as the accuracy of 
experience-based models (Section 3.2) and reputation-based models (Section 3.3) change.  
Further, a quantitative analysis is performed of the tradeoffs between experience- and 




Figure 3-8. Using (a) the Select One technique, (b) Simple Averaging, and (c) Adaptive Trust 
Modeling to compute aggregate error standard deviation, σagg,err, given experience- and reputation-


































































































Figure 3-9. Using (a) the Select One technique, (b) Simple Averaging, and (c) Adaptive Trust 
Modeling to compute aggregate error standard deviation, σagg,err, given experience- and reputation-



























































































3.2 Experience-Based Trust Model Usability Factors 
 
This section discusses environment factors affecting the accuracy of experience-
based trust models, including availability of transaction observation opportunities and 
trustee trustworthiness dynamics.  When reputation-based models are mentioned for 
comparison purposes, a general, aggregated reputation-based model is assumed, since the 
details of selecting and combining reputations are not discussed until Section 3.3.2.  
Experiments in Section 3.2.1 show that experience-based models become more accurate 
as a truster’s number of transaction observations increases; consequently, Adaptive Trust 
Modeling favors a truster’s experience-based model as number of observations increases.  
Section 3.2.2 demonstrates that the building of a truster’s experience-based model is 
slowed when the potential trustee is untrustworthy; as a result, the truster relies more on 
its reputation-based model.  Finally, Section 3.2.3 shows that increased frequency of 
trustee behavior changes permits fewer transaction observations before an experience-
based model is obsolete; therefore, reputation-based models prove more reliable when 
trustee trustworthiness is dynamic.  In all cases, Adaptive Trust Modeling produces 
aggregated suggestions that are more accurate than Simple Averaging and either single 
(experience- or reputation-based) model alone. 
3.2.1 AVAILABILITY OF TRANSACTION OBSERVATION OPPORTUNITIES 
Experience-based models become more accurate as more transaction outcomes 
are observed.  Because a truster is completely certain of each transaction’s outcome, the 
truster can be more certain of its experience-based model as more transaction 
observations contribute to it.  This section explores the relationship between the number 
of transaction observations composing an experience-based trust model and the expected 
error of that model.  Further, this section examines how a truster’s reliance on 
experience- vs. reputation-based trust models (in terms of the Adaptive Trust Modeling 
technique proposed in Section 3.1) varies depending on the number of transactions the 
truster has observed.  Intuitively, a truster is more likely to rely on its experience-based 
trust model when it has observed numerous outcomes of transactions with the trustee in 
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question, making the experience-based model very certain; this section explains this 
correlation quantitatively. 
A truster may use any number of techniques for combining transaction 
observations to form its experience-based trust model, such as trend extrapolation, 
averaging, or outlier removal, for example.  Because the truster knows its own modeling 
technique, it can predict how the inclusion of additional observations will change 
subsequent suggestions derived from the model.  As a result, the level of uncertainty of 
an experience-based model can be directly linked to the number of transaction 
observations of which it is composed.  Section 3.1.4 demonstrates that in Adaptive Trust 
Modeling, weighting of trust models—in particular, experience- vs. reputation-based 
models—is related to the accuracy of each model (models with lower suggestion 
variation, σsug are given greater weight).  This section explores how the accuracy of an 
experience-based model is calculated based on knowing the model’s suggestion-
calculating algorithm and number of transaction observations influencing the model, 
since an experience-based model changes in a predictable way, decreasing σE,sug with 
each additional transaction observation.   
To demonstrate this relationship between model error and number of transaction 
observations, an example scenario is illustrated using the following assumptions.  
Assuming a consistent trustee behavior distribution N(μbeh, σbeh), (this assumption is 
relaxed in Section 3.2.3), let m represent the number of transaction observations upon 
which the experience-based model is calculated.  Assume the experience-based model is 
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. Eqn 3 
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Figure 3-10 shows weights χt as observation age t increases for several values of 
α: 0, 1, 2, and 3.  When α = 0, all observations, regardless of age, are weighted equally.  
As α increases, the influence of older observations decreases more quickly. 
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Figure 3-10. Experience-based suggestion weight (χt) as a function of suggestion age (τ) for α values 
of 0, 1, 2, and 3.  Solid lines are for clarity only (τ is discrete). 
 
Since each observed transaction outcome Pact,i belongs to the distribution N(μbeh, 
σbeh), then an individual suggestion, PE,sug(m), based on m observations, follows the 














































.  Eqn 22 
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Assuming one transaction observation occurs at each discrete timestep, Equation 
22 is expanded using Equation 3, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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. Eqn 23 
Figure 3-11 shows σE,sug as a function of number of observed transaction 
outcomes m (assuming trustee behavior distribution remains constant) for several values 
of α: 0, 1, 2, and 3.  When α = 0, σE,sug decreases most quickly, resulting in lowest 
experience-based model error.  However, α values greater than zero are advantageous in 
real situations when trustee behavior distributions may change over time, rendering older 
transaction observations obsolete.  The system designer must determine the appropriate α 
for a given domain to both “exploit” minimum possible error (α = 0) and “explore” to 
identify changes in trustee behavior.   Setting α = 0 is acceptable at this point,  assuming 
the trustee’s behavior follows a consistent distribution N(μbeh, σbeh), since the time at 
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which observations take place is inconsequential.  Section 3.2.3 addresses the scenario in 
which trustee behavior distributions (μbeh and/or σbeh) change over time.   
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Figure 3-11. Experience-based suggestion standard deviation (σE,sug) as a function of number of 
transaction observations (m) for α values of 0, 1, 2, and 3.  Solid lines are for clarity only (m is 
discrete). 
 
Equation 23 is simplified when α = 0: 
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Figure 3-12 illustrates the distribution N(μE,sug(m), σE,sug(m)) for increasing values 
of m when α = 0.  As the number of observations (m) increases, σE,sug(m)—and expected 
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suggestion error—decreases (the likelihood that the resulting suggestion PE,sug is near μbeh 
increases).  Because μE,sug(m) equals μbeh for all m, (from Equation 21) it is asserted that 
experience-based models do not have error of distribution mean; the assumption in 
Section 3.1.4 that μsug = μbeh is not restrictive in the case of experience-based models.   
 
Figure 3-12. Probability distribution N(μE,sug(m) , σE,sug(m)) of experience-based suggestions PE,sug(m) 
for increasing values of m (number of observed transactions). 
 
Standard deviation σE,sug(m) correlates to the theoretical σE,sug of Equations 13 
and 14 in Section 3.1.4 needed to calculate weights , agg,err,minE σω  and , agg,err,minR σω .  Further, 
from Equation 5 in Section 3.1.4, the accuracy of an experience-based model, in terms of 
σE,err, is calculated as 
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σ σ += . Eqn 25 
 
Figure 3-13 shows theoretical σE,err as a function of m; the function approaches σbeh, as m 
approaches ∞. 
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Figure 3-13 Theoretical experience-based model error standard deviation (σE,err) as a function of 
number of transaction observations (m).  Trustee behavior standard deviation (σbeh), the minimum 
achievable error, is shown as a baseline.  Solid lines are for clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
As m increases, appropriate weights for experience- vs. reputation-based models 
must be re-evaluated based on the accuracy of the truster’s reputation-based model 
(σR,sug) and number of observations (m) influencing experience-based model suggestions.  
At this point in the research, reputation-based models are assumed to be simply some 
general aggregation of reputations (Section 3.3.2 addresses the formation of reputation-
based trust models in detail).  The weight, , agg,err,minR σω , of the reputation-based model is 






































































. Eqn 26 
Similarly, the weight of the experience-based model can be computed, recalling Equation 
12: 































. Eqn 27 
Note that Equation 25 is helpful for understanding how experience-based model 
error decreases theoretically as transactions are observed.  In reality, however, a truster 
does not use Equation 25 to determine its experience-based model error standard 
deviation (σE,err), since the truster does not know σbeh exactly (if it did, trust modeling 
itself—and suggestions PE,sug and PR,sug about trustee behavior—would be unnecessary).  
Instead, the truster estimates σE,err by computing the standard deviation of actual 
experience-based suggestion errors (PE,err), extended from Equation 4: 
PE,err = PE,sug – Pact.   
Similarly, the truster does not compute , agg,err,minE σω  and , agg,err,minR σω  from Equations 26 and 
27, but from Equations 13 and 14, based on actual calculations of σE,sug, the standard 
deviation of Pact values. 
Figure 3-14 shows theoretical , agg,err,minE σω  as a function of m for several values of 
σR,sug when σbeh = 1.0.  When σR,sug is large compared to σbeh (the reputation-based model 
is very inaccurate), , agg,err,minE σω  increases quickly as m increases; the accuracy of the 
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experience-based model quickly overshadows that of the inaccurate reputation-based 
model.  Conversely, when σR,sug is small compared to σbeh (the reputation-based model is 
very accurate), , agg,err,minE σω  increases slowly as m increases; the reputation-based model is a 
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Figure 3-14. Adaptive Trust Modeling’s theoretical weight (ωE) of experience-based model as a 
function of number of transaction observations (m) when σR,sug equals 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 (σbeh = 1.0).  
Solid lines are for clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
The advantages of Adaptive Trust Modeling are demonstrated by Figure 3-15, 
which theoretically compares σagg,err as the number of transaction observations, m, 
increases for four different weighting techniques as listed in Table 3-1: 1) Experience-
Based Model Only, 2) Reputation-Based Model Only (σR,sug equals 0.5), 3) Simple 
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Figure 3-15.  Theoretical comparison of aggregate suggestion error standard deviation (σagg,err) for 
Experience-Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive 
Trust Modeling techniques as number of transaction observations (m) increases (σR,sug = 0.5).  
Trustee behavior standard deviation (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a 
baseline.  Solid lines are for clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
Table 3-1. Weighting technique names, corresponding weights (ωE and ωR), and equations for 
aggregate error standard deviation (σagg,err). 
Weighing 
Technique Weights (ωE, ωR) Aggregate Error Standard Deviation (σagg,err) 
Experience-Based 
Model Only 
ωR = 0 
ωE = 1 
2 2
, ,agg err E sug behσ σ σ= +  (Eqn 5) 
Reputation-Based 
Model Only 
ωR = 1 
ωE = 0 
2 2
, ,agg err R sug behσ σ σ= +  (Eqn 5) 
Simple Averaging ωR = 0.5 
ωE = 0.5 
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As a baseline, Figure 3-15 also displays σbeh, the minimum achievable error 
(achievable when 1) μE,sug and/or μR,sug equal μbeh, and 2) σE,sug and/or σR,sug equal zero, 
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depending one which model’s suggestions are utilized).  Based on Equation 19 in Table 
3-1 and Equation 24, Adaptive Trust Modeling’s aggregate error standard deviation, 











































With few transaction observations (m is small), the σagg,err for the experience-
based model is high.  However, after many observations (m is large), the σagg,err for the 
experience-based model approaches the minimum possible error, σbeh.  By relying on 
reputation-based suggestions initially, then on experience-based suggestions as the 
experience-based model improves, Adaptive Trust Modeling achieves the lowest σagg,err 
of all four techniques, approaching σbeh as m→∞.  Note that when experience- and 
reputation-based models have the same accuracy (that is, σE,err = σR,err), the Simple 
Averaging technique achieves σagg,err as low as Adaptive Trust Modeling (because 
optimal weights for σagg,err,min happen to be ωR = ωE = 0.5).   
Experimentation reinforces the above theoretical calculations, validating Adaptive 
Trust Modeling and the assumption that empirical model error standard deviations, σE,err 
and σR,err (or model suggestion standard deviations, σE,sug and σR,sug) are adequate bases 
for computing model weights.  To confirm Figure 3-15, an experiment is conducted to 
compare error of aggregate suggestions using each of the four techniques described in 
Table 3-1: 1) Experience-Based Model Only, 2) Reputation-Based Model Only, 3) 
Simple Averaging, and 4) Adaptive Trust Modeling (all four techniques utilize only 
reputations regarding the initial transaction, when no experience-based model is 
available).  In the experiment, a single truster has access to an aggregated reputation-
based trust model which produces suggestions from the distribution N(μR,sug = μbeh, σR,sug 
= 0.5) (for this experiment, the truster is not concerned with how the reputations are 
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selected and combined).  The potential trustee behaves in such a manner that the truster’s 
net payoff, Pact, follows the distribution N(μbeh = 10, σ beh = 1.0).  Trustee behavior 
distribution mean, μbeh, is a high positive value to ensure the truster does not decline 
transactions, slowing the rate at which transaction observations are acquired and m 
increases (Section 3.2.2 discusses the impact of trustee untrustworthiness on , agg,err,minE σω  in 
greater depth).  Each run consists of 100 transaction opportunities; results from n = 
100,000 runs are averaged.  For each of the four techniques compared, the absolute value 
error of the truster’s aggregate suggestion is measured as the number of observed 
transactions, m, increases: 
 average absolute value error(m) = 
( ) ( ), , ,
1
n
agg sug i act i
i




 Eqn 28 
Note that the relationship between a normal error distribution given by N(μagg,err = 0, 
σagg,err(m)) and the average absolute value error of values taken from that distribution is 
given by 
 average absolute value error(m) = ( ),
2
agg err mσ π
 Eqn 29 
  [Fullam, 2003]. 
Within the experiment, the truster employs the following Adaptive Trust 
Modeling algorithm to compute aggregate suggestions Pagg,sug.  In each timestep, the 
reputation-based model delivers a suggestion from the distribution N(μR,sug, σR,sug).  The 





















 Eqn 2 
where 1i m
χ =  for all i.  Based on the previously calculated expected error of both the 
experience- and reputation-based trust models (σE,err and σR,err, respectively), the truster 
computes weights, , agg,err,minE σω  and , agg,err,minR σω , for the two suggestions (from Equations 13 

































. Eqn 13 
 
If the experience-based suggestion is null (no transaction outcomes have been 
observed, m = 0), σE,sug is assumed to be ∞; therefore, , agg,err,minE σω = 0 and , agg,err,minR σω = 1. 
 The aggregate suggestion, Pagg,sug, is computed as 
( ) ( ), , , , ,agg,err,min agg,err,minagg sug E E sug R R sugP P Pσ σω ω= + ,  
remembering that weights for the experience- and reputation-based suggestions sum to 
one.  If Pagg,sug is greater than zero, the truster chooses to trust (the transaction occurs).  If 
Pagg,sug is less than or equal to zero, the truster declines to conduct the transaction.  Upon 
observing the outcome of the transaction, the truster computes suggestion error (PE,err and 
PR,err) from Equation 4 (Section 3.1.4) as 
PE,err = PE,sug – Pact  and 
PR,err = PR,sug – Pact . 
PE,err, PR,err, PE,sug, and PR,sug are used to update error and suggestion distributions for 
both experience- and reputation-based trust models, and then the process is repeated for 
the next transaction opportunity. 
Results shown in Figure 3-16, comparing average absolute value error of 
aggregate suggestions for Experience-Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, 
Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling techniques, closely resemble the 
theoretical plot of σagg,err in Figure 3-15.  As m—and the accuracy of the experience-
based model—increases, the error of the experience-based-only technique decreases.  
Adaptive Trust Modeling yields σagg,err similar to or lower than all three other techniques 
for all values of m, both early on (low m) and after numerous transactions have been 
observed (high m).  Adaptive Trust Modeling’s error is statistically similar (α = 0.05) to 
that of Simple Averaging when m is low, because , agg,err,minE σω , as selected by Adaptive 
Trust Modeling, is close to 0.5, the weight used by Simple Averaging.  When m is large, 
Adaptive Trust Modeling’s error is statistically similar to that of Experience-Only, but 
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significantly lower than that of Simple Averaging.  Figure 3-17 shows the experiment’s 
average experience-based model weight , agg,err,minE σω  selected by the truster, as compared to 
the theoretical best weight from Figure 3-14, as a function of number of observed 
transactions m.  Experimental and theoretical weights differ slightly because the truster’s 
error estimates of experience- and reputation-based trust models are inexact, in reality.  
Weight , agg,err,minE σω  increases as the accuracy of the experience-based model increases, in 
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Figure 3-16. Experimental comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Experience-
Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling 
techniques as number of transaction observations (m) increases (σR,sug = 0.5).  Absolute value error 
for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a baseline.  Solid lines 
are for clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
In summary, the accuracy of an experience-based model is directly related to the 
number of transaction observations composing that model.  Adaptive Trust Modeling 
favors a truster’s experience-based model as the number of observations increases, and 
the experience-based model is favored more quickly if the truster’s reputation-based 
model (the alternative to the experience-based model) is inaccurate.  Adaptive Trust 
Modeling determines the optimal weighting between experience and reputations, 
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producing aggregated suggestions that are more accurate than Simple Averaging and 
either single (experience- or reputation-based) model alone. 
This section refutes Misconception 1 from Section 1.4: Large systems (with many 
trusters/trustees) always make experience-based modeling ineffective.  In truth, 
experience-based modeling is effective as long as a truster has numerous repeated 
opportunities to transact with each trustee it considers.  Trusters who conduct large 
numbers of transactions in large systems obtain enough transaction observations to make 
experience-based modeling useful; conversely, trusters who very rarely conduct any 







0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
























Figure 3-17. Comparison of Adaptive Trust Modeling’s weight of the experience-based model 
( , agg,err,minE σω ) when computed theoretically versus measured experimentally as number of transaction 
observations (m) increases (σbeh = 1.0, σR,sug = 0.5).  Solid lines are for clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
Availability of transaction observations (more specifically, transactions predicted 
to yield a positive payoff) is limited when the potential trustee is perceived to be 
untrustworthy; the effect of trustee trustworthiness on a truster’s ability to build its 
experience-based model is examined in Section 3.2.2.  Further, when a trustee changes its 
behavior pattern, the truster’s experience-based model, based on the earlier behavior 
pattern, becomes obsolete.  In this case, the truster may be limited in the number of 
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transaction observations it can acquire between trustee behavior changes; the impact of 
dynamic trustee behavior patterns on a truster’s ability to build its experience-based 
model is examined in Section 3.2.3.   
3.2.2 TRUSTEE BEHAVIOR: TRUSTWORTHY VS. UNTRUSTWORTHY 
This section examines how a trustee’s level of trustworthiness influences 1) a 
truster’s ability to build an accurate experience-based trust model and 2) reliance on 
experience- vs. reputation-based trust models (as measured by weights using Adaptive 
Trust Modeling).  Intuitively, a truster will rely on reputation-based models over 
experience-based models when a trustee is untrustworthy because the truster is less likely 
to observe enough transactions to build an accurate experience-based model.  
Alternatively, when a trustee is trustworthy, numerous transactions permit a truster to 
build an accurate experience-based model.  This pattern is identifiable in real-world 
scenarios, such as auto repair; a smart consumer who has been previously cheated by an 
auto mechanic often seeks out numerous reputation recommendations, hesitating before 
trusting the mechanic again.  Conversely, a consumer who has had positive experiences 
with an auto mechanic often quickly builds and relies on his own experiences, choosing 
to trust the mechanic repeatedly. 
Two factors influence the relationship between trustee trustworthiness (as 
measured by μbeh) and the weight the truster places on its experience-based trust model 
( , agg,err,minE σω ).  First, the frequency of transactions affects how quickly the experience-
based trust model is built; the less trustworthy a trustee is perceived by the truster to be 
(μbeh is negative), the less likely transactions are to occur.  Second, the accuracy of the 
truster’s reputation-based model influences how many transaction observations are 
needed to make the truster’s experience-based model more accurate that its reputation-
based model.  
Before a truster has observed any transactions with the trustee, it may base 
trusting decisions on only its reputation-based model, since no transactions have occurred 
upon which to base an experience-based model.  When μbeh is negative, there is a chance 
that the reputation-based model may suggest trusting; the probability of an incorrect 
 77
suggestion to trust increases as σR,sug is larger relative to the magnitude of μbeh.  When 
μbeh is positive, the reputation-based model correctly suggests trusting (again, the 
probability of an incorrect suggestion increases with larger values of σR,sug).  Each time 
the truster follows a suggestion to trust, it gains a transaction observation with which to 
build up its experience-based model.  As the experience-based model is built up, the 
truster gives more weight to it ( , agg,err,minE σω  increases).   
Frequency of transactions (or probability of a transaction occurring) is expressed 
by the ratio m/mopp, where mopp represents the number of transaction opportunities a 
truster encounters and m represents, from Section 3.2.1, the number of transactions the 
truster chooses to conduct (and upon which it bases its experience-based model).  When 
μbeh is negative, since transaction observations (and therefore, the truster’s experience-
based model) probabilistically indicate that the trustee is untrustworthy, the truster’s 
aggregate suggestion is even less likely to suggest trusting, so even more transaction 
opportunities pass before another transaction occurs (m/mopp decreases).  When another 
transaction does occur, the additional transaction observation only reinforces that the 
truster should not trust; additionally, the truster places even more weight on the 
experience-based model, since it has acquired more transaction observations (in other 
words, m is larger).  Therefore, a cycle forms in which the experience-based model is 
relied upon increasingly, yet experience-based suggestions indicate not to trust, which 
slows the rate at which the experience-based model is built up. 
This experiment compares the weight, , agg,err,minE σω , the truster places, when using 
Adaptive Trust Modeling, on its experience-based model (as opposed to reputation-based 
model) for different levels of trustee trustworthiness (defined by different μbeh values).  
The setup for this experiment is similar to that of Section 3.2.1.  A single truster has 
access to an aggregated reputation-based trust model with suggestions following the 
distribution N(μR,sug, σR,sug), where μR,sug = μbeh and σR,sug takes on values of 0.5 and 1.0.  
The trustee yields a payoff to the truster, Pact, according to the distribution N(μbeh, σ beh), 
where μbeh takes on values of -2.0, -1.0, -0.5, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0, and σ beh = 1.0.  Each 
run consists of 100 transaction opportunities (mopp); results from n = 10,000 runs are 
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averaged.  Note that the truster utilizes only reputations regarding the initial transaction, 
when no experience-based model is available.   
Figure 3-18 shows , agg,err,minE σω  as a function of mopp for several values of μbeh, both 
negative (trustee is untrustworthy, overall) and positive (trustee is trustworthy, overall), 
when σR,sug equals 0.5.  When μbeh equals -2.0, the likelihood of the reputation-based 
model suggesting “trust” is so small (because reputation suggestions follow the 
distribution N(−2.0, 0.5)), that the truster never chooses to trust the trustee.  As a result, 
, agg,err,minE σ
ω  remains zero because the truster’s experience-based trust model is never built 
(the ratio m/mopp equals nearly zero), and the truster must continue to rely solely on its 
reputation-based trust model.  When μbeh equals -1.0, the likelihood of the reputation-
based model suggesting “trust” is slightly greater (reputation suggestions follow the 
distribution N(−1.0, 0.5)).  Therefore, the truster is more likely to trust occasionally, has 
more transaction opportunities to build up its experience-based trust model, and, 
therefore, becomes more favorable ( , agg,err,minE σω  increases) more quickly.  When μbeh equals 
-0.5, , agg,err,minE σω  increases even more quickly for the same reason.  In general, as negative 
values of μbeh approach zero, the ratio m/mopp increases, approaching 0.5. 
When μbeh is positive (0.5, 1.0, or 2.0), the reputation-based trust model (as well 
as the experience-based trust model, as it is built up) suggests trusting nearly always.  
Therefore, a transaction is observed at nearly every opportunity (the ratio m/mopp 
approaches one as μbeh increases).  Further, as more transactions are observed, the 
truster’s experience-based trust model is built up, reinforcing the positive suggestion to 
trust.  As a result, , agg,err,minE σω  increases more quickly when μbeh is positive rather than 
negative, though , agg,err,minE σω  increases only slightly more quickly when μbeh equals 1.0 or 
2.0 than when μbeh equals 0.5. 
Figure 3-19 shows , agg,err,minE σω  as a function of mopp for the same values of μbeh 
when σR,sug equals 1.0.  When μbeh is negative, the ratio m/mopp is small; , agg,err,minE σω  grows 
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more slowly for more negative values of μbeh.  By examining Figure 3-18 and Figure 
3-19, note that , agg,err,minE σω  grows at a similar rate when μbeh is negative for similar ratios of 
σR,sug/μbeh, which indicate similar probabilities of incorrect suggestions to trust (for 
example, compare μbeh equals 1.0 in Figure 3-18, when σR,sug equals 0.5, to μbeh equals 
2.0 in Figure 3-19, when σR,sug equals 1.0).  Especially when μbeh is positive, , agg,err,minE σω  
grows more quickly in Figure 3-19 (σR,sug equals 1.0) than in Figure 3-18 (σR,sug equals 
0.5) because the accuracy of the experience-based model more quickly outpaces the 
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Figure 3-18.  Adaptive Trust Modeling’s weight (ωE) of experience-based model as a function of 
number of transaction opportunities (mopp) for the following values of μbeh: -2.0, -1.0, -0.5, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 
and 2.0 (σ beh = 1.0, σR,sug = 0.5).  Solid lines are for clarity only (mopp is discrete). 
 
In summary, trustee trustworthiness influences transaction frequency (m/mopp), 
which determines how quickly experience-based trust model is built.  A truster is less 
likely to conduct transactions with—and therefore, gain transaction observations about—
an untrustworthy trustee.  As a result, the truster’s experience-based model takes longer 
(in terms of mopp) to build and the truster relies more on its reputation-based model.  
Further, the increasingly-accurate experience-based model provides evidence of a 
trustee’s level of trustworthiness, driving the truster to trust more (if the trustee is 
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trustworthy) or less (untrustworthy), which either speeds or slows, respectively, further 







0 5 10 15 20 25 30





















μ beh  = -2.0
μ beh  = -1.0
μ beh  = -0.5
μ beh  = 2.0
μ beh  = 1.0
μ beh  = 0.5
μ beh  = 0.0
 
Figure 3-19. Adaptive Trust Modeling’s weight (ωE) of experience-based model as a function of 
number of transaction opportunities (mopp) for the following values of μbeh: -2.0, -1.0, -0.5, 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 
and 2.0 (σ beh = 1.0, σR,sug = 1.0).  Solid lines are for clarity only (mopp is discrete). 
 
3.2.3 DYNAMIC TRUSTEE TRUSTWORTHINESS  
By relaxing the earlier assumption that a trustee’s behavior distribution (N(μbeh, 
σbeh)) does not change, this section addresses how dynamic trustee trustworthiness 
influences a truster’s experience-based trust model and reliance on experience- vs. 
reputation-based trust models.  If trustee behavior changes frequently, the truster never 
observes enough transactions to build an accurate experience-based model.  As a result, 
the truster is forced to always rely more on its reputation-based model.  This intuitive 
result is seen often in real-world situations.  For example, the quality of online businesses 
may change rapidly, with new companies starting up, going out of business, or building 
reliability.  Customers who make infrequent purchases in these dynamic markets (such as 
eBay) repeatedly use reputation-based trust modeling—either through personal word-of-
mouth or expert recommendations—before conducting repeat transactions.  The rate at 
which past experiences (transaction observations) become obsolete is directly related to 
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the rate at which the trustee changes its behavior [Fullam and Barber, 2005].  This 
concept is confirmed by the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, which states that the 
transaction observation sampling rate must be at least twice the frequency at which the 
modeled behavior changes [Jerri, 1977]. 
Changes in trustee trustworthiness mean building an experience-based model 
must start anew and the number of observed transactions, m, is “reset” to zero (though it 
must be understood that the truster most likely does not know exactly when a change in 
the trustee’s behavior pattern has occurred).  Relationships between the frequency of 
trustee behavior changes (as measured by the number of observed transactions, m, that 
take place between each change) and resulting weights , agg,err,minR σω  and , agg,err,minE σω  are 































. Eqn 27 
To determine the theoretical number of observed transactions necessary to build 
an experience-based model with accuracy such that a specific value for , agg,err,minE σω  is 
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. Eqn 30 
In particular, to theoretically build an experience-based model with accuracy equivalent 
to that of a reputation-based trust model ( , agg,err,minE σω  = , agg,err,minR σω  = 0.5), Equation 30 










Therefore, the number of observed transactions needed to build an experience-based 
model at least as accurate as a given reputation-based model depends on both the 
accuracy of the reputation-based model (σR,sug) and the amount of variation in the 









 transactions, the truster is likely to always favor its reputation-based model.  
If σR,sug is very large compared to σbeh (reputations are very inaccurate), the experience-
based trust model requires only a few transaction observations to become more accurate 
than the reputation-based trust model.  If σR,sug is very small compared to σbeh (reputation 
model is very accurate), then the reputation-based model will be trusted more than the 
experience-based model, even if the trustee changes its behavior rarely. 
In the extreme case, the trustee may change behavior patterns randomly with each 
new observed transaction.  In this case, m always equals zero, since the truster’s 
experience-based trust model is obsolete after every observed transaction.  Therefore, the 


































, 0agg,err,minE σω = . 
In other words, such high variability in the trustee’s behavior yields the truster’s 
experience-based trust model useless, and the truster is likely to always weight its 
reputation-based trust model as , agg,err,minR σω = 1.  In practice, however, if the trustee’s 
behavior shifts follow a pattern, the experience-based model may build a model with a 
wider error distribution, encompassing both variation due to individual σbeh values 
between each change, as well as the additional error due to the overall change pattern.  In 
essence, patterns in trustee behavior shifts simply represent trustee behavior distributions 
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with larger standard deviations.  In these cases, the truster can substitute its estimates of 
model error standard deviation (σE,err and σR,err) for estimates of suggestion standard 
deviation (σE,sug and σR,sug) when computing weights, as is done in the experiments 
below.   
These experiments demonstrate that the truster’s experience-based trust model is 
less favored by Adaptive Trust Modeling ( , agg,err,minE σω  is lower) when the trustee changes 
its behavior pattern more frequently.  Dynamic trustee behavior is modeled as changes in 
μbeh (σ beh remains constant at 1.0) according to a uniform distribution between 2.0 and 
8.0 (all values of μbeh remain positive to avoid large numbers of declined transactions, 
which cause the ratio m/mopp to be less than one, from Section 3.2.2).  Changes in μbeh 
occur after every mmax transactions (mmax equals 1, 5, or 50).  The truster is assumed to 
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where τ equals five.  Similarly, the five most recent reputation-based suggestions are 
used to compute the truster’s estimate of σR,sug.  Results from n = 100 runs are averaged 
for each experiment. 
Figure 3-20, Figure 3-21, and Figure 3-22 show average absolute value error 
(calculated as in Equation 28 in Section 3.2.1) as a function of number of transaction 
observations (m) for three weighting techniques: 1) Experience-Based Model Only, 2) 
Reputation-Based Model Only, and 3) Adaptive Trust Modeling.  All three techniques 
utilize reputations regarding the initial transaction, when no experience-based model is 
available.  Reputation suggestions follow the distribution N(μR,sug, σR,sug), where μR,sug 
equals μbeh (which changes every mmax transactions) and σR,sug equals 0.1.  Since σR,sug 
 84
represents the variation in reputation suggestions for a single μbeh, the actual distribution 
of all reputation suggestions, over all changes in μbeh, is wider. 
In Figure 3-20, mmax equals 50; trustee behavior, as indicated by μbeh, shifts 
relatively infrequently.  Though the error of the truster’s experience-based model (as 
shown by the Experience-Based Model Only dataset) spikes immediately after shifts in 
μbeh, many transaction observations occur between shifts, enabling the experience-based 
model to become as accurate as the reputation-based model (shown by the Reputation-
Based Model Only dataset).  The Adaptive Trust Modeling maintains error magnitudes 
close to but significantly (α = 0.05) higher than the Reputation-Based Model Only 
weighting technique, but significantly lower than the Experience-Based Model Only 
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Figure 3-20. Absolute value error as a function of number of transaction observations m (σ beh = 1.0, 
σR,sug = 0.1, mmax equals 50, τ = 5).  Three weighting techniques are shown: 1) Experience-Based 
Model Only, 2) Reputation-Based Model Only, and 3) Adaptive Trust Modeling.  Solid lines are for 
clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
In Figure 3-21, trustee behavior shifts more frequently (mmax equals 5).  As a 
result, the experience-based model never observes enough transactions to achieve 
accuracy on par with the reputation-based model.  Instead, the error of the experience-
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based model continually fluctuates, with just enough transaction observations between 
μbeh shifts to achieve error near (yet still greater than) that of the reputation-based model 
before spiking again.  The Adaptive Trust Modeling maintains error magnitudes close to 
but significantly (α = 0.05) higher than the Reputation-Based Model Only weighting 









0 50 100 150 200 250 300
















Figure 3-21. Absolute value error as a function of number of transaction observations m (σ beh = 1.0, 
σR,sug = 0.1, mmax equals 5, τ = 5).  Three weighting techniques are shown: 1) Experience-Based Model 
Only, 2) Reputation-Based Model Only, and 3) Adaptive Trust Modeling.  Solid lines are for clarity 
only (m is discrete). 
 
In Figure 3-22, trustee behavior shifts continuously (mmax equals 1).  As a result, 
the experience-based model is never built up.  In fact, the experience-based model 
models what appears as a wider distribution: the trustee’s distribution N(μR,sug, σR,sug) 
compounded by μbeh changes (according to U(2.0, 8.0)) after each observed transaction.  
Therefore, the experience-based model’s error is much greater than that of that of the 
reputation-based model.   Again, The Adaptive Trust Modeling maintains error 
magnitudes close to but significantly (α = 0.05) higher than the Reputation-Based Model 
Only weighting technique, but significantly lower than the Experience-Based Model 
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Figure 3-22. Absolute value error as a function of number of transaction observations m (σ beh = 1.0, 
σR,sug = 0.1, mmax equals 1, τ = 5).  Three weighting techniques are shown: 1) Experience-Based Model 
Only, 2) Reputation-Based Model Only, and 3) Adaptive Trust Modeling.  Solid lines are for clarity 
only (m is discrete). 
 
Experience-based model weights ( , agg,err,minE σω ) computed by Adaptive Trust 
Modeling are shown in Figure 3-23.  When mmax equals 50, the truster weights its 
experience- and reputation-based models nearly equally: , agg,err,minE σω  equals 0.4 (exact 
weights depend on specific values of σbeh and σR,sug).   When mmax equals 5, , agg,err,minE σω  is 
lower (than when mmax equals 50)—decreasing early on before stabilizing at about 0.2—
because the truster’s experience-based model lacks enough transaction observations 
between μbeh shifts to become as accurate as the reputation-based model.  Finally, 
, agg,err,minE σ
ω  is lowest (0.15) when mmax equals 1, since the truster’s experience-based model 
is never built up.  However, , agg,err,minE σω  does not reach zero because the experience-based 
model identifies the larger pattern of trustee behavior changes, building a model with 
larger error standard deviation.  Exact , agg,err,minE σω  values are also influenced by the τ value 
chosen by the designer.  When τ is customized—low τ when mmax is low (to maximize 
exploration) and high τ when mmax is high (to maximize exploitation)—experimental 
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, agg,err,minE σ
ω  values are closer to the theoretical values given by Equation 27.  Further, it is 
hypothesized that customization of τ enables Adaptive Trust Modeling to achieve error 
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Figure 3-23. Adaptive Trust Modeling’s weight (ωE) of experience-based model as a function of 
number of transaction observations (m) for three values of mmax: 1, 5, and 50.  Solid lines are for 
clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
In summary, increased frequency of trustee behavior changes permits fewer 
transaction observations before an experience-based model is obsolete.  As a result, 
reputation-based models prove more reliable when trustee trustworthiness is dynamic.  
Nevertheless, if trustee trustworthiness changes follow a pattern, an experience-based 
model may provide suggestions based on that wider-varying pattern.  As a result, an 
experience-based model may provide useful suggestions when trustee trustworthiness is 
highly dynamic, but with greater error.  Adaptive Trust Modeling determines the optimal 
weighting between experience and reputations, regardless of trustee trustworthiness 
dynamics, producing aggregated suggestions that are more accurate than either 
experience- or reputation-based modeling alone. 
This section refutes Misconception 2 from Section 1.4: Infrequent transactions 
always make experience-based modeling ineffective.  In truth, experience-based modeling 
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is effective as long as the frequency with which transaction observations are accumulated 
sufficiently exceeds the frequency with which a trustee changes its trustworthiness 
behavior pattern.  Infrequent transactions still build an effective experience-based model 
if trustee behavior patterns change so rarely that the truster can still obtain transaction 
observations between those changes.   
3.3 Reputation-Based Trust Model Usability Factors 
  
This section examines factors influencing the quality of reputation-based trust 
models, including the accuracy of reputations a truster receives and cost of acquiring 
reputations.  Experiments in Section 3.3.1.1 demonstrate that the weight of a truster’s 
reputation-based model, as computed by Adaptive Trust Modeling, is higher when the 
accuracy of that model is higher.  Error-Sensitive Translation (Section 3.3.1.2) enables a 
truster to utilize consistent, though inaccurate (μR,err ≠ 0), suggestions from reputation 
providers, validating the statement in Section 3.1.4 that reputation error means are 
assumed to be zero.  Finally, experiments in Section 3.3.1 demonstrate that the weight of 
a truster’s reputation-based model is lower when reputation acquisition costs are high, 
since the number of reputations the truster can afford is more limited.  These reputation 
cost experiments motivate Adaptive Cost Selection (Chapter 4), by which a truster 
assesses the value of trust information and determines the appropriate trust information to 
acquire, in light of acquisition costs. 
3.3.1 REPUTATION-BASED MODEL ACCURACY 
This section examines how the accuracy of a reputation-based model influences 
the usefulness of that model.  Accuracy is examined both in terms of model error 
standard deviation (when model suggestions vary widely) and mean (when the model 
suggestions are consistent, yet incorrect).  Two scenarios are considered: 1) the 
reputation-based model maintains constant accuracy and 2) the reputation-based model 
increases in accuracy over time.   
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3.3.1.1  Accuracy by Error Standard Deviation 
This section explores how the usefulness of a reputation-based trust model varies 
depending on its error standard deviation.  Two scenarios are examined: in the first, the 
reputation-based model maintains a constant error standard deviation, while in the 
second, the reputation-based model error standard deviation decreases over time.  
Reputation-based models with constant error standard deviation are more likely when 
reputation providers in the system are established and provide reputation suggestions of 
consistent accuracy.  Reputation-based models with decreasing error standard deviation 
are more likely when reputation providers are improving their own trust models over 
time.  
Experience-based models require more transaction observations (higher m) to 
match the accuracy of a highly-accurate reputation-based model, as opposed to an 
inaccurate reputation-based model.  Therefore, reputation-based models with lower error 
standard deviations (σR,err) take “longer” (more transaction observations) to become 
outweighed by a truster’s experience-based model.  This relationship is consistent with 
real-world examples.  When recommendations from others, such as experts, prove very 
reliable, humans tend to trust those experts more than their own experiences, even when 
their experience-based models are based on numerous transactions.  On the contrary, 
when a recommendation is provided by a very unreliable source, a human truster will 
override those recommendations even with few experiences on which to rely.  For 
example, a patient with a chronic illness may follow the advice of a world-renown expert, 
even if the patient has years of experience dealing with the illness himself.  In contrast, 
the patient may discount the recommendations of a hurried clinic nurse, even about 
symptoms with which the patient is not familiar.  The patient perceives the expert to be a 
much more accurate (reputation) provider than the nurse, and so trusts the expert’s 
recommendations above the patient’s own experience, but experience above the advice of 
the nurse. 
Equation 26 in Section 3.1.2 describes the weight, , agg,err,minR σω , of a reputation-
based model in terms of the number of observed transactions, m, the variation in the 
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trustees trustworthiness behavior, σbeh, and the accuracy of the reputation-based model, 














. Eqn 26 
Based on Equation 26, more accurate (lower σR,sug) reputation-based models are weighted 
more highly by Adaptive Trust Modeling for constant trustee behavior (σbeh) and number 
of observed transactions (m). 
This weight relationship is demonstrated by experiments, extending those in 
Section 3.2.1, which compare experience- vs. reputation-based trust models.  This 
experiment compares the error of aggregate suggestions (σagg,err) using each of the four 
techniques described in Section 3.2.1: 1) Experience-Based Model Only, 2) Reputation-
Based Model Only, 3) Simple Averaging, and 4) Adaptive Trust Modeling (all four 
techniques utilize only reputations regarding the initial transaction, when no experience-
based model is available).  A single truster has access to an aggregated reputation-based 
trust model which produces suggestions from the distribution N(μR,sug, σR,sug), where 
μR,sug = μbeh and σR,sug takes on a value of 0.0, 0.3, 0.5, or 1.0.  The truster is not 
concerned with how the reputations are selected and combined to achieve the specified 
level of accuracy (selecting and combining reputations will be addressed in Section 
3.2.2).  The potential trustee behaves in such a manner that its payoff to the truster, Pact, 
follows the unchanging distribution N(μbeh = 10, σ beh = 1.0); as in Section 3.2.1, μbeh is a 
high positive value to ensure the truster does not decline transactions, slowing the rate at 
which transaction observations are acquired and lowering the ratio m/mopp.  Each run 
consists of 100 transaction opportunities, and results from n = 100,000 runs are averaged.   
Figure 3-24, Figure 3-25, Figure 3-26, and Figure 3-27 display absolute value 
error (as defined by Equation 28 in Section 3.2.1) as a function of number of observed 
transactions (m) when σR,sug equals 0.0, 0.3, 0.5, and 1.0, respectively (note that Figure 
3-26, in which σR,sug equals 0.5, is identical to Figure 3-16 in Section 3.2.1).  In all cases, 
the absolute value error yielded by the reputation-based model is consistent as m 
increases; higher σR,sug results in higher absolute value error.  When σR,sug equals zero 
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(Figure 3-24), the reputation-based model provides the highest accuracy possible; 
therefore, it is not advantageous for the truster to utilize its experience-based model in 
this case.  Adaptive Trust Modeling achieves error levels statistically similar (α = 0.05) 
to those of the reputation-based model once the truster quickly discovers the reputation-
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Figure 3-24. Experimental comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Experience-
Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling 
techniques as number of transaction observations (m) increases (σR,sug = 0.0).  Absolute value error 
for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a baseline.  Solid lines 
are for clarity only (m is discrete).  
 
When σR,sug equals 0.3 or 0.5 (Figure 3-25 and Figure 3-26, respectively), the 
reputation-based model yields error lower than that of the experience-based model for 
low values of m, simply because the experience-based model’s error is still decreasing 
(the reputation-based model is overtaken more quickly when σR,sug equals 0.5 than when 
σR,sug equals 0.3).  In both cases, the error of Adaptive Trust Modeling is statistically 
similar (α = 0.05) to that of the reputation-based model for low values of m, but 
decreases (in correlation to the experience-based model) as m increases.  When m is 
large, the error of Adaptive Trust Modeling is statistically similar (α = 0.05) to that of the 
experience-based model.  When σR,sug equals 1.0 (Figure 3-27), the reputation-based 
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model’s error is higher than that of the experience-based model immediately (when m = 1 
and greater).  As a result, the error of Adaptive Trust Modeling is statistically similar (α 
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Figure 3-25.  Experimental comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Experience-
Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling 
techniques as number of transaction observations (m) increases (σR,sug = 0.3).  Absolute value error 
for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a baseline.  Solid lines 
are for clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
As further justification for the validity of Adaptive Trust Modeling, note that the 
error of the Adaptive Trust Modeling mechanism is as low as, or lower than, the error of 
all other three weighting techniques: Experience-Based Model Only, Reputation-Based 
Model Only, and Simple Averaging.  Figure 3-28 shows , agg,err,minR σω  as a function of m for 
each of the σR,sug values explored: 0.0, 0.3, 0.5, and 1.0.  In agreement with previous 
discussion, Adaptive Trust Modeling computes , agg,err,minR σω  = 1 over all m values when 
σR,sug equals zero.  For less accurate reputation-based models, (higher values of σR,sug), 
, agg,err,minR σ
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Figure 3-26. Experimental comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Experience-
Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling 
techniques as number of transaction observations (m) increases (σR,sug = 0.5).  Absolute value error 
for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a baseline.  Solid lines 
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Figure 3-27.  Experimental comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Experience-
Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling 
techniques as number of transaction observations (m) increases (σR,sug = 1.0).  Absolute value error 
for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a baseline.  Solid lines 
are for clarity only (m is discrete). 
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In some cases, it is simplistic to assume the accuracy of an aggregate reputation-
based model stays constant.  In particular, a reputation-based model may become more 
accurate over time (assuming reputation providers are honest) as reputation providers 
improve their own trust models by observing transactions with the potential trustee and 
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Figure 3-28. Adaptive Trust Modeling’s weight (ωR) of reputation-based model as a function of 
number of transaction observations (m) when σR,sug equals 0.0, 0.3, 0.5, and 1.0.  Solid lines are for 
clarity only (m is discrete). 
 
To examine scenarios in which the accuracy of a reputation-based model 
increases over time, a reputation model building factor, br, is introduced, representing—
as a multiple of m—the rate at which a truster’s reputation-based model is built.  The 
number, mr, of transaction observations making up the truster’s reputation-based model is 
computed as: 
 r rm b m= . Eqn 31 
 
The value of br is greater than one in most cases, because for each of the truster’s own 
transaction observations (making up its experience-based model), either the truster’s sole 
reputation provider gathers multiple, independent transaction observations (through its 
own experience or as a “reputation broker,” gathering reputations communicated by other 
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reputation providers), or the truster receives reputations from multiple providers (who 
each gather at least one independent transaction observation). 
The suggestion standard deviation (σE,sug) of a truster’s experience-based model, 
as a function of m, is given by Equation 24 from Section 3.2.1, repeated here: 
 ( ), behE sug m m
σσ = . Eqn 24 
The suggestion standard deviation (σR,sug) of the truster’s reputation-based model 
is given by: 




σσ =  




σσ = . Eqn 32 
 
 
From Section 3.1.4 (Equation 13), the weight, , agg,err,minR σω , assigned by a truster to its 
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. Eqn 33 
In the case in which experience- and reputation-based trust models improve 
accuracy by observing transactions, Equation 33 demonstrates that the weight, , agg,err,minR σω , 
of the reputation-based model is determined by br alone.  For example, if the reputation-
based model incorporates twice as many independent transaction observations as the 
experience-based model in the same amount of time (br = 2), then , agg,err,minR σω  = 2/3.  When 
br = 1, (experience- and reputation-based models increase in accuracy at the same rate), 
, agg,err,minR σ
ω  = 1/2; it is intuitive that both models are weighted equally. 
If the truster’s reputation-based model is based on no transaction observations (br 
= 0), the reputation-based model has no accuracy, and , agg,err,minR σω  appropriately equals 
zero.  If the truster’s reputation-based model is built before the truster itself observes any 
transactions, or, in effect, the experience-based model is never built (br = ∞), then 
, agg,err,minR σ
ω  equals one, because the truster’s experience-based model is unable to 
contribute any accuracy.  It must be remembered that both of these extreme cases assume 
the experience- and reputation-based models are built according to Equations 24 and 32.  
That is, neither model has constant accuracy (constant σE,sug or σR,sug, respectively); both 
have decreasing suggestion standard deviations as dictated by m and mr and, ultimately, 
the ratio br.  Further, the assumption implies that reputation providers truthfully convey 
an aggregate of their own transaction observations (or independent observations 
truthfully conveyed to them by others).  Reputation suggestions communicated by 
untruthful reputation providers would most likely not continue to increase in accuracy 
according to Equation 32.  The concept of br, a ratio describing the relative rate at which 
transaction observations are acquired to build up experience- and reputation-based 
models, can be extended to compare rates of transaction observation acquisition between 
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reputation providers, thus assisting the truster in selecting from individual reputation 
providers when building an aggregated reputation-based model (combining reputations 
from multiple providers is discussed in Section 3.3.2). 
Table 3-2 summarizes calculations of σagg,err for each of the weighting techniques 
described previously: 1) Experience-Based Model Only, 2) Reputation-Based Model 
Only, 3) Simple Averaging, and 4) Adaptive Trust Modeling.  Figure 3-29 shows a 
theoretical calculation of absolute value error (as defined by Equation 28 in Section 
3.2.1) when br = 2 for each of the four techniques.  Error for the Experience-Based Model 
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Table 3-2. Weighting technique names, weights, and corresponding equations for aggregate error 
standard deviation (σagg,err). 
Weighing 
Technique Weights (ωE, ωR) 
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 (Eqn 36) 
 
 
Error for the reputation-based model is calculated similarly, with mr = brm 







σ σ += . Eqn 34 
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Error for the Simple Averaging technique is computed according to Equation 20 in 
Section 3.1.4: 
 ( ) ( )2 2 2, , ,0.5 0.5agg err E sug R sug behσ σ σ σ= + +  Eqn 20 
22
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, 0.5 0.5beh behagg err beh
rm b m
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. Eqn 36 
Figure 3-29 shows a theoretical calculation of absolute value error (computed 
from Equation 28 in Section 3.2.1) when br = 2 for each of the four weighing techniques.  
When m is small, the experience- and reputation-based models have similar levels of 
error.  However, as m increases, the reputation-based model increases accuracy at a faster 
rate than the experience-based model, because the reputation-based model is based on 
twice as many transaction observations as the experience-based model, for any given 
value of m.  Adaptive Trust Modeling maintains the lowest error of all techniques, 
computing , agg,err,minR σω  = 0.67 from Equation 33.  The Simple Averaging technique 
maintains error almost as low as Adaptive Trust Modeling because the weights it 
employs (ωR = 0.5) are close to those computed by the Adaptive Trust Modeling 
( , agg,err,minR σω  = 0.67) in the case of br = 2. 
Figure 3-30 shows empirical results from an experiment in which the four 
weighting techniques in Table 3-2 are compared.  To simulate a reputation-based model 
increasing in accuracy over time, a single truster has access to an aggregated reputation-
based trust model based on br transaction observations for every observation incorporated 
into the truster’s experience-based model.  The potential trustee behaves in such a manner 
that its payoff to the truster, Pact, follows the distribution N(μbeh = 10, σ beh = 1.0).  Each 
run consists of 100 transaction opportunities, and results from n = 100,000 runs are 
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averaged.  Results from the experiment agree with the theoretical prediction shown in 
Figure 3-29.  When m is low, Adaptive Trust Modeling achieves error (statistically, α = 
0.05) signicantly lower than both Experience- and Reputation-Based Only techniques.  
When m is high, the error of Adaptive Trust Modeling is statistically similar to both 
Experience- and Reputation-Based Only techniques, demonstrating that the choice of 
weighting is less important as both experience- and reputation-based models become very 
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Figure 3-29. Theoretical comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Experience-
Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling 
techniques as number of experience-based model transaction observations (m) increases (br = 2).  
Absolute value error for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a 
baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete).  
 
The similarity between the predicted Adaptive Trust Modeling results and 
empirical results is demonstrated in Figure 3-31.  Figure 3-32 shows , agg,err,minR σω  values 
calculated by Adaptive Trust Modeling, as compared to theoretical , agg,err,minR σω  values 
given by Equation 33 (Figure 3-32 also displays experimental and theoretical , agg,err,minR σω  
values for br = 1 and br = 10, in addition to br = 2).  Initially, Adaptive Trust Modeling 
assigns , agg,err,minR σω  as 0.5.  However, as estimates of experience- and reputation-based 
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model errors are built, , agg,err,minR σω  converges toward 0.67, the value specified by Equation 
33, when br = 2.  It is hypothesized that experimental , agg,err,minR σω  values require large 
numbers of transaction observations before reaching the theoretically-computed 
, agg,err,minR σ
ω  values because slight variations exist in experience- and reputation-based 
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Figure 3-30. Experimental comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Experience-
Based Model Only, Reputation-Based Model Only, Simple Averaging, and Adaptive Trust Modeling 
techniques as number of experience-based model transaction observations (m) increases (br = 2).  
Absolute value error for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable error, is shown as a 
baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete). 
 
In summary, , agg,err,minR σω , the weight of the truster’s reputation-based model, as 
computed by Adaptive Trust Modeling, is higher when the reputation-based model’s 
error, as indicated by its suggestion standard deviation (σR,sug) is lower.  When σR,sug is 
constant, the number of the experience-based model’s transaction observations needed 
for the experience-based model to surpass the reputation-based model in accuracy 
depends on σR,sug.  When σR,sug is low (reputation suggestions are accurate), , agg,err,minR σω is 
slower to decrease (the truster relies on its reputation-based model longer because the 
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experience-based model requires more transaction observations to become more accurate 
than the reputation-based model).  Regardless of reputation-based model accuracy and 
number of observed transactions, Adaptive Trust Modeling dynamically identifies the 
optimal weighting of experience- and reputation-based models to achieve the most 
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Figure 3-31. Comparison of theoretical and experimental aggregate suggestion absolute value error 
for Adaptive Trust Modeling as number of experience-based model transaction observations (m) 
increases (br = 2).  Absolute value error for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the minimum achievable 
error, is shown as a baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete).  
 
In some cases, the accuracy of a truster’s reputation-based model increases just as 
its experience-based model accuracy increases, because the reputation-based model, too, 
is based on transaction observations.  The frequency of transactions contributing to the 
truster’s reputation-based model is usually higher than that of transactions contributing to 
the truster’s experience-based model because the reputation-based model is made up of 
reputations from either several providers contributing their observations or one reputation 
provider contributing more frequent observations.  When a truster’s reputation-based 
model increases in accuracy for this reason (assuming reputations are truthful), higher 
, agg,err,minR σ
ω values are computed by Adaptive Trust Modeling when the rate at which 
transaction observations are incorporated into the reputation-based model, relative to the 
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rate at which transaction observations are incorporated into the truster’s experience-based 
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Figure 3-32. Adaptive Trust Modeling’s weight (ωR) of reputation-based model as a function of 
number of experience-based model transaction observations (m) (br = 1, 2, and 10).  For comparison, 
theoretical weights are shown.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete). 
 
This section helps refute Misconception 4 from Section 1.4: A truster can rely on 
experience-based modeling for low-value transactions, but should always acquire 
reputations when considering high-value transactions.  This misconception arises from 
the idea that reputations are a more accurate supplement to a truster’s existing 
experience-based model, which is not always true.  In truth, a truster’s decision to utilize 
experience vs. reputations must be based on the relative accuracy of both models.  If the 
truster’s experience-based model is more accurate than the reputations it has access to, 
the truster should rely more on experience than on reputations. 
3.3.1.2 Performing Error-Sensitive Translation: Overcoming Mean Errors 
This section serves as an aside, demonstrating the validity of Adaptive Trust 
Modeling’s assumption that μR,sug = μbeh for a reputation-based trust model’s suggestions 
and, therefore, μR,err = 0.  Error-Sensitive Translation is introduced, by which a reputation 
model’s suggestions are adjusted to eliminate consistent errors of suggestion mean, μR,err 
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(Equation 21 in Section 3.2.1 demonstrates that error mean for experience-based models, 
μE,err, is theoretically always zero).  Intuitively, reputation suggestions that are highly 
consistent (low suggestion distribution standard deviation, μR,sug) provide valuable 
information, regardless of their suggestions’ error distribution mean.  For instance, if a 
celebrity has a clothing advisor who always recommends the wrong outfit for every 
occasion (such as a tuxedo for an afternoon barbecue event), the celebrity might wear the 
opposite of what the advisor recommends (casual attire instead of the tuxedo), thereby 
performing a reflective transformation on the recommendation.  As another example, a 
malfunctioning mass scale might always report values that are five kilograms greater than 
the true mass being weighed; in this case the human scale reader might perform a 
translative transformation on the reported mass, subtracting five kilograms to arrive at the 
correct mass reading.  Similarly, a MySpace user seeking friends might discount 
reputations about strangers if the user knows that all recommenders are overly positive.  
In each example, the provided suggestions are useful, despite inaccuracies, because the 
consistency of the provider gives the suggestion receiver a transformation by which to 
correct the suggestion’s inaccuracy. 
Throughout the discussion of weighting two (Section 3.1.4) or more (later in 
Section 3.3.2) suggestions to derive an aggregate suggestion, it has been assumed that 
trust models from which those suggestions derive have error means (μerr) of zero.  
However, a reputation provider i may have an error distribution with a mean other than 
zero, providing reputation suggestions that are overly pessimistic ( ,iR errμ  < 0) or overly 
optimistic ( ,iR errμ  > 0).  Averaging of reputation suggestions without accounting for 
differences in error means produces aggregate suggestions with distorted values.  
Nevertheless, usefulness is gleaned from reputation providers with consistent (low ,iR errσ ) 
yet inaccurate (high ,iR errμ ) reputation suggestions.  Error-Sensitive Translation 
performs a translation for nonzero error means to produce an adjusted suggestion, ' ,iR sugP : 
'
, , ,i i iR sug R sug R err
P P μ= −  
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Note that, theoretically, experience-based trust models always have error means equal to 
zero, based on Equation 21 in Section 3.2.1.  Since 
( ),E sug behmμ μ= , 
therefore, 
( ) ( ), , 0E err E sug behm mμ μ μ= − = . 
An experiment is conducted to assess the validity of performing Error-Sensitive 
Translation when reputation provider error means ( ,iR errμ ) are nonzero.  In the 
experiment, a single truster has access to only an aggregated reputation-based trust model 
which produces suggestions from the distribution N(μR,sug, σR,sug), where μR,sug = μbeh + 
μR,err  and σR,sug = 1.0.  Adaptive Trust Modeling is not implemented, since the truster’s 
experience-based model is ignored.  Suggestion error mean, μR,err, takes on values of 0.0, 
0.5, 1.0, and 2.0.  The potential trustee behaves in such a manner that its payoff to the 
truster, Pact, follows the distribution N(μbeh = 10, σ beh = 1.0).  Each run consists of 100 
transaction opportunities, and results from n = 10,000 runs are averaged.   
Two translation approaches are compared against an approach of No Translation: 
1) Always Translation and 2) Error-Sensitive Translation.  The Always Translation 
approach performs translation even early on, when m is very low, even though the 
truster’s estimate of μR,err is very primitive.  Error-Sensitive Translation generates two 
hypothetical suggestions for each reputation-based suggestion: one that has undergone 
translation and one that has not.  Error-Sensitive Translation continues to utilize the non-
translated hypothetical suggestion in its aggregate suggestion computation until the error 
of a given translated hypothetical suggestion is lower than the error of its corresponding 
non-translated hypothetical suggestion; at this point, the trustee begins using the 
translated hypothetical suggestion instead. 
Figure 3-33 compares average absolute value error (as defined by Equation 28 in 
Section 3.2.1), for No Translation, Always Translation, and Error-Sensitive Translation 
approaches, when μR,err = 2.0, as a function of number of transaction observations m.  For 
reference, the theoretical minimum error achievable (when μR,err = 0.0) is shown as a 
baseline, where 
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theoretical minimum error = ( )2 2, 2R sug behσ σ π+ . 
 
 
Figure 3-33.  Aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Reputation-Based Model Only weighting 
technique as number of transaction observations (m) increases (μR,err = 2.0).  The following 
translation techniques are compared: 1) No Translation, 2) Always Translation, and 3) Error-
Sensitive Translation.  The theoretical minimum achievable error (for σbeh = 1.0 and σR,sug = 1.0), is 
shown as a baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete). 
 
Although the average absolute value errors of Always Translation and Error 
Sensitive Translation approaches are initially (when m = 1) statistically (α = 0.05) similar 
to that of the No Translation approach, errors of both translation approaches decline 
significantly over the first few transactions as additional observations provide more 
certainty about the appropriate translation magnitude (reputation providers’ error, μR,err).  
As m increases, the error of the Always Translation and Error-Sensitive Transaction 
approaches are statistically similar and significantly lower than No Translation.  The 
Always Translation approach begins its decline one transaction observation before the 
Error Sensitive Translation approach; the Error Sensitive Translation approach waits for 
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before beginning translation.  Nevertheless, the Error Sensitive Translation approach 
begins translation almost immediately, since |μR,err| is large compared to σR,err. 
In Figure 3-34, average absolute value error is compared among the three 
translation approaches for μR,err = 1.0.  In this case, the Always Translation approach 
performs translation with too few transaction observations (and, thus, an inaccurate 
estimate of μR,err), resulting in higher average absolute value error than the No 
Translation approach when m < 3.  The Error Sensitive Translation approach avoids this 
error spike by waiting until m = 3 to begin performing translation.  As m increases, the 
error of the Always Translation and Error-Sensitive Transaction approaches are 
statistically similar and significantly lower than No Translation.   
 
Figure 3-34. Aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Reputation-Based Model Only weighting 
technique as number of transaction observations (m) increases (μR,err = 1.0).  The following 
translation techniques are compared: 1) No Translation, 2) Always Translation, and 3) Error-
Sensitive Translation.  The theoretical minimum achievable error (for σbeh = 1.0 and σR,sug = 1.0), is 
shown as a baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete). 
 
Figure 3-35 compares average absolute value error among the three translation 
approaches for μR,err = 0.5.  Again, the Always Translation approach performs translation 
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resulting in higher average absolute value error than the No Translation approach when m 
< 6.  The Error Sensitive Translation’s slight error spike when m < 6 is due to 
imprecision in error estimates for two hypothetical (translated and non-translated) 
suggestions when |μR,err| is small compared to σR,err.  As m increases, the error of the 
Always Translation and Error-Sensitive Transaction approaches are statistically similar 
and significantly lower than No Translation.   
 
Figure 3-35. Aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Reputation-Based Model Only weighting 
technique as number of transaction observations (m) increases (μR,err = 0.5).  The following 
translation techniques are compared: 1) No Translation, 2) Always Translation, and 3) Error-
Sensitive Translation.  The theoretical minimum achievable error (for σbeh = 1.0 and σR,sug = 1.0), is 
shown as a baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete). 
 
Similarly, Figure 3-36 compares average absolute value error among the three 
translation approaches for μR,err = 0.0.  Error Sensitive Translation decreases the error 
spike due to translation (as opposed to Always Translation) when m is small; however, an 
error spike still exists since μR,err is infinitely small (μR,err = 0) compared to σR,sug.  For all 
values of μR,err, error of the Error Sensitive Translation approach converges to the 
theoretical minimum error as m increases.  As m increases, the error of all approaches are 
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3-35 and Figure 3-36, a system designer might choose to disable Error-Sensitive 
Translation if it is known that |μR,err| is significantly less than σR,err.  Figure 3-37 shows 
average absolute value error (asymptote values approximated at m = 100) as a function of 
μR,err, demonstrating that translation achieves largest decreases in average absolute value 
error when |μR,err| is large compared to σR,sug. 
 
Figure 3-36. Aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Reputation-Based Model Only weighting 
technique as number of transaction observations (m) increases (μR,err = 0.0).  The following 
translation techniques are compared: 1) No Translation, 2) Always Translation, and 3) Error-
Sensitive Translation.  The theoretical minimum achievable error (for σbeh = 1.0 and σR,sug = 1.0), is 
shown as a baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete). 
 
In summary, transformations (in particular, Error-Sensitive Translation, as 
demonstrated here) enable a truster to utilize consistent, if inaccurate, suggestions from 
reputation providers.  By tracking the previous accuracy (μR,err) of reputation providers, 
the truster alters the reputation suggestions it receives to improve suggestion accuracy.  
Error-Sensitive Translation is most effective when |μR,err| (the magnitude of the provider’s 
inaccuracy) is large compared to σR,err (related to the provider’s consistency), though 
Error-Sensitive Translation succeeds in minimizing error due to unnecessary translations 
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Figure 3-37.  Aggregate suggestion absolute value error for Reputation-Based Model Only weighting 
technique as number of transaction observations (μR,err) increases (asymptotic values estimated at m ~ 
100).  No Translation and Error-Sensitive Translation techniques are compared (Always Translation 
yields values similar to Error-Sensitive Translation).  The theoretical minimum achievable error (for 
σbeh = 1.0 and σR,sug = 1.0), is shown as a baseline. 
 
This section refutes Misconception 3 from Section 1.4: Inaccurate reputation 
providers are never useful.  In truth, if a reputation provider produces reputations that, 
though inaccurate, have consistent error, the truster can perform Error-Sensitive 
Translation on those reputations, according to error magnitude, to achieve useful 
information about a trustee. 
 
3.3.2 REPUTATION COST 
Reputations often have an acquisition cost in terms of communication, time, or 
purchase price.  When reputation costs are high, a truster is likely to purchase fewer 
reputations, resulting in a reputation-based trust model that is less accurate than when 
reputations costs are low.  As a result, the truster is more willing to rely on trust 
information it already has (i.e. the truster’s experience-based model).  For example, when 
selecting a restaurant, a diner is more likely to casually ask friends in the same room 
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the food critic’s reputations may be more valuable (assuming the critic is more 
knowledgeable than the diner’s friends and evaluates restaurants based on similar 
preferences), the communication and time cost to ask friends, “What do you think of 
Restaurant X?” is significantly lower than locating and acquiring reputations from a 
stranger.  The diner is even less likely to drive to a bookstore and buy a local restaurant 
guide; in this case, acquiring reputations would require significant amounts of both time 
and money.   
The value of the transaction influences a truster’s willingness to pay for 
reputations, as well.  If the transaction value is high, a truster is willing to invest more in 
acquiring reputations because each reputation yields a greater increase in transaction 
payoff that if the overall transaction value is low.  Continuing the restaurant example, if 
the diner is planning an anniversary dinner for his wife, he may be more likely to 
purchase the restaurant guide than if he is simply trying to find a quick lunch between 
errands.  Evaluating exactly how much reputation information to acquire, in light of 
reputation cost, is a difficult problem which requires a truster to weigh reputation 
acquisition cost against the estimated increase in transaction payoff due to a reputation’s 
contribution to increased aggregate trust model accuracy.  Chapter 4, which introduces 
Adaptive Cost Selection, is dedicated to this problem of 1) assessing the value of trust 
information—specifically reputations—in terms of resulting increase in transaction 
payoff and 2) determining the appropriate trust information to acquire, in light of the 
information’s acquisition cost.  In particular, Section 4.1.5 discusses the impact of 
transaction magnitude (risk) on a truster’s willingness to spend resources to acquire trust 
information, as illustrated by the restaurant example. 
Previous discussion in this chapter has represented suggestions from reputation-
based models simply as aggregated values whose error is described by σR,err.  In reality, 
however, the truster may have numerous reputation providers—each providing 
reputations of varying accuracy—from which to choose in building its aggregated 
reputation-based model.  Because this section discusses acquisition of individual 
reputations based on cost, it is important to understand how individual reputations are 
combined to form an aggregated reputation-based model.  As an extension of Equation 15 
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in Section 3.1.4, reputations are weighted according to the inverse variance of 





















. Eqn 15 
This research assumes the selection of individual reputation providers is 
determined before the reputations they provide are known to the truster.  Additional 
techniques for computing weights to minimize aggregate error, based on the values of the 
provided reputations, may be available, such as outlier exclusion [Fullam and Barber, 
2004].  This assumption is in effect because the truster often must commit to using (or, at 
least, acquiring) reputations before viewing them when reputations are obtained for a 
price.  
Recall from Equation 5 in Section 3.1.4 that a provider’s ,iR sugσ  is indicative of its 
error, ,iR errσ  ( ,iR errσ  is influenced by σbeh, which describes variation in trustee behavior, 
and ,iR sugσ ).  Past suggestions used to estimate a provider’s ,iR sugσ  value need not 
necessarily concern the specific trustee in question.  The truster may include suggestions 
received from the provider about other trustees, if the truster deems the group of trustees 
to all be of similar “type.”  For example, if a reputation provider has delivered several 
suggestions about trustees with regard to their abilities as lawyers, the truster might use 
those suggestions to compute the provider’s ,iR sugσ  for weighting suggestions about a 
new lawyer as a potential trustee.  However, the truster might not utilize those same 
suggestions when gauging the reputation provider’s ability to deliver suggestions about 
an auto mechanic.   
Figure 3-38 illustrates how weights for several reputation suggestions may be 
determined by Equation 15 (momentarily ignoring the truster’s experience-based model).  
As an extension of Equation 17 in Section 3.1.4, the truster’s resulting minimum 















, Eqn 37 













. Eqn 38 
 
 
Figure 3-38: The Adaptive Trust Modeling technique illustrating weighting of several reputation 
suggestions (the experience-based model is excluded from this figure).  The truster decides whether 
to trust a potential trustee by performing a weighted average of suggestions from multiple reputation 
providers.  Weights are determined by relative error of each reputation provider.  The transaction 
outcome is used to update the truster’s error estimates for each reputation provider. 
 
Figure 3-39 shows aggregate error standard deviation for an aggregate suggestion 
(composed of three reputation suggestions) for varying combinations of ω1, ω2, and ω3.  
In the experience-included case (Figure 3-40), the truster’s experience-based model is 





































that decreases as the number of transaction observations (with the trustee in question) 
increases.   
 
 
Figure 3-39. Aggregate error standard deviation (σagg,err) as a function of two out of three reputation 
suggestion weights (ω1 and ω2).  The value of σagg,err is minimized when ω1 and ω2 (and, thus, ω3) are 
computed according to Equation 15. 
 
The objective of Chapter 3 is to answer Research Question 1 by determining how 
environment factors, including reputation cost, influence a truster’s reliance on its 
experience vs. reputation-based models.  Adaptive Cost Selection (an algorithm in 
Chapter 4 for selecting reputations based on reputation provider accuracy and reputation 
cost) has not yet been introduced.  However, in the interest of Chapter 3 continuity, this 
section shows experimental results demonstrating the impact of reputation cost on a 
truster’s Adaptive Trust Modeling weights for experience- vs. reputation-based trust 
models.  In this experiment, the truster employs Adaptive Cost Selection, which is 
assumed to be an appropriate technique for assessing the tradeoff between reputation 
accuracy (contribution to increasing transaction payoff) and cost.  The experiment is 
further detailed in Section 4.2.1, where Adaptive Cost Selection is validated. 
This experiment compares the weight ( , agg,err,minR σω ) of a truster’s reputation-based 
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Cost(Ri).  The single truster has access to its experience-based model, as well as ten 
reputation providers, each providing reputation suggestions according to N( ,iR sugμ , 
,iR sug
σ ), where ,iR sugμ  = μbeh and ,iR sugσ  = 10.0.  An experiment run consists of 100 
transaction observations (m), during which the truster builds its experience-based trust 
model about a single trustee whose behavior (Pact) is normally distributed according to 
N(μbeh, σbeh), where σbeh = 1.0.  The trustee’s μbeh is constant throughout a run, but over 
different runs, each with a different trustee, μbeh is uniformly distributed between Pact,min 
= -10.0 and Pact,max = 10.0.  Results from 9000 runs are averaged.   
 
Figure 3-40: The Adaptive Trust Modeling mechanism illustrating weighting of several reputation 
suggestions, as well as experience-based suggestions.  The truster decides whether to trust a potential 
trustee by performing a weighted average of suggestions from its experience-based model and 
multiple reputation-based trust models. 
 







































Figure 3-41 shows , agg,err,minR σω  as a function of number of transaction observations 
(m) when Cost(Ri) equals 0.0, 0.02, 0.1, and 0.2.  As confirmed earlier in Section 3.2.1 
and Section 3.3.1.1, the truster’s reliance ( , agg,err,minR σω ) on its reputation-based model 
decreases as the truster obtains more transaction observations (and accuracy of its 
experience-based model increases) for all values of Cost(Ri).  However, when Cost(Ri) is 
high, , agg,err,minR σω  drops more quickly (with fewer transaction observations) than when 
Cost(Ri) is low.  Figure 3-42 shows the average number of reputations purchased as a 
function of number of transaction observations; the truster is unwilling to acquire as 
many reputations when Cost(Ri) is higher.  When reputation cost is zero, the truster 
acquires nearly all ten available reputations; in contrast, when reputation cost is 0.2, the 
truster acquires no more than one reputation.  The number of reputations acquired 
decreases as m increases and the accuracy of the truster’s experience-based model begins 
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Figure 3-41. Weight of truster’s aggregate reputation-based model vs. number of transaction 
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Figure 3-42. Number of reputations purchased vs. number of transaction observations for several 
values of reputation cost (Cost(Ri)). 
 
In summary, high reputation cost limits a truster’s ability to build an accurate 
reputation-based trust model, since a truster is unable to purchase as many reputations.  A 
truster’s decision about how much to invest in purchasing reputations is influenced by the 
magnitude of the transaction in question and the accuracy of the truster’s alternative free 
(experience-based) trust model.  As the truster’s number of transaction observations 
increases, the truster purchases fewer reputations, since the accuracy of the truster’s 
experience-based model begins to outweigh the accuracy of its reputation-based model, 
given the number of reputations it can afford to purchase.  Chapter 4 explains Adaptive 
Cost Selection, by which a truster assesses the value of trust information, in terms of 
resulting increase in transaction payoff, and determines the appropriate trust information 
to acquire, in light of the information’s acquisition cost. 
This section helps refute Misconception 4 from Section 1.4: A truster can rely on 
experience-based modeling for low-value transactions, but should always acquire 
reputations when considering high-value transactions.  In truth, a truster’s decision to 
utilize experience vs. reputations must consider the cost of reputations relative to 
transaction value, as well as the relative accuracy of both models.  If reputation costs are 
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too expensive (relative to transaction value, even though transaction value is high), the 
truster may choose to rely on experience, or, if no experience-based model exists, on no 
model at all.  Further, this section refutes Misconception 5 from Section 1.4: A truster 
should always acquire only the single or few “best” reputations.  In truth, when 
reputations are free to acquire, a truster achieves the lowest predicted error by 
aggregating as many reputations as possible, weighting each according to estimated error. 
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Chapter 4   
 
ADAPTIVE COST SELECTION: VALUATING TRUST 
INFORMATION 
 
This chapter answers Research Question 2: How should a truster assess the value 
of trust information (specifically, reputations), in light of the cost of that information, to 
determine what trust information to acquire?  The following objective is accomplished: 
presentation of the Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm for assessing the value of trust 
information (in particular, reputation suggestions), which enables a truster to determine 
what reputations to acquire in consideration of reputation cost.  Section 4.1 explains 
Adaptive Cost Selection; by knowing the worth of a given piece of trust information 
(suggestion), a truster can decide how much time, effort, and money it is willing to invest 
to acquire that suggestion.  Section 4.2 validates the Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm 
through experimentation, exhibiting how Adaptive Cost Selection identifies the optimal 
tradeoff between aggregate trust model accuracy and cost of acquired trust information to 
maximize the truster’s payoff from transactions with trustees.  Section 4.3 applies 
Adaptive Cost Selection to the ART Testbed domain problem, demonstrating that 
Adaptive Cost Selection, over existing ART Testbed strategies, improves truster 
decisions regarding suggestion acquisition when cost is a factor. 
4.1 Adaptive Cost Selection Algorithm 
 
In many real-world situations, a truster can only acquire suggestions (in 
particular, reputations) through purchasing.  At a minimum, the truster usually recognizes 
some cost (in terms of time or effort) to acquire reputations.  Evaluating the benefit of 
purchasing reputations requires comparison of two seemingly disparate quantities: 
accuracy (of the aggregate suggestion influenced by the reputation suggestions) and cost 
(to purchase the reputation suggestions).  However, upon closer examination, a link is 
observed: aggregate suggestion error directly influences transaction payoff.  Therefore, if 
error among purchased reputations, and thus aggregate suggestion error, can be correlated 
to transaction payoff, then a truster can select the best combination of reputation 
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suggestions to purchase for greatest aggregate suggestion accuracy, in light of reputation 
cost.  From Section 3.3.2, if reputation cost is high, the truster will purchase fewer 
reputations and must ensure that the reputations purchased are the most accurate 
available.  The algorithm presented in this section, called Adaptive Cost Selection, 
enables a truster to determine how many and which reputations to purchase when there is 
a cost associated with acquiring reputations.  Throughout this section, it is assumed that 
the content (the communicated estimate ,iR sugP ) of a reputation suggestion is not known to 
the truster until after it has been purchased to avoid the truster’s reliance on techniques 
such as outlier detection [Fullam and Barber, 2004] for determining suggestion weights. 
While acquiring reputations has obvious costs—cost of time and communication, 
in addition to prices charged by reputation providers—the cost to acquire experience-
based suggestions (by building an experience-based model to generate those suggestions) 
is hidden as possible losses to untrustworthy trustees and time spent conducting 
transactions.  A truster can consider these experience costs as investments in building its 
experience-based trust model that last beyond the single transaction.  Although this 
chapter focuses on evaluating reputation costs, assessing the value of experience-based 
trust information can help a truster determine the amount of effort it should put forth to 
build its experience-based trust model. 
4.1.1 DETERMINING PROBABILITY OF TRUSTING 
Adaptive Cost Selection, and the cost analysis of reputation purchasing, begins 
with a study of payoff received by the truster as a function of both truster decision (to 
trust vs. not trust) and trustee behavior (about how trustworthy to be, in terms of 
transaction payoff to the truster).  Referring to the payoff matrix in Figure 3-2 of Section 
3.1.1, when the truster chooses to trust, it receives the payoff intended by the trustee 
(Pact), here called PT.  Pact may take on any of a range of values, negative or positive 
depending on whether—and the degree to which—the trustee chooses to fulfill its 
agreement; the magnitude of Pact is determined by the magnitude of trustworthy or 
untrustworthy behavior the trustee wishes to conduct.  If the truster chooses not to trust, it 
receives a payoff, P¬T, of zero; since no transaction takes place, the truster does not 
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receive the payoff Pact intended by the trustee (note that the value of Pact, the payoff 
intended by the trustee, itself may be influenced by the truster’s decision to trust or not 
trust).  To summarize, 
( )T act actP P P=  and 
( ) 0T actP P¬ = . 
 
The truster’s decision whether to trust is described in terms of a binary probability 
distribution, where Prob(T) and Prob(¬T) represent the probabilities the truster will 
choose to trust or not trust, respectively (note that Prob(T) + Prob(¬T) = 1).  Prob(T|Pact) 
represents the probability the truster chooses to trust given the hypothetical transaction 
results in the trustee’s decision to provide a net payoff to the truster of Pact (of course, the 
truster does not know Pact a priori).  The truster’s average payoff, Reward, over all 
transaction opportunities for a given trustee decision Pact, is calculated as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )| |act act T act act T actReward P Prob T P P P Prob T P P P¬= + ¬
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )| | 0act act act actReward P Prob T P P Prob T P= + ¬  
 ( ) ( )|act act actReward P Prob T P P=  Eqn 39 
 
The truster’s probabilities of trusting (Prob(T|Pact)) and not trusting 
(Prob(¬T|Pact)) are dependent upon suggestions made by the trust models it has at its 
disposal.  Further, the appropriateness of Prob(T|Pact) and Prob(¬T|Pact) (that is, the 
truster’s likelihood of choosing to trust when Pact > 0 and choosing to not trust when Pact 
≤ 0) depends on the accuracy of those suggestions.  In this section (Section 4.1), the 
truster is assumed to have a several potential reputation providers from whom it may 
purchase reputation suggestions, here simply called “reputations” (the truster’s 
experience-based model is ignored until Section 4.2.1).  In the best case, the reputations 
purchased by the truster result in an aggregate suggestion Pagg,sug with a highly-accurate 
prediction of transaction outcome, such that 
,agg sug actP P=  
and, therefore, 
( )| 0 1actProb T P > =  and 
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( )| 0 0actProb T P ≤ = . 
That is, in the best case, the truster should choose to trust only when the transaction 
results in a positive payoff.  As a result, in the best case, 
( )act actReward P P=  when Pact > 0, and 
( ) 0actReward P =  when Pact ≤ 0. 
 
Figure 4-1 shows Prob(T) (Figure 4-1a), Prob(¬T) (Figure 4-1b), and Reward (Figure 
4-1c) as functions of Pact, within the range Pact,min to Pact,max, for this best case scenario. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. In the truster’s best-case scenario (truster’s aggregate suggestion exactly predicts 
transaction outcome), (a) probability of the truster choosing to trust (Prob(T)), (b) probability of the 
truster choosing to not trust Prob(¬T), and (c) truster’s average payoff (Reward) as functions of the 
trustee’s decision (Pact) about the hypothetical transaction’s net payoff to the truster. 
 
Alternatively, when purchased reputations result in an aggregate suggestion 
Pagg,sug with random prediction of transaction outcome (no correlation between Pagg,sug 
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( )| 0.5actProb T P =  for all Pact. 
As a result, 
( ) 0.5act actReward P P=  for all Pact. 
 
Figure 4-2 shows Prob(T) (Figure 4-2a), Prob(¬T) (Figure 4-2b), and Reward (Figure 
4-2c) as functions of Pact, within the range Pact,min to Pact,max, for this random scenario. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. In the truster’s random-case scenario (truster’s aggregate suggestion is random), (a) 
probability of the truster choosing to trust (Prob(T)), (b) probability of the truster choosing to not 
trust Prob(¬T), and (c) truster’s average payoff (Reward) as functions of the trustee’s decision (Pact) 
about the hypothetical transaction’s net payoff to the truster. 
 
In the worst case, when purchased reputations yield an aggregate suggestion 
Pagg,sug that predicts the opposite of the actual transaction outcome (Pagg,sug = - Pact), 
( )| 0 0actProb T P > =  and 
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As a result, 
( ) 0actReward P =  when Pact > 0, and 
( )act actReward P P=  when Pact ≤ 0. 
 
Figure 4-3 shows Prob(T) (Figure 4-3a), Prob(¬T) (Figure 4-3b), and Reward (Figure 
4-3c) as functions of Pact, within the range Pact,min to Pact,max, for this worst case scenario. 
 
 
Figure 4-3. In the truster’s worst-case scenario (truster’s aggregate suggestion predicts the opposite 
of transaction outcome), (a) probability of the truster choosing to trust (Prob(T)), (b) probability of 
the truster choosing to not trust Prob(¬T), and (c) truster’s average payoff (Reward) as functions of 
the trustee’s decision (Pact) about the hypothetical transaction’s net payoff to the truster. 
 
The relationship between Prob(T) and the accuracy of the aggregate suggestion 
Pagg,sug can be generalized to describe cases in which the aggregate suggestion has 
intermediate levels of accuracy.  The truster will choose to trust if the net payoff it 
expects to receive for the given transaction (Pagg,sug) is greater than zero (a net profit, as 
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equal to the probability that the aggregate suggestion (expected payoff Pagg,sug) is greater 
than zero, or, the integral, from zero to infinity, of the probability density function (PDF) 
describing the aggregate suggestion:   
 ( ) ( )( ),0| ,act agg sugProb T P PDF P z dz
∞
= ∫ . Eqn 40 
 
This section will assume an example case, in which the aggregate suggestion 
Pagg,sug has an error distribution N(0, σagg,err).  Thus, the aggregate suggestion itself 
follows the distribution N(Pact, σagg,err), where σagg,err is indicative of the aggregate 
suggestion’s accuracy in predicting Pact (σagg,err = 0 corresponds to the best case in Figure 
4-1, while σagg,err = ∞ corresponds to the random case in Figure 4-2).  The probability 















































Figure 4-4 shows the probability density function of an aggregate suggestion 
distributed normally as N(Pact, σagg,err).  The shaded portion of the figure represents 
Prob(T), the probability that the truster chooses to trust.  The likelihood of Pagg,sug 
correctly predicting Pact > 0 (indicating the truster should choose to trust) is improved by 
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Figure 4-4. Probability density function of a truster’s aggregate suggestion (Pagg,sug) with distribution 
N(Pact, σagg,err).  The probability that the truster chooses to trust (Prob(T)) is shown by the shaded 
portion of the figure; the probability that the truster chooses to not trust (Prob(¬T)) is shown by the 
unshaded portion. 
 
Figure 4-5 charts Prob(T) as a function of Pact for aggregate suggestions with 
varying accuracy (different error standard deviations σagg,err), where Pact,min = -10 and 
Pact,max = 10.  When the aggregate suggestion is exact (error distribution is N(0,0)), the 
corresponding Prob(T) function in Figure 4-5 matches Figure 4-1a; there is zero 
probability the truster will trust when trustee decision results in cheating (Pact ≤ 0) and 
complete probability of trusting when trustee decision results in not cheating (Pact > 0).  
When the aggregate suggestion is random (error distribution is N(0,∞)), the 
corresponding Prob(T) function in Figure 4-5 matches Figure 4-2a; there is 50% 
probability the truster will trust, whether trustee decisions result in cheating or not 
cheating (all Pact), assuming Pact,min = Pact,max.  In Figure 4-5, the corresponding Prob(T) 
function’s deviation from the correct decision (not trust when Pact ≤ 0 or trust when Pact > 
0) is larger for larger values of σagg,err.  The deviations occur most in the region nearest 
Pact = 0, when there is most uncertainty about whether trustee behavior Pact will be 
positive vs. negative.  Figure 4-5 does not address the case described by Figure 4-3, in 
which purchased reputations yield an aggregate suggestion that predicts the opposite of 
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the actual transaction outcome Pact.  However, it is possible for the truster to perform a 
transformation (more specifically, a reflection) on the suggestion; the suggestion would 
then fit the scenarios described by Figure 4-5 (transformations, in particular, Error-
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Figure 4-5. Probability that truster chooses to trust (Prob(T)), as a function of the trustee’s decision 
about the hypothetical transaction’s net payoff to the truster (Pact) for several distributions of Pagg,sug 
(σagg,err = 0, 1, 5, 10, 20, and ∞). Pact,min = -10 and Pact,max = 10. 
 
4.1.2 CALCULATING AVERAGEREWARD  
Extending Equation 39, the average payoff, Reward, resulting from a given 
trustee decision Pact is equal to the probability of the truster choosing to trust multiplied 
by the payoff received from trusting, Pact: 
 ( ) ( )|act act actReward P Prob T P P= . Eqn 39 



















∫ . Eqn 41 
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Figure 4-6 charts average payoff, Reward, as a function of Pact for aggregate 
suggestions with varying accuracy (different error standard deviations σagg,err).  When the 
aggregate suggestion is exact (error distribution is N(0,0)), the corresponding function 
Reward(Pact) in Figure 4-6 matches Figure 4-1c.  The truster receives: 1) the maximum 
possible average payoff (Reward) Pact (the amount given by the trustee) when the trustee 
is trustworthy (Pact > 0), because a transaction does occur, and 2) zero when the trustee is 
untrustworthy (Pact ≤ 0), because no transaction occurs.  When the aggregate suggestion 
is random (error distribution is N(0,∞)), the corresponding function Reward(Pact) in 
Figure 4-6 matches Figure 4-2c.  The truster receives a low average payoff (Reward); in 
fact, when Pact,min = Pact,max, average payoff earned for transactions in which Pact > 0 is 
canceled out by the negative average payoff for transactions in which Pact < 0, since 
Reward(Pact) = 0.5Pact for both positive and negative Pact.  Average payoff (Reward) for 
σagg,err > 0 cases is lower that in the σagg,err = 0 case, especially when trustee decisions are 
close to Pact = 0, where there is more uncertainty about whether trustee decisions Pact will 
be positive vs. negative.  When trustee decisions Pact are very far from zero, the σagg,err > 
0 cases behave similarly to the σagg,err = 0 case; relatively slight suggestion errors are 
inconsequential when suggestions Pagg,sug, and trustee decisions Pact, are far from zero 
(relative to σagg,err). 
By summing Reward values for a given σagg,err over all possible trustee decisions 
according to trustee decision probabilities, σagg,err of the aggregate suggestion can be 
linked to expected average payoff (over numerous transactions with full spectrum of 
trustee behavior).  Trustee decisions are assumed to follow a uniform distribution with 
limits Pact,max and Pact,min.  Therefore the probability distribution function ( )actP actPDF P  
describing the distributions of trustee decisions Pact is given by 
( ) , ,, ,
, ,
1 ,            
            0           ,  and 
act
act min act act max
act max act minP act
act act min act act max
P P P
P PPDF P
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Figure 4-6. Truster average payoff (Reward), as a function of the trustee’s decision (Pact) about the 
hypothetical transaction’s net payoff to the truster, for several distributions of Pagg,sug (σagg,err = 0, 1, 5, 
10, 20, and ∞). Pact,min = -10 and Pact,max = 10. 
 
The distribution of trustee decisions (Pact) can be assumed uniform via the 
following explanation.  The context of this payoff analysis is reputation-based trust 
modeling (deciding which reputations to purchase).  As demonstrated in Section 3.1.1, 
reputation-based trust modeling is useful during initial transactions with a single trustee, 
since the number of observed transactions (m) is too low for an experience-based model 
to be accurate yet.  Second, reputation-based modeling is employed when a trustee 
changes its decision pattern frequently and in unpredictable ways (described in Section 
3.2.3), since the truster can never observe enough transactions to build up an accurate 
experience-based model before the trustee’s decision pattern changes.  Third, reputation-
based modeling is used in scenarios consisting of one-time transactions with several 
trustees, since no transactions with a given trustee are observed prior to the transaction in 
question (m = 0).  In each of these three scenarios described, since a trustee’s previous 
decisions either are no indication of future decisions (in the case of a trustee with 
changing decision patterns) or have never been observed, the truster may view the trustee 
for each potential transaction as an unknown.  From the truster’s perspective, the trustee’s 
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decision may result in any value Pact within known limits Pmax and Pmin; therefore, 
assuming truster decisions to be uniformly distributed is reasonable.   
Nonetheless, situations may exist in which a different distribution of trustee 
decisions might be assumed.  An environment may be known, in general, to consist of 
mostly cheaters (for example, when trustees are dishonest used car salesmen) or mostly 
altruistic trustees (for example, when trustees are benevolent churches).  In these cases, 
the overall trustee decision distribution might be skewed negative or positive, 
respectively.  However, if the truster knows enough about trustee characteristics to skew 
the trustee decision distribution, then reputations are most likely not very useful anyway; 
accurate reputations are most valuable when there is a large amount of uncertainty as to 
whether trustee decisions tend toward cheating (Pact < 0) or not (Pact > 0), as described 
above and shown in Figure 4-6.  Section X relaxes the assumption that Pmax and Pmin are 
known to the truster a priori. 
Given Reward(Pact) (the average payoff expected for a given trustee decision Pact) 
for a given aggregate suggestion error standard deviation, σagg,err, and ( )
actP act
PDF P  (the 
estimated distribution of trustee decisions Pact), AverageReward is computed as the 
average expected payoff, over all potential trustee decisions Pact, given σagg,err: 
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⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫   Eqn 42 
Solving symbolically for AverageReward is difficult; however an empirical 
approximation, calculated by discretizing the integrals in the AverageReward equation, is 
shown in Figure 4-7 (Figure 4-7 assumes Pact,max = 10 and Pact,min = -10).  This 



















⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
, Eqn 43 
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where γ equals 1000 (γ  is determined by trial-and-error).  Equation 43 is valid only for 
cases in which Pact,max = -Pact,min.  In Section 4.1.5, a more general form of this equation, 
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Figure 4-7. Truster average expected payoff (AverageReward), as a function of the truster’s aggregate 
suggestion error standard deviation (σagg,err), defined by Equation 42.  Both an empirical 
approximation and Equation 43’s approximation of Equation 42 are shown.  Pact,min = -10 and Pact,max 
= 10.  
 
As shown in Figure 4-7, when σagg,err = 0 (the aggregate suggestion is an exact 
prediction), the average payoff received by following the aggregate suggestion is the 
maximum possible:  
































AverageReward =  Eqn 44 
 
This calculation is consistent with Figure 4-6 (and Figure 4-1c), which calculates 
AverageReward when σagg,err = 0 as the triangular area in Figure 4-1c divided by the 






























AverageReward = . 
Conversely, as σagg,err approaches infinity (the aggregate suggestion is a random 
prediction), the average payoff received by following the aggregate suggestion is: 

























AverageReward = −  
0.minAverageReward =  
This calculation is consistent with Figure 4-6 (and Figure 4-2c), which calculates 
AverageReward when σagg,err = ∞ as the difference in triangular areas Figure 4-2c divided 
by the range Pact,min to Pact,max: 
( ) ( ), ,1 1 1 12 2 2 2min act max act max act,min act,minAverageReward P P P P
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟





act max act min
min
P P
AverageReward = −  
0minAverageReward =  (since Pact,max = -Pact,min). 
 
It is important to remember that Equation 43 assumes trustee decisions are uniformly 
distributed between Pact,max = 10 and Pact,min = -10; as discussed later in Section 4.1.5, 
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other distributions of trustee decisions yield different functions for AverageReward in 
terms of σagg,err.  For example, when trustee decisions are uniformly distributed with 
larger values of Pact,max (in proportion to Pact,min), AverageReward is larger for a given 
σagg,err, since trustees yield a higher payoff, Pact, on average.   
4.1.3 REPUTATION SCENARIOS  
Figure 4-7 describes the relationship between 1) the error, σagg,err, of an aggregate 
suggestion and 2) the expected payoff, AverageReward, from a transaction for which the 
truster bases its trusting decision on that aggregate suggestion.  This relationship is 
necessary for Adaptive Cost Selection to gauge the worth of purchasing reputations with 
the goal of improving aggregate suggestion accuracy (decreasing σagg,err).  To do so, 
several reputation purchasing scenarios (lists of which reputations to purchase) are 
created, and the expected error standard deviation, σagg,err, of the aggregate suggestion is 
computed for each.  To create these scenarios, reputation providers are ranked according 
to accuracy of past reputations (in terms of ,iR errσ , the error standard deviation of the 
reputations they provide about trustees similar to the trustee in question), with the 
reasoning that the truster should purchase reputations in order of least to greatest error 
standard deviation ( ,iR errσ ).   
Note that the following discussion examines reputation provider accuracy in terms 
of ,iR errσ  instead of ,iR sugσ .  Equation 5 in Section 3.1.4 demonstrates that, for any trust 
model, both σsug (the standard deviation of the model’s suggestion distribution) and σbeh 
(the standard deviation of the trustee’s behavior distribution) contribute to σerr (the 
standard deviation of the model’s error distribution).  However, this analysis of Adaptive 
Cost Selection assumes the case in which reputation-based modeling is most 
advantageous: one-time transaction opportunities with numerous potential trustee’s (m ≤ 
1), as opposed to numerous transaction opportunities with the same trustee (large m).   
Therefore, any given trustee’s σbeh can be assumed zero, since the truster does not 
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transact with the trustee enough times to be concerned about the trustee’s behavior 
distribution.  As a result, σerr = σsug (more specifically, ,iR errσ  = ,iR sugσ ) is assumed. 
A scenario sn is defined as a case in which reputations are purchased from the n 
reputation providers with lowest ,iR errσ .  Table 4-1 illustrates example scenarios for a set 
of five potential reputation providers.  Columns 1-3 in Table 4-1 show scenario numbers 
(Column 1), with reputation providers (Column 2) sorted in order of ascending ,iR errσ  
(Column 3).  The scenario table enumerates the reputation providers whose reputations 
would be purchased in each scenario sn (Column 4).  
 
Table 4-1. Example scenario table showing computation of MarginalReward for reputations from 

















s0 — — {} — — 0.00 0.00 
s1 R1 5.0 {R1} ω1 = 1.00 5.00 1.95 1.95 
ω1 = 0.51 s2 R2 5.1 {R1, R2} 
ω2 = 0.49 
3.57 2.23 0.28 
ω1 = 0.35 
ω2 = 0.33 s3 R3 5.2 {R1, R2, R3} 
ω3 = 0.32 
2.94 2.34 0.11 
ω1 = 0.26 
ω2 = 0.25 
ω3 = 0.24 
s4 R4 5.3 
{R1, R2, R3, 
R4} 
ω4 = 0.24 
2.57 2.40 0.06 
ω1 = 0.22 
ω2 = 0.21 
ω3 = 0.20 
ω4 = 0.19 
s5 R5 5.4 
{R1, R2, R3, 
R4, R5} 
ω5 = 0.19 
2.32 2.43 0.03 
(Col. 1) (Col. 2) (Col. 3) (Col. 4) (Col. 5) (Col. 6) (Col. 7) (Col. 8) 
 
 
For each scenario, weights are calculated for the reputation of each included 
provider according to Adaptive Trust Modeling (Equation 15 in Section 3.3.2), as shown 
in Column 5.  Next, the error standard deviation σagg,err(sn), of the hypothetical aggregate 
suggestion for each scenario is computed according to Equation 38 in Section 3.3.2 
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(Column 6).  Using Equation 43 in Section 4.1.2, the AverageReward value associated 
with each scenario’s σagg,err(sn) is determined (Column 7).  Finally, Column 8 shows 
MarginalReward(Rn), the estimated additional payoff contributed by purchasing a 
reputation from reputation provider Rn and incorporating that reputation into the 
aggregate suggestion, is computed as the incremental expected payoff from incorporating 
the one additional reputation (from reputation provider Rn): 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1n agg,err n agg,err nMarginalReward R AverageReward s AverageReward sσ σ −= − .  
Eqn 45 
 
For the purpose of calculating MarginalReward (R1), a scenario, s0, is included in 
which no reputations are purchased.  As a result, 
( )0agg,err sσ = ∞ , 
since the aggregate suggestion contains no information (the aggregate suggestion is an 
arbitrary guess).  Therefore, 
( )( )0agg,err minAverageReward s AverageRewardσ =  
( )( ) ( )0agg,err agg,errAverageReward s AverageRewardσ σ= = ∞ . 
When Pact,max = 10 and Pact,min = -10, ( )( )0agg,errAverageReward sσ  is computed from 
























( )( )0 0agg,errAverageReward sσ = . 
If, instead of guessing arbitrarily, the truster adopts the policy of always declining 
transactions in the absence of suggestions, then  
( )( )0 0agg,errAverageReward sσ =  
since no transaction occurs.  Note that when Pact,max = 10 and Pact,min = -10, 
( )( )0agg,errAverageReward sσ  is the same whether the truster guesses arbitrarily or 
declines to transact.  However, when Pact,max ≠ -Pact,min, arbitrary guessing may yield 
( )( )0agg,errAverageReward sσ  greater than or less than zero (these cases are examined 
further in Section 4.1.5). 
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Finally, Adaptive Cost Selection chooses the scenario sn with the greatest value n 
such that  
 ( ) ( )i iMarginalReward R Cost R>  Eqn 46 
for all reputations Ri in sn, where Cost(Ri) is the cost the truster incurs purchasing Ri.  
Equation 46 assists the truster determining how many and which reputations to purchase 
given known values of Cost(Ri).  Further, Equation 46 serves as a tool for determining 
how much a truster is willing to pay for a given reputation when reputation prices are 
negotiable. 
4.1.4 EXAMPLE: SELECTING SCENARIOS 
This section presents an example of Adaptive Cost Selection put to use, showing 
how the variations in accuracy ( ,iR errσ ) among the set of available reputation providers 
influence the accuracy of the aggregate suggestion (σagg,err), maximum reputation 
purchase price a truster is willing to pay, and the number of reputations purchased.  For 
this purpose, Figure 4-8 shows the range of accuracy, in terms of reputation provider 
error standard deviation ,iR errσ , for several example sets of available reputation providers.  


















 for n ≥ 1. Eqn 47 
For example, when β = ∞, all reputation providers have the same error standard 
deviation of 
1 ,R err
σ ; therefore, ranking of reputation providers for the purpose of 
determining scenarios (as in Section 4.1.3) should be arbitrary (assuming the ,iR errσ  
values estimated by the truster are accurate approximations).  In other words, 
1, ,
0
i iR err R err
σ σ
−
− =  for β = ∞. 
When β = 1.0, error standard deviation increases by 
1,R err
σ  for each successively less 
accurate reputation provider.  As a result, the most accurate reputation provider (with 
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1,R err







σ , etc., in order.  In other words,  
1 1, , ,i iR err R err R err
σ σ σ
−
− =  for β = 1. 
When β < 1.0 (for example, β = 0.8 in Figure 4-8), error standard deviation for 
successively less accurate reputation providers increases at a rate that is greater than 
1,R err
σ  and continuously increasing itself.  Therefore, 
1 1, , ,i iR err R err R err
σ σ σ
−
− >  for β < 1. 
When β > 1.0 (for example, β = 1.2, 1.4, or 2.0 in Figure 4-8), error standard deviation 
for successively less accurate reputation providers increases at a rate that is less than 
1,R err
σ  and slows as i increases, converging to an asymptotic error standard deviation 
given by 
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β  = 0.8
β  = 1.0
β  = 1.2
β  = 2.0
β  = ∞
 
Figure 4-8. Reputation provider error standard deviations ( ,iR errσ , as computed by Equation 47 
when 
1 ,R err
σ = 10) for reputation providers, by rank i, in a provider set for several values of β.  For 
clarity, lines are continuous, though ranking i is discrete. 
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Figure 4-9 shows aggregate suggestion error standard deviations (σagg,err) for 
scenarios s1 to s80 for each of five reputation provider sets defined by β (β = 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 
2.0, and ∞).  The most accurate reputation provider, R1, in each set has a standard 
deviation of 
1 ,R err
σ  = 10.  For each β, including additional reputations—regardless of the 
accuracy ( ,iR errσ ) of the reputation provider—results in a decrease in σagg,err.  When β = ∞ 
(all reputation providers have the same accuracy), σagg,err decreases quickly with each 
additionally included reputation; when β is lower (each additionally included reputation 
provider is less accurate), the accuracy improvement attributed to each additional 
reputation is less.  When β = 0.8, for example, additionally included reputations have so 
much error that they are assigned near-zero weights by Adaptive Trust Modeling; thus, 
σagg,err reaches a minimum with only a few additionally included reputations and 
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β  = 0.8
β  = 1.0
β  = 1.2
β  = 2.0
β  = ∞
 
Figure 4-9. Aggregate suggestion error standard deviation (σagg,err) for scenario sn (as computed 
theoretically by Adaptive Trust Modeling) by number of reputations n in scenario sn for several 
values of β (
1 ,R err
σ = 10).  For clarity, lines are continuous, though n is discrete. 
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Including additional reputation suggestions from very inaccurate reputation 
providers never increases σagg,err (assuming the truster models ,iR errσ values accurately), 
since Adaptive Trust Modeling assigns appropriately low weights for reputations from 
providers estimated to be inaccurate.  Further, only when 1) one or more of the 
previously included reputations is given by a provider whose ,iR errσ  is equal to zero, or 2) 
an additionally included reputation is given by a provider whose ,iR errσ  is so high that it is 
weighted by Adaptive Trust Modeling as zero, does including an additional reputation 
cause σagg,err to remain unchanged.  In the former case, the reputation given by the 
provider whose ,iR errσ  is zero is weighted by Adaptive Trust Modeling as one, while all 
other reputations are weighted as zero. 
For comparison purposes, Figure 4-10 shows σagg,err for the same five reputation 
provider sets (β = 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 2.0, and ∞) when σagg,err is computed by Simple 
Averaging (an extension of Equation 20 in Section 3.1.4 that accommodates more than 
two reputations) instead of Adaptive Trust Modeling.  When β = ∞ (all reputation 
providers have the same level of accuracy), σagg,err by sn is the same for both Simple 
Averaging and Adaptive Trust Modeling, since both weighting techniques weight all 
reputations the same.  However, for smaller β values (when β ≤ 1.0 and each additionally 
included reputation suggestion is given by a provider whose ,iR errσ is significantly higher 
than that of the last included provider), additionally included reputations cause σagg,err to 
increase when Simple Averaging is utilized.  Comparing Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10 
shows the benefits of weighting reputations by Adaptive Trust Modeling, since Adaptive 
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β  = 0.8
β  = 1.0
β  = 1.2
β  = 2.0
β  = ∞
 
Figure 4-10. Aggregate suggestion error standard deviation (σagg,err) for scenario sn, as computed 
theoretically by Simple Averaging, by number of reputations n in scenario sn for several values of β 
(
1 ,R err
σ = 10).    For clarity, lines are continuous, though ranking n is discrete. 
 
Figure 4-11 shows expected average payoff, AverageReward, for scenarios s1 to 
s80 for each of five reputation provider sets defined by β (β = 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 2.0, and ∞) 
when Adaptive Trust Modeling is used for weighting reputations (Pact,max = 10 and Pact,min 
= -10).  As discussed previously, including additional reputations never results in an 
increase in σagg,err; likewise, including additional reputations never results in a decrease in 
AverageReward.  When β = ∞, AverageReward quickly reaches AverageRewardmax as 
given by Equation 44 in Section 4.1.2.  On the contrary, when β equals 0.8, 
AverageReward reaches a plateau far below AverageRewardmax with only a few 
reputations included.  In this case, additionally included reputations have so much error 
that they are weighted by Adaptive Trust Modeling as zero; thus σagg,err decreases (and 
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β  = 0.8
β  = 1.0
β  = 1.2
β  = 2.0
β  = ∞
 
Figure 4-11. AverageReward for scenario sn, by reputation provider rank n, computed theoretically 
for several values of β (
1 ,R err
σ = 10, Pact,max = 10, and Pact,min = -10).  For clarity, lines are continuous, 
though n is discrete. 
 
Figure 4-12 shows expected incremental payoff, MarginalReward, for scenarios 
s1 to s80 for each of five reputation provider sets defined by β (β = 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 2.0, and 
∞, Pact,max = 10 and Pact,min = -10).  Expected MarginalReward for each additionally 
included reputation decreases quickly as the rank number (i) of that reputation increases; 
this decrease occurs faster for lower values of β, when ,iR errσ  increases more quickly as 
rank number increases.   
The expected MarginalReward function for β = ∞ initially decreases more slowly 
than the function for β = 2.0, yet crosses the β = 2.0 function later.  This crossing occurs 
because though all reputations are equally accurate (in the β = ∞ set), only a few need to 
be included to produce a very small σagg,err value.  For the β = 2.0 set, each additionally 
included reputation is expected to be slightly less accurate than the last, but still 
contributing accuracy to the σagg,err value (reputations have similar weights, as assigned 
by Adaptive Trust Modeling).  As a result, reputations in the β = 2.0 set with higher rank 
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numbers continue to achieve larger expected MarginalReward values while reputations in 
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β  = 0.8
β  = 1.0
β  = 1.2
β  = 2.0
β  = ∞
 
Figure 4-12. MarginalReward for reputation Ri, by ranking i, computed theoretically for several 
values of β (
1 ,R err
σ = 10, Pact,max = 10, and Pact,min = -10).  For clarity, lines are continuous, though 
ranking i is discrete. 
 
Finally, from Equation 45 in Section 4.1.3, note that for all β,  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 0agg,err agg,errMarginalReward R AverageReward s AverageReward sσ σ= −   
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Since the highest-ranking reputation providers in all example sets have equal error 
standard deviation (
1R err
σ ), regardless of β, expected MarginalReward for the highest-
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ranked reputation in each set is the same (out of range, therefore not shown, in Figure 
4-12). 
Figure 4-13 displays the stepwise function for determining scenario sn (where n is 
the number of reputations to purchase, starting with the most accurate reputation 
provider) given reputation cost (cost for all reputations is assumed to be the same).  For 
reference, reputation provider ranking (i) vs. expected MarginalReward (the inverse 
graph of Figure 4-12) is also plotted.  In Figure 4-13, 
1 ,R err
σ = 10, Pact,max = 10, and Pact,min 
= -10.  For visual clarity, only the functions related to the β = ∞ example set are shown.  
Once a truster has computed a chart similar to Figure 4-13 based on the 
iR err
σ  values for 
its potential reputation providers, the truster determines from the stepwise function the 
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Figure 4-13. Optimal number of reputation providers selected (n) by the truster—yielding greatest 
aggregate suggestion accuracy for least reputation cost—computed theoretically as a function of 
reputation cost (Cost(Ri)).  In this figure, β = ∞, 1 ,R errσ = 10, Pact,max = 10, and Pact,min = -10. 
 
While the experiments to be discussed in Section 4.2 assume all reputations incur 
the same Cost(Ri), Adaptive Cost Selection’s analysis of reputation MarginalReward 
enables trusters to negotiate with reputation providers the prices they are willing to pay 
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for reputations, based on anticipated reputation accuracy.  For example, a reputation that 
is expected to gain a greater MarginalReward is worth a higher price because it is 
expected to increase the accuracy of the aggregate suggestion more, resulting in 
significantly higher AverageReward than if it were not purchased. 
Figure 4-14 charts a truster’s expected net profit (NetProfit) from a transaction, 
computed as 





expected NetProfit s AverageReward s Cost R
=
= − ∑ , Eqn 48 
a function of n (number of reputations to purchase) for several values of Cost(Ri) 
(assuming Cost(Ri) is the same for all reputations).  When Cost(Ri) is low, numerous 
reputations may be purchased to maximize AverageReward.  However, when Cost(Ri) is 
high, reputation purchase costs quickly outweigh higher AverageReward (associated with 
the aggregate suggestion’s increased accuracy) as the number of purchased reputations 
increases.  Note that the n values resulting in maximum NetProfit for given reputation 
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it Cost (R i ) = 0.001
Cost (R i ) = 0.05
Cost (R i ) = 0.1
Cost (R i ) = 0.2
 
Figure 4-14. Truster’s per-transaction NetProfit, computed theoretically as a function of number of 
purchased reputations n for several values of Cost(Ri).  In this figure, β = ∞ and 
1 ,R err
σ = 10.  For 
clarity, lines are continuous, though n is discrete.  
 145
Sections 4.1.1 through 4.1.4 explain the Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm for 
assessing the value of individual reputations to determine which reputations to purchase 
when cost is a factor.  Adaptive Cost Selection can be extended to valuate experience-
based trust information, as well.  By estimating a single experience’s impact to decrease a 
truster’s experience-based model error standard deviation (and increases its approximated 
AverageReward), the experience’s MarginalReward can be estimated, revealing the cost 
the truster should be willing to pay to acquire that experience.  The cost of the experience 
is indirect, related to the time and potential transaction losses invested in obtaining the 
experience.  Intuitively, humans realize the value of time and effort invested into building 
expertise based on experiences.  This Adaptive Cost Selection analysis of experience-
based trust information quantifies the value of experience. 
4.1.5 ASSESSING RISK VIA AVERAGEREWARD FUNCTIONS 
Section 4.1.2 introduces an equation for AverageReward, based on Pact,min and 
Pact,max, that is valid when Pact,max = -Pact,min.  This section introduces a general form of the 
AverageReward equation valid for all values of Pact,min and Pact,max.  More importantly, 
understanding the AverageReward function’s dependency on Pact,min and Pact,max—and the 
relationships among different AverageReward functions—reveals how AverageReward 
functions explain a truster’s decision-making with regard to risk. 
As a first step toward examining the relationship between AverageReward and 
risk, this section derives a general form of the AverageReward equation.  Recall from 
Equation 42 that AverageReward is the integral of the Reward curve (Figure 4-6), for a 
given σagg,err,  


















∫ ,  Eqn 41 
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− ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫ .  Eqn 42 
Note that this research assumes Pact is uniformly distributed to enable this discussion to 
outline a single set of derivations for AverageReward equations (however, 
AverageReward for other distributions of Pact can be approximated, as well).  The 




















= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∫  
where γ = 1000 (as determined by trial-and-error).  The positive portion (when 0 ≤ Pact ≤ 









































































































= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. Eqn 49 


























































⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. Eqn 50 
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agg,err agg,err
P P
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⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠=
−
. Eqn 51 
 
The special case in which Pact,max = -Pact,min yields the AverageReward equation given by 
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⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. Eqn 52 
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Eqn 53 
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⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
− − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠=
−
.  
   Eqn 54 
Understanding AverageReward enables a truster to account for risk when making 
trust-based decisions.  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides one definition 
of risk as “the statistical expectation value of an unwanted event which may or may not 
occur” [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007].  Risk may be considered to have 
two components: uncertainty and exposure [Holton, 2004].  The truster’s aggregate 
suggestion error (σagg,err) determines the truster’s uncertainty about the value of the 
resource the trustee will choose to provide (from Section 3.1.1, Pe,r,act), which translates 
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to uncertainty about the truster’s net payoff from the transaction, Pact, recalling, from 
Section 3.1.1: 
 Pact = Pe,r,act – Pr,r. Eqn 55 
 
 
Exposure magnitude is determined by the truster’s initial outlay (from Section 3.1.1, Pr,r), 
and is given by the truster’s worst case net transaction payoff, Pact,min, when Pe,r,act equals 
zero: 
Pact,min = Pact(Pe,r,act = 0) = –Pr,r. 
Computing AverageReward for this worst case, when trustees are always as 






























( ),act minAverageReward Reward P=  
( ), ,| act min act minAverageReward Prob T P P= . 
When σagg,err = ∞ (truster has no suggestions available and has the highest possible 
uncertainty about the transaction outcome), Prob(T|Pact,min) = 0.5.  Therefore, in the worst 
possible case (Pact = Pact,min and σagg,err = ∞): 
,0.5 act minAverageReward P= ⋅  
When the truster has no suggestions about the trustworthiness of potential trustees 
(σagg,err = ∞), the truster can decrease its risk by reducing its outlay (Pr,r and therefore, the 
magnitude of Pact,min).  Figure 4-15 demonstrates an example in which the truster assumes 
the worst case (Pact = Pact,min = -Pr,r), deciding on a small outlay, Pr,r = 3 to reduce the 
magnitude of Pact,min.  AverageReward in this case is shown by Point 1 in Figure 4-15a.  
Once the truster has conducted transactions with trustees in the system, the truster can 
begin to model the distribution of Pact over all potential trustees (instead of assuming the 
worst case Pact = Pact,min = –Pr,r), selecting the most appropriate AverageReward function 
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(for example, U[-3, 3], shown by Point 2 in Figure 4-15a).  Further, if the truster can 
obtain many (experience- or reputation-based) suggestions about a trustee, the truster will 
have developed a low σagg,err about that trustee, resulting in a higher AverageReward due 
to leftward movement along the AverageReward curve (Point 3 in Figure 4-15a).  Upon 
identifying the most appropriate AverageReward function and obtaining suggestions 
about specific trustees, the truster can begin to increase the magnitude of its transactions 
(shown by the larger outlay of Pr,r = 10 at Point 4 in Figure 4-15b).  If the truster does not 
choose to reduce its outlay, it is initially subjected to the greater risk associated with 
transactions of larger magnitude (as shown by Point 5 in Figure 4-15b).   
 
Figure 4-15. AverageReward as a function of aggregate suggestion error standard deviation (σagg,err) 
when the truster’s transaction outlay Pr,r equals (a) 3 and (b) 10. 
 
The truster’s strategy of reducing outlay while building trust agrees with intuitive 
human trusting behavior.  When a human truster approaches a trustee (or system of 
trustees) for the first time, the truster will often gain experience with the trustee (or set of 
trustees) by conducting transactions of relatively small value.  As a result, the truster 
protects itself from high risk transactions while gaining trust information about the trustee 
(or set of trustees).  Once the truster feels confident about the trustworthiness of the 
trustee and σagg,err is low (or set of trustees and the distribution of Pact is closely 
approximated), the truster may choose to trust with regard to a transaction of high value, 
since trust has been built up over time [Bennis, et al., 1964].  However, it should be noted 






















































not guarantee the truster avoids risk. Strategically untrustworthy trustees may 
intentionally act trustworthy during small-value transactions, building up trust with the 
intent to cheat the truster in a high-value transaction. 
The magnitude of a truster’s transaction (determined by its outlay Pr,r) also 
influences the priority the truster places on obtaining trust information about potential 
trustees, in terms of the Cost(Ri) the truster is willing to pay.  Figure 4-16 shows 
AverageReward as a function of σagg,err when Pact,max = -Pact,min and Pact,max = 1, 3, 5, and 
10.  When Pact,max = -Pact,min, larger Pact,max values achieve larger AverageReward values 
for a given level of aggregate suggestion error (σagg,err).  Figure 4-17 shows the 
corresponding MarginalReward as a function of number of combined reputation 
suggestions (scenario sn), assuming all reputation suggestions have error standard 
deviations ,iR errσ = 10 (that is, 1 ,R errσ  = 10 and β = ∞, according to Equation 47 in Section 
4.1.4).  Note that the MarginalReward function for Pact,max = 10 in Figure 4-17 represents 
the same MarginalReward function for β = ∞, in Figure 4-12 of Section 4.1.4.  Since a 
truster using Adaptive Cost Selection will pay at most the MarginalReward of a 
reputation to purchase that reputation, Figure 4-17 shows that a truster is willing to pay 
more for reputations when the “stakes” are higher (i.e., the magnitudes of potential payoff 
Pact,max and loss Pact,min are greater).   
 
The concept of investing more to estimate the outcome of larger-magnitude 
transactions is intuitive.  For example, if the truster is a potential homebuyer, he is likely 
to invest a large amount of time and money acquiring trust information that is both 
experience-based (attending open houses) and reputation-based (hiring an inspector).  
Similarly, if the truster is a consumer planning to buy an expensive new automobile, he 
will usually invest significantly by test driving vehicles and purchasing referrals, such as 
a new car buying guide.  On the other hand, when the truster is an individual deciding on 
a restaurant at which to dine, he will usually invest considerably less time and money into 
deciding on a restaurant, perhaps simply checking internet reviews or just selecting a 
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Figure 4-16. AverageReward as a function of aggregate suggestion error standard deviation (σagg,err) 
when Pact,max = -Pact,min and Pact,max = 1, 3, 5, and 10. 
 
For a given Pact,min and Pact,max where Pact,max = -Pact,min, the AverageReward 
functions describing trustee behavior distributions of 1) U[Pact,min, Pact,max], 2) U[Pact,min, 
0], and 3) U[0, Pact,max], are parallel (as shown in Figure 4-18 for the case in which Pact,max 
= 10).  Therefore, MarginalReward functions, as shown in Figure 4-17, are the same for 
each of the three cases (the truster achieves the same increase in AverageReward for a 
given reputation in each case).  As a result, in these three cases, the amount a truster 
invests in acquiring reputations depends only on the magnitude of the transaction (Pact,min 
and Pact,max), not on the overall level of trustworthiness within the pool of potential 
trustees (which may not be true when compared against other distributions of Pact, such 
as U[-10, -9], for example). 
The whole of this research assumes the truster’s decisions are Boolean (trust vs. 
not-trust) and the truster’s outlay value, Pr,r, is fixed.  However, if the truster is enabled to 
choose the magnitude of Pr,r, the truster can decrease its risk by only conducting small-
value transactions when the truster has no trust information about trustees (agg,err = ∞).  
When trust information is available (either experience- or reputation-based suggestions), 
the truster can increase the magnitude of its outlay, since trust information increases the 
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truster’s certainty of the transaction outcome.  Further, a truster’s willingness to pay for 
reputations is directly related to the magnitude of the truster’s outlay; the truster is willing 
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Figure 4-17. MarginalReward of reputation i as a function of n when Pact,max = -Pact,min and Pact,max = 1, 
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Figure 4-18. AverageReward as a function of aggregate suggestion error standard deviation (σagg,err) 
when the distribution of Pact over all potential trustees is U[-10, 10], U[-10, 0], and U[0, 10]. 
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This section refutes Misconception 6 from Section 1.4: A truster should always 
rely on reputation-based modeling when it has no experience with a trustee.  More 
accurately, a truster is more likely to purchase reputations when considering a high-value 
transaction simply because each acquired reputation is worth more (has a higher 
MarginalReward).  However, if the truster has access to an accurate, no-cost experience-
based model, the truster is likely to utilize its experiences, as well, regardless of the 
transaction magnitude.  When considering low-value transactions, reputations may be too 
expensive in relation to the transaction magnitude; therefore, a truster may be forced to 
rely on experience-based modeling or no trust information at all.  When a truster has no 
trust information, the truster’s decision to trust anyway does not indicate a use of 
experience-based trust modeling.  Rather, the decision to trust indicates the truster’s 
threshold for risk is not exceeded by the low value of the transactions magnitude.  
However, the result of transaction may be observed by the truster and incorporated into 
its experience-based model for use regarding subsequent decisions. 
4.2 Adaptive Cost Selection Evaluation 
This section validates Adaptive Cost Selection, demonstrating that Adaptive Cost 
Selection achieves NetProfit (as defined by Equation 48 in Section 4.1.4) as high as the 
most profitable fixed-quantity reputation selection approach when the truster both does 
and does not have access to an experience-based trust model (Section 4.2.1).  Section 
4.2.2 shows that NetProfit decreases only slightly when the assumption of a priori 
knowledge of the trustees’ Pact distribution is relaxed. 
4.2.1 ADAPTIVE COST SELECTION VS. FIXED-QUANTITY SELECTION 
An experiment is conducted to compare the Adaptive Cost Selection technique 
against static strategies which select fixed numbers of reputation providers.  In this 
experiment, a single truster has access to ten reputation providers, each providing 
reputation suggestions according to N(μR,sug, σR,sug), where μR,sug = Pact and σR,sug = 10.0, 
resulting in error distributions described by N(μR,err, σR,err), where μR,err = 0 and 
σR,err = σR,sug.  In this experiment, the truster is assumed to have no experience-based 
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model so the problem of selecting reputations can be isolated (later, a second experiment 
in this section incorporates the truster’s experience-based model).  All reputation 
providers have the same accuracy (β = ∞) because, as indicated by Figure 4-12 in Section 
4.1.4, more similarity (very high β value, from Equation 47 in Section 4.1.4) among the 
accuracies of reputation providers makes more difficult the truster’s decision concerning 
how many reputation providers to select.  On the contrary, a set of reputation providers 
with a wide range of accuracy (very low β value) often requires only a trivial solution 
from the truster: select only the single most accurate reputation provider.  Pact represents 
the actual outcome of trustee behavior (truster’s net payoff) for the transaction in 
question.  Pact values over all transaction opportunities are uniformly distributed between 
Pact,min = -10.0 and Pact,max = 10.0 to simulate the truster’s encounter with a new trustee in 
each transaction opportunity.  The truster’s Adaptive Cost Selection technique uses the 
corresponding computation of AverageReward given by Equation 43 in Section 4.1.2, 
which assumes uniform distribution of Pact, with Pact,min = -10.0 and Pact,max = 10.0 
(Section 4.2.2 relaxes the assumption that the distribution of Pact is known a priori by the 
truster).  Results from 20 runs, each consisting of 2000 transaction opportunities with 
unique trustees, are averaged.  The experiment compares the truster’s average per-
transaction profit (NetProfit, defined by Equation 48 in Section 4.1.4 as transaction 
earnings minus reputation costs) when the truster utilizes Adaptive Cost Selection vs. 
selecting a fixed quantity of the most accurate providers (scenarios s1, s4, s6, s8, or s10). 
Experiment results for NetProfit (average per-transaction profit) vs. Cost(Ri) 
(reputation cost) are shown in Figure 4-19.  Among the fixed-quantity selection 
approaches, selecting ten providers (s10) achieves the highest average per-transaction 
NetProfit when reputation cost is zero, because purchasing reputation suggestions from 
more providers results in more accurate aggregate reputation-based suggestions, yet costs 
nothing.  However, NetProfit from selecting ten providers quickly decreases as cost per 
reputation increases; for reputation costs greater than 0.24 per reputation, the cost of 
purchasing ten reputations outweighs transaction earnings, despite the accuracy of the 
aggregate reputation-based suggestion.  In contrast, selecting only the single most 
accurate provider (s1) yields the lowest per-transaction NetProfit when reputation cost is 
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zero because the resulting aggregate suggestion is less accurate than when reputations 
from more providers are selected, and there is no cost savings by declining additional 
reputation providers.  However, when reputation costs are high, selecting the single most 
accurate provider yields the highest average per-transaction NetProfit because reputation 
costs are minimized. 
As Figure 4-19 shows, Adaptive Cost Selection selects the appropriate number of 
reputations from providers, depending on reputation cost and provider accuracy, for all 
reputation costs, achieving NetProfit statistically similar (α = 0.05) to that of the best 
fixed-quantity technique for the specific reputation cost.  Figure 4-20 shows the similarity 
between the number providers chosen in the experiment by Adaptive Cost Selection and 
the theoretical computation for best number of providers, previously charted in Figure 
4-13 (Section 4.1.4).  When using Adaptive Cost Selection in the experiment, the truster 
always selects the scenario sn with n lower than, but close to, the theoretical best n for 
which MarginalReward of the nth reputation equals Cost(Ri), minimizing both aggregate 
suggestion error and total reputation cost.  Due to randomness, the standard deviations of 
reputation provider suggestions are not all exactly 10; instead, they tend to fall within a 
range of approximately 9 to 11.  As a result, MarginalReward for the first reputation 
purchased is higher than theoretically predicted (and MarginalReward for subsequent 
reputations is lower than theoretically predicted).  Consequently, the empirical number of 
reputations selected (shown in Figure 4-20) is lower than the theoretically computed 
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Figure 4-19. Truster’s per-transaction NetProfit as a function of reputation cost (Cost(Ri)).  Several 
approaches which each select a fixed number (n) of reputations to purchase are compared 
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Figure 4-20. Number of selected reputations (n) as a function of reputation cost (Cost(Ri)).  The 
number of reputation providers selected experimentally by the truster using Adaptive Cost Selection 
is compared against the theoretically-determined best n (as shown in Figure 4-13). 
 
A second experiment is conducted in which the availability of experience-based 
trust information is accounted for in the Adaptive Cost Selection technique.  This same 
experiment is references in Section 3.3.2, which demonstrates how a truster’s reliance on 
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its reputation-based trust model (ωR) changes as the number of transaction observations 
(m) increases.  This experiment validates the results in Section 3.3.2 by showing that 
Adaptive Cost Selection achieves NetProfit as high as, or higher than, the best fixed-
quantity reputation selection technique for all reputation costs (Cost(Ri)) and number of 
transaction observations (m).  In the experience-included case, the truster’s experience-
based model is viewed as an additional “reputation provider” whose suggestions have 
zero cost and error that decreases as the number of transaction observations (with the 
trustee in question) increases.  Therefore, experience-based suggestions are always 
included in computing the aggregate suggestion.  Scenario s0 describes the scenario in 
which the suggestion from only the experience-based “provider” is included, while 
scenario s1 includes the experience-based suggestion and the reputation from the single 
reputation provider with least error, and so on. 
In addition to its experience-based model, a single truster has access to ten 
reputation providers, each providing reputation suggestions according to N(μR,sug, σR,sug), 
where μR,sug = μbeh and σR,sug = 10.0.  An experiment run consists of 100 transaction 
observations (m), during which the truster builds its experience-based trust model about a 
single trustee whose behavior Pact is normally distributed according to N(μbeh, σbeh), 
where σbeh = 1.0.  The trustee’s μbeh is constant throughout a run, but over different runs, 
each with a different trustee, μbeh is uniformly distributed between Pact,min = -10.0 and 
Pact,max = 10.0 (the truster’s Adaptive Cost Selection technique uses the corresponding 
computation of AverageReward given by Equation 43 in Section 4.1.2, which assumes 
Pact,min = -10.0 and Pact,max = 10.0).  Results from 9000 runs are averaged.  The 
experiment compares the truster’s average per-transaction profit (NetProfit, defined by 
Equation 48 in Section 4.1.4 as transaction earnings minus reputation costs) as a function 
of both reputation cost and number of observed transactions m (with the single trustee in 
question).  The experiment results compare NetProfit achieved by Adaptive Cost 
Selection vs. always selecting a fixed quantity of the most accurate reputation providers: 
scenarios s0 (experience-only), s1, s4, s6, s8, or s10.  In all cases, the truster includes, at no 
cost, suggestions from its experience-based model. 
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Figure 4-21 shows the truster’s per-transaction NetProfit as a function of Cost(Ri) 
when m = 100 (after 100 transactions with the trustee have been observed).  As Cost(Ri) 
increases, selecting zero reputations (s0, using experience-based suggestions only), yields 
the highest NetProfit, while purchasing more reputations results in lower NetProfit.  After 
100 transaction observations, the truster’s experience-based model is so accurate that 
reputation suggestions do not significantly improve the accuracy of the truster’s 
aggregate suggestion, while paying for reputation suggestions only serves to decrease 
NetProfit.  Adaptive Cost Selection achieves NetProfit statistically similar (α = 0.05) to 
that of the best fixed-quantity case, selecting zero reputation providers and relying only 
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Figure 4-21. Truster’s per-transaction NetProfit as a function of reputation cost (Cost(Ri)), when 
number of transaction observations (m) equals 100.  Several approaches which each select a fixed 
number of reputations (n) to purchase are compared experimentally against Adaptive Cost Selection 
(in each case, the truster has access to experience-based suggestions). 
 
Figure 4-22, Figure 4-23, and Figure 4-24 show the truster’s per-transaction 
NetProfit, as the number of observed transactions (m) with the trustee increases, when 
Cost(Ri) equals 0.2, 0.02, and 0.0, respectively (for visual clarity, only the fixed-quantity 
scenarios s0, s4, and s10 are shown, in addition to Adaptive Cost Selection).  When 
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Cost(Ri) equals 0.2, reputation cost is too high to justify purchasing any reputations, even 
when m is small (the truster’s experience-based model is not very accurate).  As a result, 
purchasing fewer reputations results in highest NetProfit.  When Cost(Ri) equals 0.02, s10 
is advantageous when number of transaction observations (m) is low, because reputation 
cost is low and the truster’s experience-based model has not yet built up sufficient 
accuracy.  However, as the truster’s experience-based model increases in accuracy (m 
increases), the contribution of each reputation to the truster’s aggregate suggestion 
decreases, and the truster achieves higher NetProfit by relying on experience only (s0).  
The Adaptive Cost Selection technique identifies the best number of reputations to 
purchase, given both reputation cost and experience-based model accuracy (based on m), 
decreasing the number of reputations purchased as m increases and the MarginalReward 
of each subsequent reputation decreases.  When Cost(Ri) equals 0.0, the truster finds it 
advantageous to utilize as many reputations as possible—no matter how accurate its 
experience-based model—because purchased reputations incur no cost.  Correspondingly, 
the fixed-quantity case of selecting ten reputations (s10) yields the highest NetProfit, 
regardless of number of observed transactions.  Adaptive Cost Selection matches the 
highest NetProfit by also purchasing ten reputations for all values of m.  In all three 
figures, Adaptive Cost Selection achieves NetProfit statistically similar (α = 0.05) to that 
of the fixed-quantity case yielding the highest NetProfit (purchasing zero and using 
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Figure 4-22. Truster’s per-transaction NetProfit as a function of number of transaction observations 
(m), when reputation cost (Cost(Ri)) equals 0.2.  Several approaches which each select a fixed number 
(n) of reputations to purchase are compared experimentally against Adaptive Cost Selection (in each 
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Figure 4-23. Truster’s per-transaction NetProfit as a function of number of transaction observations 
(m), when reputation cost (Cost(Ri)) equals 0.02.  Several approaches which each select a fixed 
number (n) of reputations to purchase are compared experimentally against Adaptive Cost Selection 
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Figure 4-24. Truster’s per-transaction NetProfit as a function of number of transaction observations 
(m), when reputation cost (Cost(Ri)) equals zero.  Several approaches which each select a fixed 
number (n) of reputations to purchase are compared experimentally against Adaptive Cost Selection 
(in each case, the truster has access to experience-based suggestions).  
 
Figure 4-25 compares the number of reputations purchased according to Adaptive 
Cost Selection as a function of reputation cost for three cases: 1) when m = 3 (before the 
truster’s experience-based model achieves significant accuracy), 2) when m = 100 (after 
the truster’s experience-based model has become very accurate), and 3) when no 
experience-based model is available (from Figure 4-20, for comparison purposes).  Even 
when m is small, Adaptive Cost Selection purchases fewer reputations when the truster’s 
experience-based model is available than when no experience-based model is available.  
When m is large (the truster’s experience-based model is very accurate), even fewer 
reputations are purchased.  Recall from Figure 3-41 in Section 3.3.2 that the truster’s 
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Figure 4-25. Number of reputations (n) selected as a function of reputation cost (Cost(Ri)).  The 
number of reputations selected experimentally by the truster using Adaptive Cost Selection is 
compared when 1) m = 3, 2) m = 100, and 3) no experience-based model is available (as shown in 
Figure 4-20).  
 
In summary, this research presents an adaptive technique for selecting reputation 
suggestions when reputation cost is a factor.  Adaptive Cost Selection achieves NetProfit 
as high as the most profitable fixed-quantity reputation selection technique by weighing 
the cost of a reputation suggestion against the predicted accuracy of the reputation and 
resulting utility gained from it, in terms of payoff from the potential transaction.  In 
general, when utilizing Adaptive Cost Selection, the truster selects reputations from more 
providers when reputation cost is low because the positive impact of increased suggestion 
accuracy on transaction payoff outweighs the negative impact of reputation cost.  
Conversely, when reputation cost is high, the truster selects reputations from fewer 
providers, though accuracy of the aggregated reputation-based suggestion suffers, 
because the negative impact of reputation cost outweighs the positive impact of increased 
accuracy otherwise.  When suggestions from the truster’s experience-based model are 
available, the truster selects more reputations early on, before the experience-based 
model has built up significant accuracy.  However, as the truster’s experience-based 
model gains accuracy, Adaptive Cost Selection purchases fewer reputations.  The 
Adaptive Cost Selection technique assesses the MarginalReward of each reputation to 
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find the optimal balance between reputation cost and increased aggregate suggestion 
accuracy. 
4.2.2 CHOOSING APPROPRIATE  AVERAGEREWARD FUNCTIONS 
The experiments in Section 4.2.1, which demonstrate the advantage of Adaptive 
Cost Selection over strategies selecting fixed-quantities of reputations, assume the truster 
knows a priori that Pact over all trustees is distributed uniformly as U[Pact,min, Pact,max], 
where Pact,min = -10.0 and Pact,max = 10.0. In those experiments, the truster uses the 
specific AverageReward function displayed in Figure 4-7, unique for the Pact distribution 
U[-10.0, 10.0], to compute the number of reputations to purchase given reputation cost 
Cost(Ri).  However, as detailed in Section 4.1.5, different distributions of Pact over 
trustees can yield very different AverageReward functions.  Further, in many cases, a 
truster has no absolute knowledge about the distribution of Pact over trustees, outside of 
the individual transaction outcomes it observes.  Therefore, an important step in 
justifying the usefulness of Adaptive Cost Selection requires removing the assumption 
that the distribution of Pact over trustees is known by the truster.   
This section demonstrates how a truster can select the most appropriate 
AverageReward function given its estimate of the distribution of Pact over all potential 
trustees.  The truster maintains an average, μall,beh, and standard deviation, σall,beh, of 
transaction outcomes Pact over all trustees.  For simplicity, the truster models the 
distribution of Pact over all trustees as uniform; therefore, Pact,min and Pact,max are 
computed from estimates of μall,beh and σall,beh: 
, , , 3act max all beh all behP μ σ= +  and 
, , , 3act min all beh all behP μ σ= − . 
Before the truster has observed any transaction outcomes with any trustees, it assumes the 
distribution of Pact over all potential trustees is some default distribution (for the purpose 
of the experiments below, U[-1.0, 1.0] is used).  As the truster observes transaction 
outcomes, it updates its estimates of Pact,min and Pact,max according to changes in μall,beh 
and σall,beh.  The technique above enables a truster to dynamically select the most 
appropriate AverageReward function by estimating of the distribution of Pact over all 
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potential trustees.  The truster uses the AverageReward function to determine the scenario 
sn (number n of error-ordered reputations to purchase) to maximize aggregate suggestion 
accuracy (and transaction payoff Pact) while minimizing reputation cost.   
An experiment is conducted in which Adaptive Cost Selection (selecting the most 
appropriate AverageReward function based on estimates of the distribution of Pact over 
all potential trustees) is compared when the distribution of Pact is vs. is not known to the 
truster a priori.  A single truster has access to ten reputation providers, each providing 
reputations according to N(μR,sug, σR,sug), where μR,sug = Pact and σR,sug = 10.0, as in the 
first experiment of Section 4.2.1.  The experiment averages 1,000 runs, each consisting of 
100 transaction opportunities, each with a unique trustee.  Pact values over all transaction 
opportunities are uniformly distributed between Pact,min = -10.0 and Pact,max = 10.0.  For 
several values of reputation cost Cost(Ri), the experiment compares 1) Adaptive Cost 
Selection assuming the distribution of Pact over all potential trustees is known to be U[-
10, 10] against 2) Adaptive Cost Selection assuming the distribution of Pact over all 
potential trustees is unknown a priori, estimating the distribution of Pact over all potential 
trustees to select the most appropriate AverageReward function.  Both Adaptive Cost 
Selection variations select scenario s10 as default during the first two transaction 
opportunities. 
Figure 4-26, Figure 4-27, and Figure 4-28 show (a) number of reputations 
selected (n) and (b) NetProfit as functions of number of transaction opportunities (m) 
when Cost(Ri) equals 0.0, 0.1, and 1.0, respectively.  When Cost(Ri) equals 0.0, Adaptive 
Cost Selection (with and without a priori knowledge of trustees’ Pact distribution) 
automatically select scenario s10 (selecting all ten reputation providers), the scenario 
yielding the theoretically highest NetProfit (Figure 4-26a).  NetProfit earned in the with 
vs. without a priori knowledge cases is statistically similar (α = 0.05). 
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Figure 4-26. Adaptive Cost Selection compared when the distribution of Pact over all potential 
trustees is known vs. unknown in terms of (a) number of reputations in selected scenario sn and (b) 
truster per-transaction NetProfit vs. number of transaction opportunities when Cost(Ri) = 0.0. 
 
When Cost(Ri) equals 0.1, Adaptive Cost Selection (with and without a priori 
knowledge of trustees’ Pact distribution) quickly settles on selecting an average of about 
four reputations, once accurate estimates of reputation provider error are built up (Figure 
4-27a).  Adaptive Cost Selection without a priori knowledge selects slightly fewer 
reputations, on average; occasionally the algorithm is unable to form an accurate estimate 
of Pact,min and Pact,max because too many truster decisions result in not trusting, preventing 
the truster from observing instances of Pact.  Adaptive Cost Selection without a priori 
knowledge achieves NetProfit values close to but significantly less than Adaptive Cost 
Selection with a priori knowledge (Figure 4-27b). 
When Cost(Ri) equals 1.0, Adaptive Cost Selection (with and without a priori 
knowledge of trustees’ Pact distribution) quickly settles on selecting an average of about 
one reputation, once accurate estimates of reputation provider error are built up (Figure 
4-28a).  Again, Adaptive Cost Selection without a priori knowledge selects slightly fewer 
reputations, on average.  Though both Adaptive Cost Selection versions initially yield 
negative NetProfit values, Adaptive Cost Selection quickly converges to yield a positive 
NetProfit (Figure 4-28b).  Adaptive Cost Selection without a priori knowledge achieves 
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Figure 4-27. Adaptive Cost Selection compared when the distribution of Pact over all potential 
trustees is known vs. unknown in terms of (a) number of reputations in selected scenario sn and (b) 
truster per-transaction NetProfit vs. number of transaction opportunities when Cost(Ri) = 0.1. 
 
 
Figure 4-28. Adaptive Cost Selection compared when the distribution of Pact over all potential 
trustees is known vs. unknown in terms of (a) number of reputations in selected scenario sn and (b) 
truster per-transaction NetProfit vs. number of transaction opportunities when Cost(Ri) = 1.0. 
 
Figure 4-29 compares NetProfit, averaged over the first 100 transaction 
opportunities, as a function of Cost(Ri) for Adaptive Cost Selection with vs. without a 
priori knowledge of the Pact distribution.  Removing the assumption that Adaptive Cost 
Selection has a priori knowledge of trustees’ Pact distribution results in only a slightly 
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Figure 4-29. Adaptive Cost Selection compared when the distribution of Pact over all potential 
trustees is known vs. unknown in terms of truster per-transaction NetProfit vs. Cost(Ri). 
 
In summary, it is not necessary to assume that Adaptive Cost Selection has a 
priori knowledge of the distribution of Pact over all potential trustees.  Rather, even early 
(within approximately the first twenty transaction opportunities) estimates of the trustees’ 
Pact distribution enable Adaptive Cost Selection to select an appropriate AverageReward 
function for selecting scenario sn.   
 
4.3 Applying Adaptive Cost Selection in the ART Testbed 
This section explains experiments performed in the Agent Reputation and Trust 
(ART) Testbed demonstrating the effectiveness of Adaptive Cost Selection.  The ART 
Testbed is an experimentation facility for trust-related research which provides an open-
access platform for easily-repeatable experiments.  Further, the ART Testbed provides a 
forum for competitions among agents designed by an international array of researchers.  
In the ART Testbed’s art appraisal domain, agents function as appraisers, with varying 
levels of expertise, who earn fees by appraising paintings for clients.  If an appraising 
agent does not have the expertise needed to complete the appraisal, it can choose to trust 
opinions it receives from other appraiser agents.  Appraisers receive more clients, and 
thus more profit, for producing more accurate appraisals.  In the experiments presented 
here, Adaptive Cost Selection is implemented as an improvement to the strategy of the 
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ART Testbed competition’s winning agent.  The experiments demonstrate that a winning-
strategy agent implementing Adaptive Cost Selection earns higher net profits than a 
winning-strategy agent without Adaptive Cost Selection when the two agents compete 
against each other in the ART Testbed. 
The ART Testbed Project began in 2004, when this author began recruiting an 
initial team of ten researchers from six countries to participate in software development 
and competition organization.  The ART Testbed was conceived from the need to 1) 
attract researchers to interesting problems related to trust and reputation in multi-agent 
systems, 2) establish success benchmarks for trust-related technologies, and 3) provide a 
common experimentation platform enabling experiment repeatability.  Version releases 
of the open source Testbed began in late 2005; ongoing improvements are initiated by the 
core development team, as well as other researchers and competitors who contribute new 
features and changes to existing code.  International competitions were conducted in 
2006 (involving 14 competitors from 7 research organizations) and 2007 (involving 18 
competitors from 13 research organizations).  As of this writing, 100 subscribers 
participate in the ART Testbed Project’s discussion group [ART Testbed, 2007].  Further, 
numerous publications by researchers (most unaffiliated with the organizing team) have 
examined topics such as developing strategies for winning the competition [Kafali and 
Yolum, 2006; Teacy, et al., 2007], assessing the feasibility of coalition formation in the 
ART Testbed [Sen, et al., 2006], using the ART Testbed for trust algorithm 
experimentation [Fullam and Barber, 2006], and designing trust and reputation ontologies 
[Brandão, et al., 2007].   
Experimentation demonstrating the contribution of Adaptive Cost Selection is 
performed within the ART Testbed facility for several reasons.  First, the widespread 
involvement by the international agent trust research community in ART Testbed 
experimentation and competitions means solid benchmarks are established for assessing 
the contribution of new trust research.  Specifically, the winning agents of the 2006 and 
2007 ART Testbed competitions serve as comparison baselines for these experiments.  
Further, the experiments presented in this chapter are easily-repeatable, since the ART 
Testbed facility is open source and experiment parameters are explicitly defined.  
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Experimentation requires very little start-up effort; using the java programming language, 
the user builds an agent simply by coding nine methods—each regarding a different trust-
related decision—inherited from an abstract agent class.  Finally, the flexibility of the 
ART Testbed permits researchers to alter game rules and parameters in a straightforward 
manner, enabling the Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm implemented here to serve as a 
springboard for future experiments under different system conditions. 
Section 4.3.1 explains the game rules in place for both the 2006 and 2007 
competitions.  Section 4.3.2 presents results [Fullam, et al., 2006] and an explanation of 
the winning strategy [Teacy, et al., 2007] for the 2006 competition.  A listing of final 
scores for the 2007 competition, as well as a short explanation of differences between the 
2006 and 2007 games, are included; however, 2007 competition details, including 
explanation of the winning agent strategy and in-depth analysis of results, are not yet 
available at the time of this writing.  As a result, the discussion of Adaptive Cost 
Selection implementation in Section 4.3.3 is presented in the context of improving the 
2006 winning agent.  Winning agents of both the 2006 and 2007 competitions were 
designed by the same research team; that team has claimed, through informal 
communication, that changes between their 2006 and 2007 agents are insignificant.  
Therefore, experiments presented in Section 4.3.4 compare the earned profits of an agent 
utilizing Adaptive Cost Selection against the winning agents of both the 2006 and 2007 
competitions.   
4.3.1 THE ART TESTBED GAME RULES 
This section provides a brief description of the ART Testbed game rules in effect 
for the 2006 and 2007 competitions.  Additional details are provided in the official 
Testbed specifications and game rules publications [Fullam, et al., 2005a; Fullam, et al., 
2005b; Fullam, et al., 2004]; updated rules associated with subsequent Testbed releases 
may be found at the ART Testbed website [ART Testbed, 2007].  In the ART Testbed 
game scenario, agents act as painting appraisers with varying levels of expertise in 
different artistic eras.  Paying a fixed fee f, simulation-generated clients request appraisals 
for paintings from different eras.  An appraising agent may generate its own valuation 
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estimate (called an opinion) of the painting, or, if the appraising agent does not have the 
expertise to complete the appraisal, it may request opinions from other appraiser agents. 
Appraisers producing accurate appraisals receive more clients, and thus more fees, in 
future timesteps.  The winning agent is the appraiser achieving the highest bank balance 
by the end of the game.   
The ART Testbed defines an appraiser's expertise as its ability to generate an 
accurate opinion about the value of a painting, as described by a normal distribution of 
the error between the appraiser's opinion and the true painting value (known only by the 
simulation).  The simulation creates opinions according to this error distribution, which 






= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 
where s*, unique for each era, is an inverse measure of an appraiser's expertise in that era 
(the expertise is assigned to an appraiser by the simulation from a uniform distribution 
between 0.1 and 1.0, inclusive, in increments of 0.1). The value t is the true value of the 
painting to be appraised and α is a parameter, chosen by the competition organizers and 
fixed for all appraisers, relating opinion-generation cost to resulting opinion accuracy. An 
opinion provider chooses a variable cost cg, representing time taken to examine the 
painting, to pay in generating an opinion about a painting's value (a higher cg value 
results in increased opinion accuracy).  By choosing to pay a higher cost, analogous to 
spending more time studying the painting, an opinion provider increases the accuracy of 
its opinion, which also depends on—and is ultimately limited by—the appraiser's 
expertise in the painting's era. 
Appraisers may request opinions from as many other appraisers as desired for 
each painting, at a fixed cost cp for each opinion transaction.  An appraiser's final 
appraisal is computed as a weighted average of all requested opinions (including opinions 
generated by the appraiser itself); the appraiser selects weights for each opinion provider 
in correlation with its trust in each opinion provider.  The Testbed simulation uses these 
weights to compute each final appraisal as a weighted average of the appraiser’s 
requested opinions.  After the simulation notifies the appraiser of the final appraisal and 
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the painting’s true value, an appraiser may use this feedback to revise its trust models of 
other opinion providers.  Appraisers acting as opinion requesters must identify the most 
accurate opinion providers to produce accurate appraisals at low cost.  Appraisers acting 
as opinion providers must determine the optimal amount cg to minimize opinion-
generation costs and prevent competitors from achieving highest appraisal accuracy, yet 
continue to profit from opinion requests from other appraisers. 
For a fixed cost cr, an appraiser may query another appraiser for reputations about 
an opinion provider.  The reputation provider reports a reputation of the same form as 
weights submitted for final appraisal calculation; however, reputations need not be 
truthful.  Appraisers acting as reputation requesters must identify those appraisers 
providing accurate reputations about honest opinion providers with high expertise, while 
minimizing reputation purchase costs.  Appraisers acting as reputation providers must 
provide reputations which encourage requesters to continue purchasing recommendations 
while preventing competitors from obtaining accurate opinions. 
Although clients are initially evenly distributed among appraisers, appraisers with 
more accurate final appraisals are rewarded with a larger share of the client base in 
subsequent timesteps (the total number of clients per timestep remains constant for the 
game duration).  To calculate each appraiser's share of the client base, each appraiser a's 

















where Ca is the set of appraiser a's clients, *cp is appraiser a's final appraisal for client c, 
and tc is the true value of the painting client c submitted to a for appraisal.  Next, each 
appraiser a is assigned a preliminary client share ar  according to its average relative 
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   Eqn 56 
where A is the set of all appraisers, C is the set of all clients, and  
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. Eqn 57 
Thus, the appraiser with the least average relative appraisal error achieves the 
highest preliminary client share.  Finally, each appraiser a's actual client share ra is 
influenced by the appraiser's client share from the previous timestep:  
( )' 1a a ar q r q r= ⋅ + − ⋅ , 
where 'ar  is appraiser a's client share in the previous timestep.  The parameter q, a value 
between zero and one inclusive, reflects the influence of previous client share size on 
client share size in the next timestep. 
Three changes from the 2006 competition are introduced for the 2007 
competition.  While the 2006 competition includes only five agents (competitors) per 
game, the 2007 competition adds fifteen “dummy” agents (five “cheating” agents, five 
“benevolent” agents, and five “neutral” agents) to each game, for a total of twenty agents 
per game.  Second, the 2007 competition introduces mid-game, unexpected expertise 
changes.  Finally, the software used for the 2007 competition (release version 1.0.4) 
includes updated features (improved data accessibility, faster running times) over the 
software used for the 2006 competition (release version 0.3.4), though these  software 
improvements are irrelevant to agent strategies. 
4.3.2 ART TESTBED INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIONS 
The 2006 ART Testbed international competition was conducted using the game 
parameters specified in Table 4-2.  A final round of competition was conducted among 
the five highest-scoring participants in the preliminary round.  Table 4-3 shows results 
from the final round, where average profit per timestep and normalized profit ratio are 
calculated as: 
average ending bank balanceaverage profit per timestep =
number of  timesteps per game
 and 
( )
average profit per timestepnormalized profit ratio =
f average number of  clients per agent⋅
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Note that an in-depth analysis of the 2006 competition results is provided in 
[Fullam, et al., 2006]; more detailed game data, as well as .jar files for each participating 
agent (source code is not made public by competitors), are accessible via the ART 
Testbed website [ART Testbed, 2007]. 
 
Table 4-2. 2006 parameters 
Game Parameter Value 
Average Number of Clients per Agent 20 
Number of Timesteps per Game 60 
Number of Competitors per Game 5 
Opinion Accuracy Factor α 0.5 
Previous Client Share Influence q 0.1 
Client Fee f 100 
Opinion Cost cp 10 
Reputation Cost cr 1 
 
Table 4-3. Rankings, by average profit per timestep, for the Final Round of the 2006 international 
competition.  





1 IAM Univ. Southampton 2193 1.10 
2 JOEY Univ. Nebraska-Lincoln 1717 0.86 
3 NEIL Nanyang Technological Univ. 1710 0.86 
4 FROST Bogazici Univ. 1690 0.85 
5 SABATINI Univ. Carlos III de Madrid 1541 0.77 
 
Average profit per timestep for a game determines a game’s winning agent.  
Normalized profit ratio indicates profit irrespective of client fee f and overall client base 
size C (client base size is determined by number of competitors).  Normalized profit ratio 
is useful for comparing results of the 2006 competition games against experimental 
games presented later in Section 4.3.4.  The 2006 winning agent, IAM (designed by a 
University of Southampton team) achieves a normalized profit ratio of 1.10, as compared 
to the second-place agent, JOEY, which achieves a normalized profit ratio of 0.86.  In 
other words, IAM maximizes its number of clients and earnings from selling opinions, 
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while not paying too much to acquire opinions and generate opinions for other appraisers.  
Detailed data regarding client shares, opinion earnings, opinion-generation costs, and 
opinion purchase costs are contained in the 2006 competition analysis [Fullam, et al., 
2006]. 
Game parameters for the 2007 ART Testbed competition are specified in Table 
4-4 [ART Testbed, 2007].  Between the 2006 and 2007 competitions, the number of 
timesteps per game is increased from 60 to 200, and reputation cost cr is decreased from 
1.0 to 0.1.  Table 4-5 shows results from the 2007 final round [ART Testbed, 2007] in 
terms of average profit per timestep, profit ratio, and normalized profit ratio.  The 
winning agent, IAM2 (designed by the same University of Southampton team), achieves 
a normalized profit ratio of 2.77, as compared to the second-place agent, JAM, which 
achieves a normalized profit ratio of 1.86.  Profit ratios are substantially higher in the 
2007 competition, as compared to 2006, because the inclusion of fifteen dummy agents 
per game increases the total client base from 100 agents to 400.  While dummy agents 
each retain some small client share, the majority of clients are acquired by the more 
accurate-appraising competitor agents. 
Interestingly, in all but rare instances, participants in both the 2006 and 2007 
competitions make no use of reputation exchange [Fullam, et al., 2006; ART Testbed, 
2007] (Section 4.3.5 explores the reasons and makes suggestions for game rule changes 
to encourage reputation exchange).  Therefore, applying Adaptive Cost Selection to 
reputation purchasing decisions provides little benefit, given the described ART Testbed 
competition game setup.  However, appraisers make similar decisions regarding opinion 
purchases, weighing the cost to acquire opinions against the increased accuracy of 
appraisals (and increased client earnings).  IAM’s policies regarding purchasing and 
weighting opinions, as part of its larger strategy, are described here as the baseline for the 
implementation of Adaptive Cost Selection presented in Section 4.3.3.  IAM (2006) (as 
opposed to IAM2 (2007)) is studied, since 1) detailed documentation about the IAM 
strategy exists and 2) the Southampton designers informally suggest that changes 
between IAM and IAM2 are insignificant.  Nevertheless, experiments are conducted 
using both IAM and IAM2 agents in Section 4.3.4. 
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Table 4-4. 2007 Parameters 
Game Parameter Value 
Average Number of Clients per Agent 20 
Number of Timesteps per Game 200 
Number of Competitors per Game 5 
Opinion Accuracy Factor α 0.5 
Previous Client Share Influence q 0.1 
Client Fee f 100 
Opinion Cost cp 10 
Reputation Cost cr 0.1 
 
Table 4-5. Rankings, by average profit per timestep, for the Final Round of the 2007 international 
competition.  
Rank Agent Name Team Affiliation Avg. Profit per Timestep 
Normalized 
Profit Ratio 
1 IAM2 Univ. Southampton 5536 2.77 
2 JAM Univ. Tulsa 3715 1.86 
3 BLIZZARD Bogazici Univ. 3620 1.81 
4 SPARTAN Univ. Girona 3374 1.69 
5 ZECARIOCALES Univ. Rio de Janeiro 2893 1.45 
 
The following summary gives an overview of the IAM strategy for purchasing 
opinions.  IAM strategy elements are explained in greater detail in [Teacy, et al., 2007].  
The IAM agent purchases opinions from providers in order of least to greatest error 
variance ( 2
iOP
σ ), acquiring each additional opinion if adding the opinion decreases the 
cumulative expected variance by at least 15%.  The 15% error variance improvement 
threshold is empirically determined according to the given competition parameters in 
Table 4-2 (as demonstrated in Section 4.3.3, the optimal threshold for adding an 
additional opinion is dependent on opinion cost, cp, and client fee, f).  In similar fashion 
to the technique discussed in Ch  5.1.3 for selecting reputation providers, the IAM agent 






















IAM’s 15% error variance improvement threshold does not account for variations 
in opinion cost and client fee (justifiably so, since these parameters are fixed in the 
competition setting).  Section 4.3.3 describes how Adaptive Cost Selection, when 
implemented in place of the 15% variance improvement threshold, allows an agent to 
achieve net profits higher than those of an IAM agent, over a wide range of opinion costs 
and client fees, when the two agents compete against each other in the ART Testbed. 
4.3.3 IMPLEMENTING ADAPTIVE COST SELECTION IN THE ART TESTBED 
This section describes the implementation of Adaptive Cost Selection in an agent 
here called ACS-Agent.  ACS-Agent is based on the IAM strategy [Teacy, et al., 2007] 
(here called “IAM-Agent”), but replaces the 15% error variance improvement threshold 
with the Adaptive Cost Selection technique for purchasing opinions in all opinion cost 
and client fee situations.  The calculations presented here assume a single ACS-Agent 
competes against a single IAM-Agent. 
As does IAM-Agent, ACS-Agent relies on statistical estimates of each opinion 
provider OPi’s error (standard deviations, iOPσ ).  Until providers’ error standard 
deviations can be estimated (i.e. during the first two timesteps, t1 and t2), ACS-Agent 
selects a small number of opinions for each client’s painting: at least one opinion, but as 
many opinions nACS as can be purchased by using ten percent of the client fee earned by 
that painting: 
( ) ( )1 2
0.1max floor ,1ACS ACS
p
fn t n t
c
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⋅
= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. 
From the list of error standard deviations it maintains, ACS-Agent estimates the 
number of opinions per client, nIAM, an opponent IAM-Agent will purchase (from opinion 
providers with least to greatest error standard deviation, based on the 15% error variance 
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improvement threshold) and the error standard deviation, σIAM, of the IAM-Agent’s 














Based on its estimate of σIAM, ACS-Agent estimates the client shares of both itself and 
IAM-Agent (rACS and rIAM, respectively), in terms of its own potential aggregate appraisal 
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If equilibrium is assumed, then an agent’s previous share ( 'ar ) equals its current share 
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. Eqn 59 
Both agents’ NetProfit (earnings from client fees minus total opinion costs), 
( )ACS ACS ACS pNetProfit r f n c= −  and 
( )IAM IAM IAM pNetProfit r f n c= − , 
are estimated in terms of ACS-Agent’s potential aggregate appraisal error, σACS 
(substituting Equation 58 and Equation 59): 
 ( )IAMACS ACS p
ACS IAM
NetProfit C f n cσ
σ σ
⎛ ⎞
= ⋅ −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 and Eqn 60 
( )ACSIAM IAM p
ACS IAM
NetProfit C f n cσ
σ σ
⎛ ⎞
= ⋅ −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
. 
If ACS-Agent’s goal were to maximize its NetProfit, it could simply build a 
scenario table (as described in Section 4.1.3) in which AverageReward and 








= ⋅⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 and 
( ) ( ) ( )1ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACSMarginalReward n AverageReward n AverageReward n= − −  
Figure 4-30 shows MarginalReward of a provider’s opinions (yielded over all 
clients) as a function of opinion provider ranking iACS, for an example case in which 
ACS-Agent has a choice between ten opinion providers, 
iOP
σ  = 0.5 for all providers, C = 
200, and f = 100.  Unlike the situation in Section 4.1.4, in which cost (Cost(Ri)) is 
constant for each additional reputation purchased (Ri), in the ART Testbed, cost (here 
called MarginalCost) increases as ranking nACS increases, since ACS-Agent must 
purchase an additional opinion for each new client it acquires.  AverageCost, the total 
opinion costs for a given timestep, is computed as: 
( )IAMACS ACS p
ACS IAM
AverageCost C n cσ
σ σ
⎛ ⎞
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Figure 4-30. MarginalReward and MarginalCost (cp = 1, 5, 10, 20) as functions of opinion provider 
ranking, iACS ( iOPσ  = 0.5 for ten providers, C = 200, and f = 100). 
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( ) ( ) ( )1ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACSMarginalCost n AverageCost n AverageCost n= − −  
In Figure 4-30, MarginalCost is shown for example cases in which cp equals 1, 5, 
10, and 20.  Figure 4-31 shows NetProfitACS (Equation 60) for the cp = 5 case; ACS-
Agent’s NetProfit is maximized when MarginalCost = MarginalReward at nACS = 4.  
However, in some cases, selecting the highest NetProfitACS also results in a high 
NetProfitIAM.  Instead, ACS-Agent must seek to maximize its NetProfit advantage 
(advACS), where 
ACS ACS IAMadv NetProfit NetProfit= −  
( ) ( )ACSIAMACS ACS p IAM p
ACS IAM ACS IAM
adv C f n c C f n cσσ
σ σ σ σ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= ⋅ − − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
( ) ( )ACS IAM ACS p ACS IAM p
ACS IAM
Cadv f n c f n cσ σ
σ σ
⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦+
. 
In the equation for advACS above, all values are known (C, f, and cp) or estimated 
(nIAM and σIAM), except for ACS-Agent’s number of opinions per client to purchase (nACS) 
and resulting aggregate appraisal error (σACS).  To determine the number of opinions per 
client to purchase (nACS) to maximize advACS, ACS-Agent builds a scenario table, 
computing advACS for each scenario sn.  A scenario sn describes the resulting aggregate 
appraisal error (σACS) and NetProfit advantage (advACS) ACS-Agent achieves from 
purchasing opinions from providers 1 through n for each client (when providers are 
ordered from least to greatest provider error, 
iOP
σ ).  Figure 4-32 shows NetProfitACS and 
NetProfitIAM as functions of nACS (for the same case in which cp = 5 and iOPσ  = 0.5 for all 
providers).  NetProfitIAM decreases as nACS increases since ACS-Agent’s appraisal 
accuracy increases with more opinions, taking client share away from IAM-Agent.  
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Figure 4-31. MarginalReward, MarginalCost, and resulting NetProfitACS as functions of opinion 
provider ranking, iACS ( iOPσ  = 0.5 for ten providers, C = 200, f = 100, and cp = 5).  Maximum 
NetProfitACS is achieved when ACS-Agent purchases opinions the four providers with lowest expected 
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Figure 4-32. NetProfitACS, NetProfitIAM, and resulting advACS as functions of number of opinions 
purchased per client, nACS ( iOPσ  = 0.5 for ten providers, C = 200, and f = 100, and cp = 5).  Maximum 
advACS is achieved when ACS-Agent purchases (for each client) opinions from the six providers with 
lowest expected error. 
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4.3.4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS 
These experiments demonstrate that applying Adaptive Cost Selection to IAM’s 
strategy enables an agent to achieve higher profits, when competing against an IAM 
agent that is not equipped with Adaptive Cost Selection, across a range of values for 
opinion cost (cp) and client fees (f).  In the competition version of the ART Testbed game 
rules, confounding factors (such as an appraiser’s strategy for generating and selling 
opinions) influence net profit earnings.  Therefore, for the purpose of these experiments, 
limitations are placed on roles each type of agent plays.  Each game consists of one ACS-
Agent, one IAM-Agent, and ten “opinion provider” agents, which behave as follows: 
ACS-Agent: The ACS-Agent acts as an appraiser agent, executing the algorithm 
described in Section 4.3.3 (implementing Adaptive Cost Selection) with regard to opinion 
requesting and weighting.  All appraiser agents, including the ACS-Agent, may only 
requests opinions from opinion provider agents.  The ACS-Agent does not make opinion-
providing decisions, since neither appraiser agents nor opinion provider agents request 
opinions from appraiser agents.  Reputation-exchange is deactivated system-wide; 
therefore, ACS-Agents (and all other agents) make no decisions about requesting or 
providing reputations.   
IAM-Agent: The IAM-Agent acts as an appraiser agent, executing IAM’s 
strategy, as described in Section 4.3.2 (implementing the 15% error variance 
improvement threshold) with regard to opinion requesting and weighting.  In all other 
respects, the IAM-Agent behaves similarly to the ACS-Agent. 
Opinion Provider Agent:  Opinion provider agents are assigned expertise values 
(s*) which remain constant throughout a game.  Opinion providers are not considered 
competitors in these experiments.  Opinion providers do not act as appraisers for clients; 
therefore, they do not request nor weight opinions, nor do they earn client fees.  When an 
ACS-Agent or IAM-Agent requests an opinion, the opinion provider agent invests an 
amount cg, which is the same for every opinion generated.  
Experiment parameters are listed in Table 4-6 for Experiment 1 (cg = 10) and 
Experiment 2 (cg = cp).  Parameter settings α and q are identical to competition settings.  
Each game is run for 100 timesteps, and the average number of clients per agent is 100 
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(since opinion providers are not considered competitors, the total number of clients is 
200).  Results are averaged from twenty games for each combination of opinion cost cp (0 
to 24) and client fee f (50, 100, 200, or 500), where cp and f are constant throughout a 
game. 
Table 4-6. Parameters for Experiment 1 (opinion providers invest cg = 10 units when generating 
opinions) and Experiment 2 (opinion providers invest cg = cp). 
Game Parameter Value 
Average Number of Clients per Agent 100 
Number of Timesteps per Game 100 
Number of Competitors per Game 2 
Number of Opinion Providers per Game 10 
Opinion Accuracy Factor α 0.5 
Previous Client Share Influence q 0.1 
Client Fee f 50 to 500 
Opinion Cost cp 0 to 24 
Reputation Cost cr N/A 
Opinion Provider Investment in Opinion cg 10 or cp 
 
Results for Experiment 1 (in which cg = 10) show per-timestep NetProfit for both 
ACS-Agent and IAM-Agent as a function of opinion cost cp (Figure 4-33 (charts a-d) 
assumes client fee f equals 50, 100, 200, and 500, respectively).  For all values of f and cp, 
ACS-Agent earns NetProfit that is equal to or higher than its opponent, IAM-Agent.  
When f = 100 and cp = 10 (Figure 4-33b), ACS-Agent and IAM-Agent achieve the same 
NetProfit; since IAM-Agent’s 15% error variance improvement threshold is customized 
to those values of f and cp (competition settings).  The 15% threshold appears to generate 
highest possible NetProfit in cases where cp/f = 0.1 (as shown by f = 50 and cp = 5 in 
Figure 4-33a, and f = 200 and cp = 20 in Figure 4-33c).  Specifically, NetProfits for ACS-
Agent and IAM-Agent are statistically similar (α = 0.05) when cp = 4 for f = 50, cp = 6, 8, 
12, and 18 for f = 100, and cp = 12 to 24 for f = 200.  The difference between ACS-
Agent’s profit and IAM-Agent’s profit is greatest when cp is much greater or less than 
0.1f.  When opinion costs are very low compared to client fees, ACS-Agent takes 
advantage of the opportunity to buy many opinions per client, giving it a slightly lower 
appraisal error rate (and higher client share) than IAM-Agent, with only slightly higher 
 185
total opinion costs.  When opinion costs are very high, ACS-Agent sacrifices appraisal 
accuracy (resulting in a smaller client share) to avoid total opinion costs that would 
outweigh the benefit of more clients.   
Figure 4-34 displays results for Experiment 2, in which cg = cp (Figure 4-34, 
charts a-d, assume f equals 50, 100, 200, and 500, respectively).  Experiment 2 results are 
very similar to those of Experiment 1, demonstrating that the amount opinion providers 
invest in opinions does not affect whether ACS-Agent earns higher profits than IAM-
Agent.  In Experiment 2, ACS-Agent earns NetProfit that is equal to or higher than its 
opponent, IAM-Agent for all values of f and cp.  Specifically, NetProfits for ACS-Agent 
and IAM-Agent are statistically similar (α = 0.05) only when cp = 4 for f = 50.  Lastly, 
Figure 4-35 displays results showing ACS-Agent competing against the 2007 winning 
agent, IAM2-Agent, under Experiment 1 conditions, in which cg = cp (Figure 4-35, charts 
a-d, assume f equals 50, 100, 200, and 500, respectively).  For all values of f and cp, ACS-
Agent earns NetProfit that is (statistically) significantly higher than its opponent, IAM2-
Agent.  In many cases, the difference between ACS-Agent’s profit and IAM2-Agent’s 
profit is greater than when ACS-Agent competes against IAM-Agent.  Unfortunately, 
IAM2-Agent’s exact strategy has not yet been released to the public, so it is difficult to 
ascertain the reason for the difference in outcomes when ACS-Agent’s competes against 
IAM-Agent vs. IAM2-Agent. 
In summary, Adaptive Cost Selection enables the winning agent, in the ART 
Testbed competition, IAM, to better assess the utility of acquiring opinions, based on the 
cost of those opinions and the expected increase in appraisal accuracy (and thus, increase 
in client earnings).  Adaptive Cost Selection provides the highest improvement in 
NetProfit when cp/f is much greater or lower than 0.1, the ratio to which IAM is 




Figure 4-33. Per-timestep NetProfit for ACS-Agent and IAM-Agent as functions of opinion cost, cp, 
when client fee, f, equals (a) 50, (b) 100, (c) 200, and (d) 500.  Opinion providers invest 10 units in 
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Figure 4-34. Per-timestep NetProfit for ACS-Agent and IAM-Agent as functions of opinion cost, cp, 
when client fee, f, equals (a) 50, (b) 100, (c) 200, and (d) 500.  Opinion providers invest cp units in 
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Figure 4-35. Per-timestep NetProfit for ACS-Agent and IAM2-Agent as functions of opinion cost, cp, 
when client fee, f, equals (a) 50, (b) 100, (c) 200, and (d) 500.  Opinion providers invest 10 units in 
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4.3.5 ENCOURAGING REPUTATION EXCHANGE IN THE ART TESTBED 
This side discussion applies the quantitative analysis of when reputation-based 
trust modeling is most useful (discussion in Chapter 3) to the problem of encouraging 
reputation exchange in the ART Testbed.  As stated in Section 4.3.2, successful appraiser 
strategies in the 2006 and 2007 ART Testbed competitions do not make use of reputation 
exchange [Fullam, et al., 2006; ART Testbed, 2007].  Though interesting research 
advances still emerge from the competitions, this result is viewed as a weakness in the 
ART Testbed game design, since the ART Testbed is intended to serve as a forum for 
studying both experience- and reputation-based trust problems [Fullam, et al., 2005a].  
The goal of this section is to 1) analyze why reputation exchange is not useful in the 2006 
and 2007 competitions and 2) make recommendations, based on theoretical and empirical 
results from Chapter 3, for future changes to the ART Testbed game design to encourage 
reputation exchange.  Through informal communication, members of the ART Testbed 
competition’s organizing team have expressed enthusiastic interest in integrating the 
results of this research for future competitions. 
Experimentation to identify game changes that encourage reputation exchange is 
complex.  Existing agent designs from past competitions cannot be used in experiments, 
because those agents are not designed within the context of the new game rules.  
Competing agents must be designed to exploit the proposed rule changes, then resulting 
games must be observed to determine whether reputation exchange plays a role in 
appraisers’ success.  Competition is artificial if all competing appraiser agents are 
designed by a single researcher; results are dependent upon the quality of agent designs.  
The usefulness of reputation exchange is demonstrated if an agent whose strategy 
incorporates reputation exchange can achieve higher NetProfit than winning agents from 
past competitions; however, designing an agent that implements all strategy decisions 
required for success in the competition (including trustee-related decisions) is beyond the 
scope of this side discussion.  The proposed game changes should be implemented in an 
actual competition setting to determine whether successful competitors make use of 
reputation exchange, but competition implementation is an impractical requirement given 
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the time constraints of this research.  Nevertheless, it is useful to make recommendations 
based on theory and experimentation in Chapter 3. 
Experiments in Chapter 3 identify five influencers encouraging reputation 
exchange.  These influencers indicate that appraisers should rely on reputation-based 
modeling to determine from which opinion providers to purchase opinions when: 
Influencer 1: The number of opinion transaction observations (m) is low (Section 
3.2.1), 
Influencer 2: Opinion providers give inaccurate opinions, causing appraisers to 
transact less often and, therefore, obtain fewer transaction observations (Section 
3.2.2), 
Influencer 3: Opinion providers’ opinion accuracy changes quickly, meaning the 
number of transaction observations (m) between changes never grows large 
(Section 3.2.3), 
Influencer 4: Reputations are very accurate (Section 3.3.1), and 
Influencer 5: Reputation cost is very low, relative to profit benefit from reputation 
acquisition (Section 3.3.2). 
Decreasing the accuracy of opinion providers’ appraisals (Influencer 2) is not a 
promising option for encouraging reputation exchange in the ART Testbed.  First, game 
parameters cannot control opinion providers’ decisions regarding cg, the amount to invest 
in creating opinions.  Second, when s* and α are increased for all opinion providers, 
opinion error is likely to increase for all appraisers; since client allocations are dependent 
upon differences in appraisal error (not absolute magnitude of appraisal error), increasing 
s* and α are likely to not affect appraisers’ views of opinion providers’ trustworthiness.  
Alternatively, if the range of s* values is widened, the range of capabilities for producing 
accurate opinions is increased, and appraisers will transact with more accurate opinion 
providers while simply ignoring less accurate ones.  Increasing the accuracy of 
reputations delivered by reputation providers (Influencer 4) is not a viable option, either, 
because reputation providers’ decisions regarding reputation accuracy are not directly 
controllable by game parameters. 
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Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 describe how the 2007 competition, in an attempt 
to encourage reputation exchange, implements three changes to the game rules used in 
2006 [ART Testbed, 2007]: 
“Dummy” Agents: Fifteen dummy agents (five “cheating” agents, five 
“benevolent” agents, and five “neutral” agents) are added to each game to 
increase the total number of agents in the system (in an effort to activate 
Influencer 1 by slowing the number of observations per agent per timestep, 
assuming appraisers will purchase opinions from a limited number of opinion 
providers in each timestep).  This game change fails to encourage reputation 
exchange because competitor appraisers select a subset of best opinion providers, 
and build up experience-based models about opinion providers in that subset, 
since expertise changes occur rarely. 
Expertise Changes: Mid-game, unexpected expertise changes occur (zero, one, or 
two changes per game) in an effort to activate Influencer 3.  This game change 
fails to encourage reputation exchange because appraisers still have many 
opportunities (approximately 200, 100, or 67 timesteps, on average) to observe 
transactions and, therefore, build experience-based models, between expertise 
changes. 
Reputation Costs: Reputation cost is reduced from 1.0 to 0.1 in an effort to 
activate Influencer 5.  This game change fails to encourage reputation exchange 
because appraisers have little need for reputations anyway, given the first two 
reasons; under these conditions, reputation cost is unimportant. 
In an effort to slow the growth rate of an appraiser’s number of opinion 
transactions with each opinion provider (Influencer 1), one might consider changing the 
game rules to conduct each game with a very large number of agents (as is the purpose of 
inserting dummy agents in the 2007 competition), either dummy agents or duplicates of 
competitors.  In large systems with many dummy agents, an appraiser, who is limited by 
the opinion purchase cost in the number of opinions it can acquire, may be likely to select 
an adequate subset of opinion providers, building long-term experience-based models of 
the opinion providers in that subset.  When duplicates of competitors are inserted to 
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multiply the system size, the competition becomes susceptible to collusion among agents 
belonging to the same designer (a similar problem occurred during the 2004 Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma competition [Rogers, et al., 2007]).   
A more viable option for encouraging reputation exchange is derived by 
examining the method by which agents might form both reputations to communicate to 
other appraisers and their own experience-based models.  Because all appraisers begin 
the game with no trust models about other agents (acting as opinion providers), the 
reputations that appraisers provide to each other are inaccurate at the beginning of the 
game.  However, reputations increase in accuracy over the course of the game (in the best 
case, when reputations are reported truthfully), until there is a change in the expertise of 
the opinion provider whose reputation is being discussed.  At that time, reputations are 
again inaccurate but begin again to gain accuracy as each reputation provider observes 
more opinion transactions or receives more reputations.  Increasing reputation accuracy is 
modeled in Section 3.3.1.1, where Figure 3-29 compares error of a truster’s experience-
based model and reputation-based model when br = 2 (the truster’s reputation-based 
model is composed of twice as many transaction observations as its experience-based 
model).  Figure 4-36 shows an extension of Figure 3-29, illustrating the error of a 
truster’s experience-based model as compared against reputation models for which br = 2, 
5, 10, and 20.  When the truster relies on reputations representing many (for example, 2, 
5, 10, or 20) transaction observations for each of its own transaction observations in its 
experience-based model, the truster’s error is significantly reduced, especially early on, 
when it has only a few transaction observations building its experience-based model (for 
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Figure 4-36. Theoretical comparison of aggregate suggestion absolute value error for an experience-
based model (br = 1), as compared to reputation-based models (when br = 2, 5, 10, and 20) as number 
of transaction observations (m) increases.  Absolute value error for trustee behavior (σbeh = 1.0), the 
minimum achievable error, is shown as a baseline.  For clarity, solid lines are shown (m is discrete). 
 
A truster utilizing Adaptive Trust Modeling reduces its error further by combining 
both experience- and reputation-based models.  Figure 4-37 shows theoretical weights of 
a truster’s aggregate reputation-based model (assuming the truster weights experience- 
and reputation-based models according to Adaptive Trust Modeling) as a function of 
reputation-based model building factor (br).  A truster is more likely to weight its 
reputation-based model highly if the model is built from multiple reputation suggestions 
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Figure 4-37.  Theoretical weight of a truster’s aggregate reputation-based model (assuming the 
truster weights experience- and reputation-based models according to Adaptive Trust Modeling) vs. 
reputation-based model building factor (br). 
 
To encourage reputation exchange in the ART Testbed competition, game rules 
should ensure that opinion providers’ expertise changes often enough to ensure that the 
accuracy of an appraiser’s potential reputation-based model (depending on br) is 
consistently significantly higher than that of its experience-based model,  As shown in 
Figure 4-36, reputation-based models are most advantageous when m is small; this notion 
is reinforced by Figure 3-23 in Section 3.2.3, which shows that experience-based model 
weight decreases (reputation-based model weight increases) as the number of observation 
opportunities between trustee behavior changes (mmax) decreases.  As m increases, the 
difference in accuracy between an appraiser’s reputation- vs. experience-based model 
decreases until the cost of purchasing reputations outweighs the benefit of increased 
accuracy and client share gain.  Further, it must be remembered that a single reputation 
(with respect to a given era) impacts opinion-purchasing decisions regarding numerous 
clients in each timestep (an appraiser’s number of clients in a timestep with same-era 
paintings is equal to the appraiser’s client share divided by the number of eras, on 
average).  Therefore, a reputation’s MarginalReward (and cost cr the appraiser is willing 
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to pay) is significantly large if the number of eras is small.  Reputation cost (cr) should be 
set low enough to encourage appraisers to purchase reputations, yet high enough to give 
reputation providers an incentive to report truthful reputations (determination of an 
appropriate cr value requires experimentation).   
In summary, game rules for previous ART Testbed competitions have failed to 
encourage reputation exchange among competing agents.  Even recent suggestions from 
ART Testbed competition organizers ([Gomez, et al., 2007]) for game rule changes have 
failed to identify the suggestions presented here.  However, theoretical and empirical 
results from Chapter 3, identifying environmental factors influencing the effectiveness of 
experience- vs. reputation-based trust modeling, provide clues for improving ART 
Testbed game rules for future competitions.  It is hypothesized that reputation exchange 
is encouraged in the ART Testbed by 1) enforcing frequent expertise changes (to limit the 
maximum number of transaction observations building up experience-based models) and 
2) selecting an appropriate value for reputation cost (low enough to encourage purchasing 
but high enough to encourage communication of accurate reputations). 
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This research presents 1) Adaptive Trust Modeling for identifying how trusters 
may utilize both experience- and reputation-based trust modeling to achieve the most 
effective decision-making tool possible and 2) Adaptive Cost Selection for valuating and 
purchasing trust information.  This chapter summarizes the research presented, 
enumerates its contributions, and outlines possible future extensions and applications. 
5.1 Research Summary 
This research explores the following hypothesis: Experience- and reputation-
based trust models can be integrated to yield an aggregate trust model more accurate 
and cost-effective than either single model.  Chapter 3 examines how conditions of a 
truster’s environment impact its reliance on experience- vs. reputation-based trust 
modeling (Research Question 1), introducing the Adaptive Trust Modeling technique, by 
which a truster can optimally utilize both experience- and reputation-based modeling to 
achieve an aggregate model more accurate than either single model.  Chapter 4 introduces 
Adaptive Cost Selection, answering the question of how trust information should be 
valuated to assist a truster in acquiring trust information at a cost (Research Question 2). 
5.1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCING 
EXPERIENCE- AND REPUTATION-BASED MODELS 
Research Question 1 asks: How do characteristics of a truster’s environment 
affect the usefulness of the truster’s experience- and reputation-based models?  Chapter 3 
answers this research question through Adaptive Trust Modeling (Section 3.1), a 
technique for weighing the accuracy of experience- and reputation-based trust models.  
Adaptive Trust Modeling combines the two models for a more accurate aggregate model 
than using either single model or simply averaging, as demonstrated theoretically in 
Section 3.1.4.  Further, experiments show that Adaptive Trust Modeling achieves an 
aggregate model with greater accuracy than either experience- or reputation-based 
modeling alone across a wide range of system conditions, with variations in 1) 
availability of transaction observation opportunities (Section 3.2.1), 2) trustee 
trustworthiness dynamics (Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3), 3) accuracy of available 
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reputations (Section 3.3.1), and 4) cost of available reputations (Section 3.3.2).  The 
Error-Sensitive Translation technique described in Section 3.3.1.2 improves the usability 
of reputations from providers who are inaccurate, yet consistent, in the reputations they 
deliver.  Examination of experience- and reputation-based model weights assigned by 
Adaptive Trust Modeling given these varying system conditions reveal that the weight of 
a truster’s experience-based model increases as:  
1) The number of transactions (m) with the trustee, as observed by the truster, 
increases, since the truster is better able to model trustee behavior with more 
observations (Section 3.2.1), 
2) Trustee trustworthiness (μbeh) increases, since the truster is more likely to conduct 
transactions (and gain observations) if the trustee is perceived to be more 
trustworthy (Section 3.2.2), and  
3) The frequency of the trustee’s behavior change (changes in μbeh) decreases, since 
the truster is able to obtain more observations between changes (Section 3.2.3). 
Further, the weight of a truster’s reputation-based model increases as: 
1) The accuracy (σR,sug) of that reputation-based model increases (Section 3.3.1) and 
2) The cost (Cost(Ri)) of purchasing reputations decreases, since the truster is able to 
purchase more reputations, which yield a more accurate, aggregated reputation-
based model (Section 3.3.2). 
The experimental results of Chapter 3 refute the first three misconceptions 
identified in Section 1.4.  Misconception 1 states: “Large systems (with many 
trusters/trustees) always make experience-based modeling ineffective.”  From Section 
3.2.1, a truster’s experience-based model is effective as long as the truster continually 
observes enough transactions with each trustee it considers (in other words, if m reaches a 
high number, between changes in trustee behavior, μbeh, relative to the accuracy, σR,sug, of 
the truster’s reputation-based trust model).  Misconception 2 states: “Infrequent 
transactions always make experience-based modeling ineffective.”  From Section 3.2.3, a 
truster’s experience-based model is effective as long as the truster observes transactions 
more frequently than the trustee changes its trustworthiness behavior pattern (in other 
words, if m reaches a high number, between changes in trustee behavior, μbeh).  
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Misconception 3 states: “Inaccurate reputation providers are never useful.”  The Error-
Sensitive Translation technique described in Section 3.3.1.2 improves the usability of 
reputations from providers who are inaccurate, yet consistent, in the reputations they 
deliver.  Finally, the experimental results provide a practical application by identifying 
rule change suggestions for the ART Testbed competition with the purpose of 
encouraging reputation exchange among competing agents.  
5.1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: ASSESSING TRUST INFORMATION VALUE 
Research Question 2 asks: How should a truster assess the value of trust 
information (specifically, reputations), in light of the cost of that information, to 
determine what trust information to acquire?  Chapter 4 answers this research question 
through Adaptive Cost Selection (Section 4.1), a technique for valuating pieces of trust 
information (specifically, reputations) based on the marginal aggregate model accuracy 
they contribute and resulting increase in the truster’s average payoff.  By understanding 
the value of trust information, a truster can make decisions about the amount of risk 
exposure to accept (in terms of its transaction outlay) relative to expected net transaction 
payoff, given the truster’s amount of trust information available (Section 4.1.5).  
Experiments in Section 4.2.1 demonstrate that Adaptive Cost Selection achieves net 
payoff (transaction payoff minus reputation costs) equal to that of the best fixed-quantity 
selection strategy over a wide range of possible reputation cost values, Cost(Ri).  When 
the truster has access to a free experience-based trust model, in addition to purchased 
reputations, Adaptive Cost Selection purchases an efficient number of reputations, 
decreasing the number of reputations purchased as the accuracy of its experience-based 
model increases.  Further, experiments in Section 4.2.2 show that Adaptive Cost 
Selection need not rely on assumptions about average trustee behavior distributions.  By 
approximating average trustee behavior distributions over time, Adaptive Cost Selection 
achieves net payoff nearly as high as when average trustee behavior distributions are 
known.  In Section 4.3, Adaptive Cost Selection is applied to the ART Testbed domain 
problem, demonstrating that an agent employing Adaptive Cost Selection achieves higher 
total profits when competing against an agent not using Adaptive Cost Selection across a 
wide range of information cost values. 
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The experimental results of Chapter 4 refute the last three misconceptions 
identified in Section 1.4.  Misconception 4 states: “A truster can rely on experience-based 
modeling for low-value transactions, but should always acquire reputations when 
considering high-value transactions.”  Experiments in Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2  
show that both cost and accuracy of trust information should influence the truster’s 
decision to acquire trust information.  Misconception 5 states: “A truster should always 
acquire only the single or few ‘best’ reputations.”  Experiments in Section 3.3.2 show 
that the appropriate number of reputations to purchase depends on not only the accuracy 
of each reputation, but also on reputation cost and the availability of other free trust 
information (e.g. an experience-based model); when reputations are free or inexpensive 
(compared to the expected transaction payoff), a truster benefits from acquiring many 
reputations.  Misconception 6 states: “A truster should always rely on reputation-based 
modeling when it has no experience with a trustee.”  Section Section 4.1.5  demonstrates 
that when reputation costs are prohibitive, a truster may have decide whether to trust 
based on no trust information at all, basing its decision on the transaction’s risk.   
5.2 Contributions 
This research makes the following contributions to the field of agent trust 
research: 
Dynamic utilization of experience- and reputation-based trust models for 
effective trust-based decision-making: The agent trust research field has traditionally 
viewed experience- and reputation-based trust modeling as incompatible trust assessment 
techniques for disparate environments, as evidenced by research regarding one-to-one 
games [Crandall and Goodrich, 2004; Biswas, et al., 1999], which ignores the 
opportunity for reputation exchange, vs. referral networks [Yolum and Singh, 2003] and 
online reputation mechanisms [Dellarocas, 2000] which assume trusters have few 
opportunities for repeated transactions.  Recent work acknowledges scenarios in which 
both experience- and reputation-based trust assessment are useful, but techniques for 
combining both types of models are limited to static weighting [Barber and Kim, 2003] 
or rely on manual weight assignment based on the human designer’s intuition [Huynh, et 
al., 2004; Ramchurn, et al., 2004].  In contrast, Adaptive Trust Modeling enables a truster 
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to dynamically and automatically adapt its reliance on experience- or reputation-based 
trust as system conditions change.  Adaptive Trust Modeling transitions smoothly along 
the spectrum of experience- and reputation-based trust model utilization by translating 
environment factors (availability of transaction observation opportunities, trustee 
trustworthiness dynamics, accuracy of available reputation providers, and cost of 
acquiring reputations) into influencers of trust model accuracy.   
Quantitative analysis of experience- and reputation-based model tradeoffs 
for strategic trust modeling building: Humans often have an intuitive notion about the 
most appropriate type of trust modeling to use in a given environment.  However, the 
misconceptions outlined in Section 1.4 and the shortcomings of the ART Testbed game 
problem design (in failing to ensure the necessity of reputation exchange in successful 
strategies [Fullam, et al., 2006]) demonstrate how humans make mistakes in determining 
when to use experiences vs. reputations.  Further, humans have difficulty dealing with the 
ambiguity of questions (from Section 1.1) such as 1) When is transaction experience 
sufficient enough to rely on an experience-based model? 2) How frequently may a trustee 
change its behavior pattern yet still be accurately modeled by experiences? 3) How 
accurate must provided reputations be to make reputation-based modeling advantageous? 
4) At what point do reputations become too expensive to make reputation-based 
modeling feasible?  A quantitative analysis of the tradeoffs between experience- and 
reputation-based models eliminates misconceptions about both model types, providing 
human trusters with intuitive explanations for when each type of trust modeling, 
experience- and reputation-based, is most appropriate.  Adaptive Trust Modeling 
computes the optimal combination of experience- and reputation-based trust information 
to produce the most accurate aggregate model possible.  Further, analysis of experience- 
and reputation-encouraging environment factors empowers agents to make trust-related 
decisions to acquire the types of trust information they can utilize best.  If a truster has 
control over building its experience- and reputation-based models, knowing the system 
conditions conducive to each type of model instructs the truster about which type of 
model to invest in building.  An individual who benefits from a specific type of trust 
 201
modeling may seek out (or even influence) specific system conditions to encourage its 
preferred trust modeling technique.   
Valuation of trust information for cost-based reputation selection: Other 
research acknowledges the cost to produce trust information [Avery, et al., 1999], noting 
that cost of trust information acquisition should be minimized [Ghanea-Hercock, 2004].  
Incentive compatible mechanisms for reputation exchange [Jurca and Faltings, 2006; 
Huynh, et al., 2006] minimize a truster’s effort to acquire trust information, but do not 
address a truster’s problem of valuating trust information of varying accuracy.  Instead, 
Adaptive Cost Selection assesses the value of trust information, enabling a truster to 
analyze the cost vs. benefit of acquiring that trust information.  Adaptive Cost Selection 
is unique because it correlates trust model accuracy to transaction payoff, valuating trust 
information based on the marginal aggregate model accuracy increase attributable to a 
single piece of trust information.  By knowing the worth of a given piece of trust 
information, a truster can decide how much time, effort, and money it is willing to invest 
to acquire that information.  Further, Adaptive Cost Selection assists reputation providers 
in setting reputation costs, and trusters in negotiating reputation costs, when those costs 
are flexible.  The Adaptive Cost Selection algorithm described in this research assesses 
the value of individual pieces of trust information (in particular, reputations), with the 
understanding that trust information may have varying degrees of accuracy.  Adaptive 
Cost Selection minimizes the truster’s costs when acquiring trust information by 
determining exactly how much and which trust information to acquire.  Further, the 
algorithm identifies the optimal tradeoff between aggregate trust model accuracy and cost 
of acquired trust information to maximize the truster’s payoff from transactions with 
trustees.   
This research produces tools to aid both human and agent decision-makers in 
determining when to trust.  Adaptive Trust Modeling and Adaptive Cost Selection enable 
software agents to dynamically change modeling techniques based on varying 
environment factors.  Further, these technologies assist human users in complex trusting 
domains, computing the most effective combination of experience- and reputation-based 
trust modeling for given system conditions. 
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5.3 Future Extensions and Application 
The investigations presented here pave the way for numerous research extensions.  
First, Adaptive Trust Modeling calculations assume trustee behavior and trust model 
suggestions follow normal distributions.  While these assumptions are reasonable in 
many cases, future work can extend the types of distributions accommodated with more 
complicated computation.  Second, this research examines the links between only two 
types of trust modeling.  While experience- and reputation-based modeling approaches 
are two of the most well-studied trust modeling techniques in the agent trust research 
community, integration of other techniques, including group association and credentials, 
should be explored.  As an underlying theme, this research demonstrates that scenarios 
exist in which changing system conditions make necessary the use of multiple trust 
modeling types; additional trust modeling techniques can strengthen truster decision-
making in scenarios for which experiences and reputations fall short.  For example, when 
reputations are inaccurate and a truster has had no previous experiences with a potential 
trustee (e.g. the trustee is a medical doctor new to town with no previous patients), if the 
truster maintains trust models about trustees similar to the trustee in question, the truster 
may use group association make decisions regarding that trustee (the medical group 
practice to which the doctor belongs is well-known).  Further, if the truster has no 
experience with or reputations about any trustees in the system whatsoever, the truster 
will improve the quality of its trusting decisions if credentials are available for verifying 
the trustworthiness of the trustee (the doctor’s medical school records verify his 
capabilities).    
In addition, future work should examine limitations of Adaptive Trust Modeling.  
If an adversarial trustee knows the truster’s Adaptive Trust Modeling algorithm, it might 
attempt to cheat the truster, for example, by allowing the truster to build a very confident 
experience-based model (indicating high trustee trustworthiness), only to unexpectedly 
cheat later on in a single, large-value transaction.  Adaptive Trust Modeling provides 
robustness, helping prevent this scenario by enabling a truster to rely on both experience 
and reputation.  Further, risk assessment strategies as discussed in Section 4.1.5 
(conducting small-value transactions until trust models are sufficiently accurate) help 
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limit transaction losses.  Nevertheless, Adaptive Trust Modeling is only as accurate as its 
experience- and reputation-based models and its estimates of their error.  Future work 
must identify ways to thwart these strategic trustee cheating techniques.  
The Adaptive Cost Selection technique for valuating trust information provides 
insights into future work regarding reputation price negotiation.  Adaptive Cost Selection 
enables a truster to estimate the utility of each available reputation, then perform a cost-
benefit assessment with regard to each potential reputation purchase.  Therefore, trusters 
can use their utility estimates as guides when proposing prices they are willing to pay in 
negotiable-cost reputation markets.  Strategies similar to Adaptive Cost Selection can be 
explored for application by reputation brokers, who may use utility estimates for price-
setting.  Risk-management techniques can be investigated in scenarios in which a truster 
may determine the outlay it is willing to based on the transaction’s risk, as measured by 
the amount of trust information it has acquired. 
Finally, this research provides tools to overcome weaknesses in human trust 
decision-making regarding when to use experience- vs. reputation-based trust assessment.  
Humans frequently make mistakes when evaluating the trustworthiness of potential 
trustees, perhaps due to naïveté, irrationality, or emotion.  A natural extension of this 
work explores applications in which humans interact with the technology presented in 
this research.  For example, Adaptive Trust Modeling can be implemented in 
environments such as online social networks, where both experience- and reputation-
based trust modeling assist users in forming relationships.  Adaptive Cost Selection can 
be implemented for evaluating cost-appropriate recommendations from fee-based online 
referrals services.  Future research must address implementation issues; each tool must be 
introduced to the human user such that the user will 1) recognize the advantage of using 
the tool (motivation), 2) take time to use the tool (user-friendliness), and 3) follow the 
technology’s decisions over the human’s (confidence).  This research makes an important 
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